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1 Introduction to the Discursive Other 
 
The idea that innovation is a linear process in which scientists invent, businesses apply and 
consumers buy has been replaced by the notion of innovation as a co-evolutionary product 
of science, technology and society (Gremmen, 2007; Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2005; Rip, 2001). 
Funding bodies, government representatives and societal action groups demand that 
scientific experts pay more attention to ‘lay’ concerns in different technology development 
stages (Caron-Flinterman, 2005; Gaskell & Bauer, 2001). Lay concerns may refer to concerns 
of citizens or people in general, or concerns of prospective users or consumers of new 
technologies1. Involvement of users and people is particularly propagated when technologies 
are perceived to contribute to high-stakes societal issues – e.g. global food security – or if 
public resistance to new technologies is anticipated. Both high stakes and public controversy 
are characteristic of the plant technology science field in Europe and in the Netherlands 
(Duarte, 2011; Gaskell & Bauer, 2001; Leach et al., 2005; Rowe et al., 2005; Rowe & Frewer, 
2005). Dutch plant technology science is the setting in which data were gathered for this 
thesis.    
Scientific experts need to relate to the concerns of a great many others – users, 
citizens, consumers, representatives of industry or government. Experts may do this in 
different ways: they may talk with laypeople and prospective users of technology during so-
called public or open meetings, and they may talk about people and user concerns with the 
media or during expert or invitational meetings. How experts in technology development 
choose to relate to people and users very much depends on what relationship they have and 
aspire to have with people and users.  
Central to this thesis is how plant scientists discursively handle their relationships 
with the public or people as plant scientists refer to them, and prospective users of plant 
technology – crop producers (farmers) and crop creators (crop or plant breeders). Why focus 
on the relationship between science and society in the plant science field? The relationship 
between plant scientists on the one hand and laypeople on the other has been strained for a 
long time. Plant technologies such as genetic modification (GM) of staple crops are 
persistently met with public controversy in Europe despite, or perhaps because of, public 
engagement activities (e.g. see Gaskell & Bauer, 2001, 2006; De Krom et al., 2012; Wynne, 
2001). In particular, cross-breeding between different species to design food products is met 
with public resistance. Tinkering with food is framed as violating existing religious and 
species-based sociocultural classification systems (Douglas, 2002; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1983). For instance, tomatoes modified with pork genes may be unacceptable by some 
because relevant species’ boundaries are crossed. Furthermore, forms of genetic 
modification are often framed as unnatural and as potential threats to our health and safety 
(Marris, 2001; Wynne, 2001). The resistance to genetically modified crops occasionally 
becomes very tangible; sites where genetically modified crops are tested are with some 
regularity destroyed or damaged by action groups (De Krom et al., 2012; Duarte, 2011).  
                                                 
1
 Laypeople or laymen are a standard way of referring to non-experts. Because the term lay has a derogatory 
connotation in the context of this thesis, it is initially put between inverted commas; layness or ignorance is not 
a standalone category but tends to be constructed in opposition to expertise and as such tends to be negatively 
valued. The term lay is also inaccurate, that is, expertise or the lack thereof tends to be highly relative and 
context-dependent; one and the same person may be treated as either an expert or layperson depending on 
the subject under discussion and the interaction setting. In this thesis, I use the term laypeople unless the 
analytical focus warrants me to be more specific. 
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Bio-scientists have variously responded to people’s concerns and reactions to 
technologies such as genetic modification of food crops. Backed by the Dutch government, 
Dutch plant experts2 genetically modify staple crops, e.g. to make them disease resistant. 
However, these experts appear to have accommodated people’s concerns with regard to the 
transgression of species’ boundaries; they decided to adopt genetic modification based on 
intra-species plant breeding – cisgenesis – and to abandon the practice of cross-species plant 
breeding – transgenesis. Moreover, plant scientists and plant breeders are campaigning in 
Brussels for cisgenic modified crops to be exempted from stringent EU regulations on field 
testing and producing GMOs (Holm et al., 2013; Jacobsen & Schouten, 2008). 
Lay concerns are widely dismissed as irrational, emotional or irrelevant to science 
(Burchell, 2007a, 2007b; Cook, 2004; Cook et al., 2004). In contrast, bio-scientists including 
plant scientists tend to present themselves as rationally acting professionals. This is criticized 
by Cook (2004); he shows that plant scientists are prone to act emotionally themselves in 
talk about GMO. The typecasting of people and scientists in oppositional and mutually 
exclusive categories of irrational versus rational tends to spur some bio-scientists to engage 
in public education activities.  
An underlying assumption of many science education initiatives is that, if people 
understand science and technology better, then they will respond more rationally when 
confronted with new technologies (Besley & Nisbet, 2013). For instance, bio-scientists tend 
to consider people’s lack of knowledge of mainstream food production practices problematic 
because, according to them, this knowledge deficit at least in part explains why people’s 
expectations or preferences with regard to food are unrealistic or irrational (Meyer et al., 
2012).  
The focus of many bio-scientists on fixing the knowledge deficit of non-scientists has 
been widely criticized (Hansen et al., 2003; Wynne, 2006). One of the criticisms is that 
increased knowledge does not necessarily mean that people will come to share someone 
else’s views, attitudes and stances on a subject. A study of the Dutch Advisory Board on 
Genetic Modification (COGEM) that analyses patterns in arguments for and against genetic 
modification in agriculture shows that the well-informed – in the technical-scientific sense – 
do not necessary cease their opposition against GM crops (COGEM, 2007). Another critique 
is that many science literacy activities treat their audiences implicitly as passive recipients of 
knowledge, whereas research shows that people integrate new knowledge into what they 
already know and in alignment with their needs (Bucchi, 2004; Bucchi & Trench, 2008; 
Dietrich & Schibeci, 2003). Put differently, it is unlikely that education or lecturing alone is 
enough to bring plant experts and laypeople closer together with regard to the value and 
desirability of genetic modification (GM).   
  In the literature, the strained relationship between (plant) experts and laypeople is 
often attributed to a lack of trust in science (Cunningham-Burley, 2006; Wynne, 2006)3. 
However, research indicates that the public are critical of science and use scientific 
arguments to substantiate their claims and positions vis-à-vis scientists and non-scientists 
alike (e.g. see Bean, 2011; te Molder, 2012). Non-scientists’ use of scientific arguments 
                                                 
2
 The category of plant experts consists of various types of experts: academic plant scientists, experts from the 
plant breeding industry who do or do not supervise research, field experts and experts who combine relevant 
content expertise with communication expertise. Genetic modification of plants happens within and outside 
academia and involves various types of plant experts.   
3
 The mistrust hypothesis is not without its contradictions. Scientists want citizens to trust them more, but they 
also want citizens to act more rationally or objectively; simply relying on the authority of scientists is not very 
rational or objective.  
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seems to signal a trust in science as an institution, and the popularity of talk about scientific 
studies indicates that science has become an integral part of societal discourse (e.g. see te 
Molder, 2012). However, the latter also implies that individual scientists have fallen from 
their pedestal; they are increasingly asked to account for their scientific practices – probably 
because scientists have a less exclusive access to, and understanding of, science than they 
used to have.  
In the Netherlands and the world more broadly, the percentage of more highly 
educated citizens has grown substantially. Additionally, the advent of the Internet and social 
media has facilitated lay access to science and its debates. Because of these developments, 
people have gained a better understanding and, arguably, a better appreciation of science. 
Despite this, as Wynne (2001, 2005) has repeatedly pointed out, scientists and policymakers 
have largely failed to acknowledge that there are limits to the predictive knowledge of 
science and of what (part of) phenomena science can make sense in a meaningful manner – 
something of which the public are increasingly aware and critical (Epstein, 1995; te Molder, 
2012).   
Put differently, it appears that bio-experts need to find ways to relate to people who 
increasingly do not accept their concerns becoming sidelined in science–society debates. Or 
as Swierstra and te Molder (2012) argue, natural scientists should in particular seriously 
engage with so-called soft impacts – social, political and cultural impacts of emerging 
technologies that tend to be treated as soft by experts and policymakers – in order to 
produce technologies that optimally help to manage high-stake societal issues. Before 
relevant concerns of non-scientists may be sufficiently addressed in technology 
development, different steps need to be taken.  
A first step would be to investigate how, in real-life situated practices, experts 
involved in technology development in the life sciences, for better or worse, deploy their 
professional expertise relative to other forms of expertise: everyday knowledge and user 
knowledge (Epstein, 2011; Swierstra & te Molder, 2012; Haen et al., 2014, forthcoming). The 
benefit of focusing on real-life practices is that one may gain a better understanding of how 
plant experts deal with one another and other stakeholders in everyday interactions than by 
relying on what study participants say about their practices.    
One way of investigating how experts engage with user and lay concerns in 
technology development in real-life practices is by looking at how they talk with and about 
people and users in meetings centring on plant technologies. Talk or language in use is 
instrumental in achieving things (Austin, 1962). With language – formulations, statements 
and claims – people may unintendedly persuade or convince others, manage stakes and 
interests so as to protect the factuality of their descriptions, or, conversely, attribute them to 
others in order to undermine the objectivity of their talk (Potter, 1996). Plant experts may 
routinely deploy language or discourse in a way that leads to a serious, partial or no 
consideration of ‘soft’ concerns in technology development. Language use is learned and 
habitual in nature; people may therefore unwittingly reproduce dominant discourses on, for 
instance, technologies. Analysis may bring to light taken-for-granted or hidden consequences 
of talk.  
After insights are gained into the interactional consequences of plant experts’ 
references to Others, what happens when plant experts are given the tools to appraise the 
interactional consequences of their own talk in the past and the future can be explored 
(Haen et al., 2014; Lamerichs et al., 2009). 
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1.1        Aims and Research Questions 
A first aim of the thesis is to further insight into how and to what end plant technology 
experts – scientific and field experts – make ‘significant Others’ relevant in talk about or talk 
with people and users. In biology texts, it is common to treat non-humans such as plants and 
animals as actors who have agency and/or human traits (e.g. see Dorst, 2011; Drogosz, 
2012). Therefore, in talk, significant Others that are either human or non-human may be 
made relevant. Plant experts whose talk is analysed for this thesis are working on new and 
comprehensive ways to combat Phytophthora – a major plant disease that has been 
pestering potatoes and other crops for ages4. Plant experts – in particular plant scientists – 
appear to have a strained relationship with laypeople, users of plant technology and with 
Phytophthora. The aim of increasing understanding of how plant scientists make Others 
relevant in their talk can be translated in the following main research questions:  
 How and to what end do plant scientists discursively manage the science–society 
relationship? This question is addressed in chapter 3 by looking at plant scientists’ 
talk about laypeople.  
 What functions do references to users serve in talk focusing on technology 
development to combat Phytophthora in plant expert board meetings? This question 
is addressed in chapter 4.  
 How do plant scientists discursively represent Phytophthora and genomics to the 
public? And what may we learn from that? In chapter 5, this question is addressed by 
looking at the innovative (metaphorical) framing of Phytophthora and plant genomics 
– plant genomics is the proposed solution to Phytophthora. 
 
After insights are gained into the function of plant experts’ discursive constructions in face-
to-face interactions, these insights may be deployed to help realize a second aim: to explore 
whether plant experts can be empowered to appraise the interactional consequences of 
their own talk alongside the content of talk. Interactional consequences or effects of talk 
refer to how participants in talk-in-interaction, intentionally or not, construct laypeople or 
science in their talk and how this affects relationships, claims and decisional rights; who has 
superior rights or is best equipped to decide how lay, user and scientific concerns are 
weighed against one another in plant technology development? Put differently: 
 What happens when plant experts are given the tools to critically appraise the 
interactional consequences of their own talk? To what extent, and in what sense, do 
plant experts become self-reflective about their current communication practices?  
An attempt to turn plant experts into self-reflective communicators is reported upon 
in chapter 6. 
 
In the following section, the concept that connects the various studies of plant experts’ talk 
in this thesis – The discursive Other – is introduced.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Phytophthora is Greek for plant destroyer. It is the most important pest in potato crops, but other crops and 
plants are also greatly affected by varieties of Phytophthora. In the research programmes followed for this 
thesis, the oomycete Phytophthora Infestans is the main culprit (Kimmann et al., 2002).  
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1.2 The Discursive Other as Central Concept 
Studying how people relate to others is central to the social sciences: people depend on 
others for their survival, well-being and sustenance. Anthropologists tend to study the so-
called exotic Other in different cultures; economists look at transactions between (groups of) 
people or how people work together to satisfy their basic needs; psychology looks at how 
individuals’ self-image, intentions and behaviours are affected by others (Buchowski, 
2006).There are also studies that focus on processes of othering: classifying certain groups of 
people as Other to fit them in a hierarchy, to exclude them or to justify bad treatment of 
groups, people or differences in societal standing (e.g. studies focusing on racism, sexism and 
marginalization) (e.g. see Colligan, 1994).  
This study differs from these kinds of studies in that, in this thesis, the focus is on 
plant experts’ references to the Other in real-life real-time talk-in-interaction. Moreover, the 
focus is not on how talk about the Other affects this Other personally or socially. Rather, it 
looks at how experts discursively deploy references to Others who are not given the 
opportunity, or are not able, to speak for themselves. Insight into what talk about the 
relevant but physically absent Other accomplishes may help further understanding of how 
relevant Others matter in technology development.  
On a more abstract level, this study may shed light on how scientific plant experts 
may handle the problem of representation. Experts who develop technologies for society in 
society – like the plant scientists in this study – need to decide about whom to invite to 
participate in deliberations about technology, and they have to decide in what form they 
give invitees the opportunity to voice their own and others’ concerns.  
The concept of the discursive Other as used in this thesis is grounded in discursive 
psychology, the study of talk-in-interaction that propagates a non-cognitive view on the 
relationship between mind and language use (for more on discursive psychology, see section 
1.3). People may say things, not because they believe them to be true, but because they 
consciously or unconsciously feel that it is relevant to do so in a specific interaction setting, 
e.g. people may talk about Islam, not because they necessarily believe in its precepts or are 
strongly opposed to Islam, but because displaying knowledge and tolerance of Islam may be 
a relevant activity to avoid potential accusations of discrimination (Bonilla-Silva, 2002).  
In this thesis, the focus is on the interaction effects that people’s accounts 
intentionally or unintentionally project or generate in real-life settings, irrespective of 
whether people’s discursive actions reflect their inner feelings and thoughts. The concept of 
discursive action means that, with their utterances, participants in talk-in-interaction 
routinely manage identities, roles, rights and responsibilities relevant to particular real-life 
settings to effectuate various ends intentionally or otherwise. In expert–lay meetings, for 
instance, experts perform the discursive action of asserting their expertise in face-to-face 
meetings, e.g. by voicing or explaining jargon. By doing this, expert speakers may project 
discursively that they have superior access to a field of expertise. Demonstrated superior 
access to a knowledge domain may generate the interactional effect that co-participants in 
talk-in-interaction defer to speakers’ discursively displayed expertise and grant them 
superior decisional rights and responsibilities by default, e.g. by ultimately leaving the right 
and the responsibility to make decisions to people who act like experts in discourse.      
Thus, the aim here is not to discover whether what (scientific) plant experts think to 
be true about lay views is correct, but to discover what (scientific) plant experts achieve, 
consciously or otherwise, by saying particular things to, and about, Others in a range of 
different settings. To stress that in this study the focus is on the interactional achievements 
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of plant scientists’ references to Others and, thus, differs from most studies, the term the 
discursive Other is used rather than the Other (every reference to another, one could argue, 
is discursive in nature).  
As far as I know, the concept of the Other has not been used before as a central 
concept in discursive psychological studies, although it is used more broadly in the social 
sciences. The concept as used in this thesis has been inspired by various authors who have 
researched references to Others: anthropology’s concept of the exotic Other (e.g. see 
Buchowski, 2006), the concept of the generalized Other as developed by Holdsworth and 
Morgan (2007), Latour’s (1996) actants, Maranta et al.’s (2003) distinction between 
Individual LayPeople (ILPs) and General LayPeople (GLPs). From the perspective of discursive 
psychology – the main research approach of this thesis – the problem with these studies is 
that they generally deploy the concept of the Other, intentionally or unintentionally, as a 
concept that partly reflects people’s thoughts. The concept of the discursive Other is 
explicitly used in a non-cognitive way (as explained previously, see also section 1.3).  
 The correspondence between the concept of the discursive Other of this thesis and 
anthropology’s exotic Other is that the Other generally has subjugated societal status and 
less (discursive) power than the one who is doing the othering. The exotic Other tended to 
be seen as more primitive, less knowledgeable and less cultured than the White Man 
(Buchowski, 2006). A parallel can be drawn with expert–lay constructions. In the literature 
discussion in the introduction to this chapter, we have seen that bio-scientists tend to 
conceptualize laypeople as less rational, less consistent and more emotional than experts. 
Given that emotionality is valued less than rationality in society, scientists who call laypeople 
irrational can be understood to be establishing their superiority over laypeople by 
discursively representing them as less, as Other. Moreover, the process of othering tends to 
create ‘us’ and ‘them’ categories (e.g. see Buchowski, 2006). 
 The concept of the discursive Other of this thesis is also inspired by Holdsworth and 
Morgan’s (2007) concept of the generalized Other. Holdsworth and Morgan (2007) noticed 
during ethnographic interviews that informants frequently made references to Others in a 
generalized way. Their informants tended to refer to categories of people – mothers or the 
prototypical mother, fathers or the prototypical father, children or the prototypical child. Or 
they referred to a group of people they knew personally in the plural – e.g. the nephews, 
neighbours – or in more indeterminable vague references – e.g. they, people. Scientists’ 
references to non-scientists in the lay–expert literature also tend to be indeterminable and 
in the plural. Like the generalized Other, the discursive Other does not refer to concrete 
individuals but to categories of people, or the prototypical member of a social category.  
There are also differences between the discursive Other and the generalized Other. 
Holdsworth and Morgan (2007) use and adapt the concept of generalized Other in a 
cognitive way, that is, the generalized Other refers to people’s mental states. With this, they 
follow in the footsteps of the philosopher and sociologist George Herbert Mead who 
pioneered symbolic interactionism and introduced the term, the generalized Other (Mead, 
1962 [1934]). In this thesis, references to the Other explicitly do not refer to people’s 
thoughts.  
Latour (1996), who investigated the practices of natural scientists, was also an 
inspiration, albeit in a limited sense. He pointed out that agency or even freewill is not 
exclusively attributed to humans but tends to be ascribed to animals, plants and objects. 
Drogosz (2012) and Costa da Silva et al. (2009) show that Charles Darwin, the father of 
modern-day biology, attributed agency to plants and animals by personifying or humanizing 
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them in his texts. Darwin deployed this discursive strategy of personification to better 
describe and explain his theory of natural selection to lay or non-scientific audiences. 
Furthermore, like Holdsworth and Morgan (2007) and Maranta et al. (2003), Latour (1996) 
observed that references to Others may be generic. From his observations, Latour (1996: 2) 
extended ‘the word actor – or actant – to include non-human, non-individual entities’, 
thereby accommodating the empirical reality that scientists often attribute agency and 
freewill to plants and animals and refer to humans and non-humans in generic terms.   
The concept of the discursive Other follows Latour (1996) in that it acknowledges 
that experts may project agency and human characteristics onto non-humans such as plants 
and diseases in their talk. This, however, does not necessarily mean that experts who 
humanize plants and diseases in their talk actually believe that plants have human 
characteristics, nor does it necessarily mean that plant experts see plants as veritable 
interaction partners. Rather, it means that the humanization of plants and animals is 
apparently interactively relevant in plant experts’ text and talk. Latour’s principle of 
symmetry and the material-semiotic approach of actor network theory (ANT) is not followed 
in this thesis (e.g. see McLean & Hassard, 2004, for more on ANT and symmetry).  
Considering all the different takes on the Other as discussed above, I conceptualize 
the discursive Other in this thesis as follows:  
 
The discursive Other consists of references to human and non-human actors; Others are 
discursively treated as human(oid) agents in their own right and as relevant to the interactive 
management of a problem or dilemma in an interaction setting.  
 
The above definition implies that the discursive Other may vary across interaction settings. 
Moreover, the discursive Other: 
1. is treated as human or humanoid in talk-in-interaction. In reality, the discursive Other 
may be non-human. 
2. is not in, or not given, the position to voice concerns for him/her/itself. The Other 
central to the interactive management of a problem tends to be discursively present 
but physically absent.  
3. is central to (scientific) experts’ discursive handling of contradictory requirements or 
realities but does not necessarily reflect speakers’ actual beliefs or thoughts.  
 
The concept of the discursive Other serves to enable discussion and reflection on how 
laypeople and users matter interactively in plant technology development, either because 
they are the subject of plant experts’ talk or because plant experts talk about Phytophthora 
research in front of them. In the latter case, it is assumed that plant experts’ research 
accounts are prepared with a lay audience in mind.  
 
 
1.3 Main Research Approach: Discursive Psychology  
There are different ways of studying the Other in real-life, real-time practices. Arguably, the 
most widely known way of doing this is by engaging in participant observation for an 
extended time period in the setting of interest, as anthropologists or ethnographers aspire 
to do in their study of different cultures from an insider or emic point of view5. However, a 
                                                 
5
 Total participation in the field of interest is often not feasible. In practice, observation and participation are 
difficult to handle simultaneously by the researcher. Furthermore, the social status, knowledge and capabilities 
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less well-known and relatively young methodological approach is deployed in this thesis: 
discursive psychology (DP)6.  
Discursive psychology is a discourse analytical approach that assumes that language 
is the main resource people deploy to get things done. People use language in encounters 
with others to perform different actions such as asserting identities, persuading others of 
their standpoints and making claims (Potter, 1996). Actions performed by speakers may 
generate different interactional effects. For instance, asserting one’s identity as a consumer 
may serve to demonstrate that one understands and is sympathetic to consumer plights. 
Demonstrated understanding of consumer plights may then, in a next step, be deployed to 
legitimize judgements about these plights and so on. Ultimately, DP seeks to offer insights 
into how participants in talk-in-interaction (re)produce and handle societally relevant issues. 
Discursive psychologists are generally interested in the issues that speakers make 
relevant in specific interaction settings. They ask themselves: Why does this speaker say this 
right now? What discursive ends do speakers who respond to one another’s utterances, 
(intentionally or unintentionally) further by corroborating or negating claims or descriptions 
of events, people and processes? These questions are relevant because people may word 
things in various ways; depending on the timing and wording of events, people and 
processes, speakers may enable or project various responses to their talk and, thus, generate 
different interactional effects.  
One and the same utterance may be heard or interpreted in different ways by 
recipients of talk. The rhetorical principle in DP makes use of this feature of talk-in-
interaction (e.g. see Edwards, 1997; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). DP analysts deploy 
knowledge of what could have been said by participants in talk-in-interaction to determine 
the significance and import of a speaker utterance, or speaker utterance and recipient 
response. Words, sentences and other units of language are imbued with sociocultural 
meanings that speakers may deploy for their various interactional purposes. For instance, if 
one wants to say something about the general population of a country, one could use 
different nouns to talk about people in a general sense, e.g. citizens and consumers. 
Although these words share a common ground, they all come with their own set of 
connotations. Citizens are members of society owing loyalty to a state and are entitled by 
birth or naturalization to be protected by a state or nation; they are associated with 
democracy, public life, rights and obligations, e.g. citizens have the right to vote and have to 
pay taxes. In contrast, consumers are understood to be persons who buy goods such as food 
and clothes to satisfy their personal needs. They are associated with the economy, 
individualism, capitalism, consumption, households, purchasing power. These differences in 
the sociocultural connotations imbued in nouns and other units of language enable different 
discursive actions and may generate different interactional effects – if one wants to delegate 
people’s concerns to the private sphere, this may be accomplished more easily by using the 
term consumer than citizen; the term consumer is already associated with the private 
sphere, whereas the citizen category is associated with the public sphere.  
In line with its action orientation, DP treats expertise and social identities as unfixed 
characteristics of people7. Personal characteristics or epistemic status need to be asserted or 
                                                                                                                                                         
of informants may make participation impossible or very difficult. For instance, to participate in science or top 
sport, researchers need to have specialized capabilities to be able to engage in participant observation.  
6
 Discursive psychology was founded by Jonathan Potter and Derek Edwards at Loughborough University, UK. In 
2012, DP’s 25
th
 anniversary was celebrated. 
7
 This stance on expertise can also be found in studies that focus on the performative function of talk without 
deploying DP (e.g. see Carr, 2010). 
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projected in talk-in-interaction in the interaction setting of interest  – e.g. public debates –
before characteristics or statuses are considered valid in DP analysis (Heritage, 2012). For 
instance, the question What do farmers say about the technology? directed at a crop advisor 
makes crop advisors’ expertise with regard to farmers discursively relevant. Furthermore, 
the questioner in the example shows himself, perhaps unwittingly, to be less knowledgeable 
on the subject of farmers than the crop advisor who is asked to share his knowledge. 
Depending on the uptake of the question by the crop advisor, the projected epistemic status 
of the crop advisor may be confirmed or not.  
Now, I use an example to illustrate how discursive psychological analysis works. The 
example is taken from a recorded expert board meeting (for a DP analysis of user-references 
during expert board meetings, see chapter 4) and is transcribed using Jeffersonian transcript 
notation (Jefferson, 2004). After transcription, the fragment was translated from Dutch to 
English. It is early in the meeting and the chair is engaged in the interactional business of 
checking whether participants have followed up on the action points assigned to them at the 
previous meeting. Details on transcript notation can be found in the appendix at the end of 
this chapter.  
 
Example 1  
1 Chair: Second action point.  
2  That’s about the Organic Centre 
3 P2: (0.3) she cancelled yesterday 
4  P3: Well, did that meeting take place or not? 
5 Chair: No 
6 P2: Or heard something? 
7 Chair: Well, now it probably will not happen anymore (.) 
8   Action point for P2 
9 P2: That was about research we would do for MP (.) 
10  with that we are now one step further 
11 Chair: °Done° (.) ok, thank you (.) report? 
12 P3: We go, I think, very very fast about closing the organic thing 
13  ((two lines omitted)) 
14  I think it is really too easy 
15  that people join our meetings=  
16 Chair: =yes= 
17 P3: =and then say a lot of things and then not show up  
18  yes, that is not the way it works for me 
19 Chair:  for me neither (0.3) my proposal is to stop wasting words on the matter 
20 P3: oka:y 
21 P4: I know also that the Ministry is taking it seriously too… 
                             (Px= participants) 
 
The example shows a lot of interaction between various participants (Px) and the chair. This 
means that the participants’ proof principle, that is,recipient uptake can be applied in 
analysis alongside the rhetorical principle. The chair of the meeting generally checks action 
points quickly, after which he moves to the first item on the agenda. However, in this 
example, the chair is forced to deviate from business as usual to address an issue brought up 
by P3.  
In line 3, P2’s response to the chair’s statement about action point 2 is a first 
indication that action point 2 is being differently treated than other action points, namely, P2 
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does not say anything about the action point – what is the standard course of action – 
instead, he says something about the person who is responsible for following up on action 
point 2: she cancelled yesterday.  
In line 4, P4 says: well, did that meeting take place or not? Generally, participants are 
expected to follow up on action points irrespective of whether or not they are able to attend 
the meeting. Thus, P3’s query can be understood as an attempt to go back to business as 
usual, namely, checking whether action points are completed.  
The chair’s answer in line 5 is negative and indicates that he already knew that the 
action point was not completed; P2’s subsequent query in line 6: or heard something? 
indicates that he treats this action point the standard way by inquiring how the action point 
will be effectuated later on.  
In line 7, the chair provides a negative assessment of whether the action point will be 
completed. In particular, the now in the response indicates that something is the matter. 
Later in the meeting, it will become clear that the Organic Centre participant did not just 
excuse herself for the current meeting but for all future meetings and that she has no 
successor who will in future represent the Organic Centre. The chair does not dwell on the 
matter or expand his assessment in line 7. The action point is checked, so he moves on to the 
following action point in line 8 that is the responsibility of P2. P2 corroborates the chair’s 
action by responding to the chair’s query regarding his action point.   
 Then, in lines 12–18, P3 opens the Organic Centre issue by providing a negative 
personal assessment of people, that is, relative outsiders who violate meeting norms by 
claiming a lot of attention during meetings but do not show up when it suits them better 
(the I think in line 14 signals that it is a personal assessment). P3 uses the generic people, but 
it is clear from the foregoing discussion that the representative of the Organic Centre is 
implicated (the latter is more explicitly stated later on in the discussion not shown here). 
Subsequently, in line 19 the chair acts in alignment with P3 by agreeing with P2’s negative 
assessment; however, simultaneously he attempts to redirect the discussion to the 
unfinished business of checking all action points by providing the following statement: For 
me neither (.) My proposal is to stop wasting words on the matter. Stop wasting words is an 
extreme case formulation.  
Extreme case formulations are descriptions that seek by their design to persuade 
listeners that what is stated is believable or reasonable (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998: 209–
210). In this case, the extreme case formulation signals that the chair agrees with P3’s 
concern on a personal basis and in sentiment – what happened is totally not done – and it 
signals that, different from P3, the chair does not want to talk about the matter, at least not 
right now, given the interactional business at hand. But exactly the opposite happens after 
this statement. In line 21, P4 aligns himself with P3 by confirming the legitimacy of P3’s 
concerns. Moreover, P4’s action increases the legitimacy of P3’s concern further by stating in 
line 21 the Ministry is taking it seriously too.... In other words, what started as an action 
point that an absent participant did not complete turns into a much bigger issue about which 
the Ministry is reportedly concerned.   
 After P4’s contribution in line 21, a minutes-long discussion ensues devoted to the 
actual participation of organic plant breeding representatives versus their desired 
participation in the expert board meetings, before the participants return to the business as 
usual of checking the remaining action points (not included in Example 1).  
Example 1 shows that DP analysts need to have some knowledge of the participants, 
context and interaction setting to be able to assess utterance plus recipient uptake (see also 
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Koole, 1997). In Example 1, for my analysis I used knowledge of how action points are 
discursively handled during meetings in general and how action points tend to be 
discursively handled in expert board meetings in particular. I also deployed knowledge of 
general discursive trends in the data corpus of recorded expert board meetings in the 
analysis of this specific fragment of talk-in-interaction.   
 
The Non-Cognitive Focus of Discursive Psychology  
As already mentioned, an important feature of discursive psychology is that DP analysts 
systematically refrain from attributing underlying cognitive states to speakers’ utterances 
(Potter, 1996; Edwards, 1997; te Molder & Potter, 2005). On the basis of the actions that 
speakers perform with their talk and the consequences of speakers’ discursive actions, one 
cannot say for sure that: ‘the speaker thought this, or the speaker intended that while saying 
this’.   
Moreover, as Example 1 shows, what talk-in-interaction accomplishes depends on 
two or more people: a speaker and the recipient(s) of that talk. An individual speaker cannot 
be held totally responsible for the interactional consequences of his or her talk-in-interaction 
with others.  
Perhaps more importantly, attributing mental states to speakers may thwart an aim 
of discursive psychology and an aim of this thesis: exploring what happens when speakers 
are stimulated to be self-reflective about the interactional consequences of their talk with 
others. DP analyses may empower speakers to improve their talk. They can enable certain 
interpretations of their talk and discourage others, although speakers cannot totally direct 
how recipients will interpret their talk. Speakers may affect recipient uptake and with that 
the interactional effects that talk-in-interaction generatesThus, it may help if speakers are 
(made) aware of the sociocultural inferences imbued in their utterances.  
From an early age, children are taught the meaning of language, what they are 
allowed to say when, and how they should perform discursive actions such as requesting 
something of someone. People are also taught how they should respond to talk of others: if 
a child is asked something, it is taught to answer; if it is reprimanded, it is taught to 
apologize. The latter aspect of language education has to do with the social organization of 
talk, also known as sequence organization: different types of utterances such as questions or 
descriptions are not randomly combined. For instance, questions tend to be followed by 
answers, not the other way around. Given that people’s language use is highly routinized, 
speakers may not be sufficiently aware of how they may deploy the inference richness of talk 
and the sequence organization of talk consciously to influence the interaction effects that 
they project with their talk.  
Speakers who initiate speech are free to choose how they do this as long as they 
orient their responses to social conventions. For instance, speakers may start their talk with 
a personal anecdote or refer to facts. A personal anecdote is generally reciprocated by a 
show of empathy and/or a personal anecdote of the recipient, e.g. I have that too! Last 
week…, whereas, if one initiates a topic by referring to facts heard or read about, recipients 
are likely to orient their responses to the facts rather than to the person who is introducing 
the facts. Thus, if one seeks to invoke empathy from one’s audience, telling a personal 
anecdote may be a more effective discursive strategy than sticking to the facts is likely to be.  
 To sum up, discursive psychology is a discourse analytical approach that focuses on 
people’s talk-in-interaction. DP analysts deploy the social organization of talk and the 
inference richness of language and recipients’ uptake of talk to find out how people 
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discursively manage identities, stakes and interests, problems and dilemmas. Additionally, 
DP analysts seek to systematically refrain from implicitly or explicitly attributing mental 
states to people; people’s talk can be observed directly, whereas people’s thoughts cannot. 
Moreover, people can, but do not necessarily, act in keeping with their attitudes and beliefs. 
Discursive psychologists are primarily interested in the interactional ends for which speakers 
use language, intentionally or not; they are not interested in people’s thoughts and beliefs 
per se, unless they invoke these thoughts and beliefs in their talk to conduct interactional 
business.  
 Because discursive psychology is a relatively new and little-known research approach 
in the social sciences, I explain in the following fairly detailed subsection the practical 
methodological aspects of discursive psychology. 
 
Requirements that Discursive Psychology Imposes on Data 
To be able to conduct a discursive psychological analysis, datasets should meet several 
requirements. Monologues are more difficult to analyse with DP than dialogues because 
recipient uptake is absent or delayed, e.g. because people are only allowed to ask questions 
after lectures. 
 Furthermore, discursive psychological analysis takes into account non-verbal aspects 
of talk such as tone of voice, speed of speech, loudness of speech, in-breaths, pauses in talk 
and so forth. For that purpose, Gail Jefferson developed the so-called Jeffersonian transcript 
notation (Jefferson, 2004). Jeffersonian notation has become the standard in conversation 
analysis (CA) and DP. The attention to detail in DP transcription and analysis requires that 
talk-to-be-analysed should be audio or video-recorded (see also Wiggins & Potter, 2007). 
Without recordings, one cannot transcribe pauses in tenths of seconds, in-breaths and so on.   
 Discursive psychology is also characterized by a focus on naturalistic talk-in-
interaction; the DP analyst preferably does not take part in the talk-in-interaction under 
analysis. Potter (1996: 135) explains this with his dead social scientist test: interaction is 
naturalistic in nature when the interaction takes place irrespective of whether the 
researcher is alive or not. For this reason, many DP and CA practitioners are reluctant to 
analyse research interviews (for notable exceptions, see De Kok, 2008; Myers, 1999; 
Roulston, 2006). However, research interviews can be analysed with discursive psychology, 
as chapter 3 of this thesis demonstrates.  
 Finally, discursive psychology is very time-consuming. The standard time investment 
for Jeffersonian data transcription is 20 hours per audio recorded hour of talk-in-interaction, 
whereas the standard for verbatim transcription in the social sciences is approximately eight 
hours per recorded hour of talk. Put differently, if one wants to conduct a discursive 
psychological analysis, one needs to have the time to do so. Moreover, one also needs to 
consider whether a discursive psychological analysis is necessary to generate the kind of 
insights one seeks. Discursive psychology may offer unique insights into the interactional 
dimension of human action. However, some of the insights one may gain from discursive 
psychological analysis can also be gained by other means, possibly in less time, e.g. by 
observing the phenomena of interest for an extended period of time. In the latter case, the 
so-called parsimony principle is worth considering: do not spend more time or effort on 
arriving at the kind of insights you need than is necessary (e.g. see Braithwaite, 2007). 
Parsimony is a criterion that funding organizations tend to take seriously.  
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When and Where to Apply Discursive Psychology  
Discursive psychology is particularly useful if talk-in-interaction is the main arena where the 
action takes place that is of interest to the researcher. There is, furthermore, a requirement 
for the researcher to get permission to record the talk-in-interaction of interest8. Taboo 
subjects – topics that people are unwilling to discuss or find difficult to talk about in front of 
a recording device – are generally difficult to analyse with discursive psychology. Also, 
subjects that people are not free to discuss with outsiders – trade secrets or classified 
information – are difficult to research with discursive psychology, if only because one is less 
likely to get permission to record talk-in-interaction. In contrast, discursive psychology 
thrives on ordinary casual everyday conversations, public discussions and debates.  
The usefulness of discursive psychology also depends on the nature of one’s primary 
research interest. If one seeks to understand people’s world views or ways of thinking, 
discursive psychology is not the obvious choice. As already stated, discursive psychologists 
analyse what mental states, events, descriptions speakers choose to make relevant and what 
ends these voiced states, events and descriptions serve, intentionally or not. Discursive 
psychology is also of little use if one’s primary research interest is to identify causal 
relationships between different phenomena. Causal relationships are almost impossible to 
ascertain with discursive psychology (Arminen, 2000). However, if one wants to investigate 
how people deal with dilemmas in different social contexts, or if one is interested in how 
people conduct complex tasks in interaction with others, or what the interactional impact is 
of what people say when and where, one may consider deploying discursive psychology (e.g. 
see Potter, 1996). Discursive psychology is also worth considering if one thinks that insight 
into what facts or descriptions do in a particular interaction setting may help resolve 
complex problems. 
  
 
1.4 The Research Environment: Disease Management with Plant (Genomics) 
Technology  
This thesis focuses on Dutch plant experts’ understanding of non-experts in real-life face-to-
face settings. To familiarize myself with this, I observed and recorded meetings that all 
focused on the plant disease Phytophthora Infestans in potato crops in different but closely 
related Phytophthora research programmes; all these programmes try to reduce 
Phytophthora to manageable proportions with the help of genomics knowledge, that is, 
knowledge of the genome. To fight Phytophthora, plant scientists collaborate with different 
plant experts employed in the plant breeding industry or in non-academic government-
funded organizations.  
Different Phytophthora programmes use different strategies to make potato crops 
late blight resistant (late blight is another name for Phytophthora). Some programmes 
deploy classical breeding techniques; others use forms of genetic modification (GM). The 
generic justification that plant experts provide for the use of GM in staple crops is that GM 
can speed up the crop-breeding process. The latter is necessary, experts maintain, because it 
takes plant breeders longer to develop a new resistant potato variety with classical breeding 
techniques than it takes Phytophthora to breach disease-resistance of potatoes. Diseased 
potatoes are considered problematic because potatoes are the third staple crop in the world 
and a major Dutch export product. Additionally, plant experts followed in this study develop 
and propagate decision support systems that aim to help crop producers and crop creators 
                                                 
8
 For anthropological analysis, recordings are not necessary per se.  
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decide what agrochemicals they should spray when and where in order to keep 
Phytophthora under control. Some experts involved in the study also try to better 
understand and change Phytophthora’s genetic makeup. The research programmes have to 
deal with action groups and people who destroy test fields on a recurring basis.   
The research programmes followed for this thesis work closely together. Plant 
experts assume that Phytophthora may only be definitively kept under control if crop 
creators and crop producers use different strategies in tandem, that is, if it is possible at all 
to create and maintain durable Phytophthora resistant potato crops in large-scale crop 
production systems typical of developed countries. Exchange of ideas between the different 
programmes is considered crucial to ensure that different Phytophthora management 
strategies complement one another seamlessly. Therefore exchange of ideas, knowledge and 
findings are structurally facilitated in a number of ways across research programmes. For 
instance, senior scientists are assigned to two or three research programmes that deploy 
different Phytophthora management strategies. Plant experts may act in one programme as 
project or programme managers and in another as board members or consultants. 
Furthermore, different research programmes present their work and findings together at 
self-organized and other-organized public meetings9. And last but not least, many senior 
scientists participate in an expert board connected to several Phytophthora research 
programmes.  
 Disease management in staple crops differs greatly from how illnesses in humans are 
treated. In biomedicine, the focus is on curing patients and on motivating people to cease 
behaviour that increases the occurrence of disease. In contrast, in crop agriculture, diseased 
plants are not cured, nor do plant scientists try to change the behaviour of crops to prevent 
the incidence of disease. Instead, disease management in crops focuses on changing the 
genetic makeup of healthy crops, changing the behaviour of crop producers and on other 
less invasive crop protection strategies in order to create or maintain disease resistance in 
crops.  
Most people who are not professionally involved in plant breeding know little about 
plant breeding and its societal impact. Therefore, the following subsection focuses on what 
plant breeding is about and explains some key plant breeding concepts used in expert and 
public meetings analysed in this thesis. Some basic understanding of plant breeding concepts 
may further elucidate what is at stake in expert–lay interactions in crop technology science. 
It may also give an inkling of what may be gained from discursive analyses in this field.  
 
Societal Relevance of Crop Breeding  
Plant or crop breeding is a deliberate human effort to change aspects of plants to perform 
new roles or to enhance existing functions of plants. The changes made in plants are 
heritable (Acquaah, 2007: 3). Plant breeders are professionals who manipulate plant 
attributes, structure and composition to make them more useful to humankind. Usually, 
breeders specialize in a group of plants. For instance, breeders may develop plants that resist 
pests so farmers can apply smaller amounts of chemicals to protect their crops against 
plagues and diseases. Or breeders may develop high-yielding crop varieties so that farmers 
can produce more for industrial and consumer markets. The latter improves farmers’ 
incomes and accommodates consumer demand for food products.  
                                                 
9
 For instance, the Dutch National Agricultural Organization (LTO) also organizes public meetings at which 
Phytophthora research is presented. Some of these meetings are included in the dataset.  
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The term cultivar is generally reserved for new crop varieties that breeders 
purposefully create (Acquaah, 2007: 4). Plant breeders also maintain the characteristics and 
quality typical of certified varieties. They do this because characteristics of a particular 
variety may change over time due to changes or mutations in its genome and environmental 
influences. For commercial purposes, it is important that crop varieties of staple crops such 
as potatoes remain constant in taste, colour, smell, structure, yield, disease susceptibility. 
Plant breeders use different technologies to modify existing plant varieties or to 
create new cultivars: classical breeding techniques, genomics and genetic modification. For 
instance, they deploy classical breeding techniques to enhance the flavour of a tomato. 
Classical breeding involves the selection and nurturing of a specimen of a certain crop variety 
provided by nature that exhibits the desired trait. The plant breeder selects in every 
generational cohort for further breeding the offspring that exhibit the desired traits best and 
throws away the specimens that do not live up to expectations. Consequently, plant 
breeding is sometimes also called the art of throwing away (personal communication from 
an expert from a breeding company). A problem associated with traditional breeding 
practices is connected to this continuous throwing away: it decreases the diversity of the 
crop’s gene pool; less genetic variety is associated with higher disease susceptibility in crops. 
To develop a new variety that exhibits reliably, the desired traits may take longer 
than 10 years with classical breeding techniques. The long time span involved in creating or 
enhancing crop varieties is considered problematic, in particular in large-scale agricultural 
mono-crop production systems typical in developed countries such as the Netherlands. In 
these large-scale food production systems, harvests tend to be vulnerable to diseases; this 
causes crops to succumb to disease before a new, more resistant variety is developed. 
 To manage problems such as these, plant breeders and scientists have 
supplemented non-technological disease management strategies with new technologies 
such as genomics. Barnes and Dupré (2008: 400) define genomics as both knowledge and 
technology: genomics is knowledge of the genome and the application of genomics 
knowledge – technology – for different purposes such as genetic modification. It is also 
argued that genomics is technology that requires knowledge about doing: ‘technology is 
more properly interpreted as the codified and abstracted knowing about doing; about 
practices, about means to ends, and technical systems’ (Bond, 2003: 126). 
Plant scientists and plant breeders deploy genomics technology for different 
purposes: to speed up the classical breeding process or to create new varieties that cannot 
be obtained with the help of classical breeding techniques (Rommens et al., 2007). For 
instance, breeders may use genomics knowledge and techniques to transfer a desirable gene 
from a mouse into a tomato in order to create tomatoes that exhibit the desired trait. This 
transference of genes between different species that cannot sexually reproduce outside the 
laboratory – the so-called cross-breeding of non-crossable species by sexual hybridization – 
is called transgenesis. This means that transgenesis cannot be accomplished with classical 
breeding techniques. Transgenesis and its younger brother cisgenesis are forms of genetic 
modification.  
Cisgenesis differs from transgenesis: in cisgenic plant breeding, genes are used only 
of species that are crossable in nature. For that reason, this form of genetic modification is 
said to mimic nature (Holm et al., 2013; Rommens et al., 2007). According to Holm et al. 
(2013), scientists introduced the cisgenic concept internationally in 2006, and field trials with 
a variety of crops are on the way or have pending applications for deregulation. Application 
procedures may take years. As a result, there is a considerable delay between what scientists 
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come up with in the laboratory, the actual testing of varieties that have been modified in the 
field and the introduction of modified crops on the market. The delay caused by application 
procedures is considered by some plant experts as undesirable or unnecessary (Levidow et 
al., 2000; Schouten et al., 2006).  
The scientists whom I followed in my research alternately use classical breeding 
techniques, forms of genomics technology or cisgenesis. They all deploy complementary 
non-genomics disease management strategies such as the removal of offshoots of 
potentially infected crops after harvest. These indirect strategies aimed at decreasing plant 
susceptibility to disease – e.g. soil management and plant nutrition – are not the main focus 
of the research programmes on which this thesis draws and therefore are not further 
discussed here10.  
 
 
1.5 Data Gathered in the Setting of Plant Technology Science  
I collected, recorded and observed different naturalistic face-to-face encounters to explore 
experts’ talk on Phytophthora research. I also conducted ethnographic interviews with plant 
experts who at the time of the interviews were or had been connected to the research 
programmes and projects followed11. Furthermore, I spent one day a week for three years at 
the plant science group. Annual reports of the programmes and materials used during 
meetings, such as PowerPoint slides and/or hand-outs provided during meetings, were 
collected to aid transcription and analysis of data12.  
Additionally, I observed and audio-recorded different sets of meetings. The exception 
is the two workshops that I organized together with, respectively, Prof. Dr te Molder and 
Prof. Dr Gremmen. The workshops were partly audio-recorded and partly video-recorded. 
Naturalistic meetings were not videotaped because experts who organized the Phytophthora 
meetings wanted participants to feel free to voice their questions and opinions and expressed 
the view that videotaping might inhibit meeting participants from doing so.  
In the first phase of the project, it was not always clear in what setting sufficient 
amounts of data could be recorded. During one meeting, I was allowed to be present and 
make notes but not allowed to use audio-recording equipment; however, I was able to 
record other, similar meetings. Additionally, during the research period, changes occurred in 
the Phytophthora research projects that I was following; one research programme ended 
one year earlier than originally planned because the Ministry of Agriculture, Economics and 
Innovation discontinued funding it.  
In the following pages, I provide short descriptions of the types of meetings and 
interviews I recorded and/or observed. A distinction is made between the recordings I 
analysed discursively in-depth and the recordings I used to gain a general broader 
understanding of the diversity and nature of face-to-face multi-party interactions that take 
place in plant technology development and what is at stake there. The latter meetings also 
helped me to place the conducted discursive analyses in a wider context. Together, the 
subsets provide an overview of the rich diversity of institutional, multi-party face-to-face 
encounters that take place in actual practice in crop technology development.  
                                                 
10
 For alternative plant breeding strategies, see Lammerts van Bueren et al., 2008. 
11
 The research programmes started long before I started my PhD project to analyse their multi-party or non-
dyadic face-to-face encounters. 
12
 The latter I did not do for all meetings because sometimes PowerPoint presentations tended to be used 
multiple times. This is in particular true for organized public meetings that tended to vary little content-wise.  
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Data Discursively Analysed  
 
Expert board meetings: Interaction between scientific experts and field experts 
At the beginning of 2010, I found out that there was an expert board formally connected to 
one of the research programmes whose talk-in-interaction I was following. This expert board 
assessed all Phytophthora research projects that applied for government funding until the 
end of 2011. In addition, the expert board with its representatives from university, the plant 
breeding industry and governmental agencies monitored Phytophthora research projects 
that had obtained funding from the Ministry. Meetings of this expert board were recorded in 
2010 and 2011 (eight meetings); a discursive psychological analysis of these meetings can be 
found in chapter 4 of this thesis.  
 
Public Phytophthora meetings: Scientist–non-scientist interaction 
In the period 2010–2013, I recorded public meetings organized by Phytophthora research 
programmes and public days organized by advocacy organizations for field experts. Public 
meetings focusing on Phytophthora took place partly indoors and partly outdoors. Scientists 
first presented their research with the help of PowerPoint presentations in a lecture hall. 
Visitors were allowed to ask one or two questions after all the presentations, and then the 
company moved on to the test field. When public meetings took place depended partly on 
the lifecycle of potato plants, the lifecycle of Phytophthora, the weather and whether 
enough people were interested in attending the meeting (one year a public meeting was 
cancelled due to lack of interest). Public meetings were attended by 15 to 120 people 
(generally more than 30), and most often took place during the summer months.  
During public meetings, there tended to be limited opportunities for scientist–non-
scientist exchanges. In the period 2010–2012, most time at public Phytophthora meetings 
was spent on experts’ monologues. From 2012 onwards, the time spent on expert–people 
interactions increased. The interaction design appeared to reinforce nominal expert and lay 
roles: visitors asked questions and experts answered them (for a detailed description of the 
interaction setting, see Box 1.1).  
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Box 1.1: The organization of asking and answering questions during public Phytophthora 
meetings  
In the recorded public meetings, analysed in chapter 5, plant expert talk generally takes place in 
a lecture hall and is characterized by little interaction: the chair introduces the meeting 
programme, explains the interaction rules and introduces each speaker. The expert comes on 
stage and delivers his or her PowerPoint-assisted talk on Phytophthora, the audience listens and 
asks, as instructed by the chair, the occasional clarifying question. Then, after the introduction 
of Phytophthora research, the company leaves the lecture hall and boards wagons behind a 
tractor that transports them to the test fields where modified and non-modified plants are 
tested on their disease resistance. On location, the public meeting continues; one or two experts 
explain what exactly is done on the test field. The visitors can see the test results with their own 
eyes.  
Moreover, after the test field introduction, the chair invites the visitors to ask questions 
of the experts. Visitors raise their hand, the chair walks or runs to them with the microphone 
(generally they start with two microphones but usually one breaks down), the visitor ask his or 
her question. The chair if necessary repeats or summarizes the questions and announces who of 
the present experts and in what order will answer the question. After that, the chair walks or 
runs to the various experts named and/or the named experts walk or run to the chair to answer 
the question. After all named experts have had their say, the chair returns with the microphone 
to the questioner to check whether his or her question has been answered (this check is not 
systematically done at all recorded meetings). If the question has been answered satisfactorily, 
then the chair invites the visitors to ask a new question and a new round of question–answer(s) 
starts. After the meetings draw to a close (usually after two hours including talks in the lecture 
hall), last questions are collected, and, if possible, answered. The chair thanks participants and 
closes the meeting. Subsequently, the tractor transports the visitors back to the lecture hall 
where the meeting started.  
 At some recorded public meetings, there is a short discussion staged at the test field site 
between experts on the one hand and a representative from an action group such as 
Greenpeace on the other. This discussion takes place in between mediated question–answer(s) 
sequences of other visitors.  
 
Description based on the author’s field notes 
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Photograph 1.1 Field Visit to a Phytophthora test field with journalists and others 
 
 
Ethnographic interviews with plant experts and stay at the plant sciences group  
In 2009–2010, I conducted 25 topic-based ethnographic interviews with plant scientists, 
representatives of government and representatives of the plant breeding industry (the 
Phytophthora research programmes are government funded). The different interviewees 
have or had a direct interest in plant technology development and participated in recorded 
meetings or meetings similar to the recorded meetings. Often, interviews were my first face-
to-face contact with various key players in the research programmes followed and thus were 
important in establishing access to the research site. Interviews provided important 
background information on the research setting and are partly analysed discursively in 
chapters 3 and 5.  
In chapter 3, the 12 ethnographic interviews with the plant scientists are analysed to 
elucidate how plant scientists discursively manage the science–society relationship. These 
interviews are analysed with DP in chapter 3 because the naturalistic data gathered for this 
thesis did not provide sufficiently insight into how the science–society relationship is 
discursively constructed. In chapter 5, plant experts’ use of innovative (metaphorical) 
framings of the central problem – Phytophthora – and the main technology to fight it – 
genomics and genetic modification – are analysed qualitatively in the interviews and public 
meetings.  
Additionally, I spent one day a week at the plant science department from the end of 
2010 to 2013. This helped me to keep up-to-date on public meetings organized ad hoc, 
maintain rapport with study participants and gatekeepers, and increase my general 
knowledge of the societal relevance and stakes in crop-breeding technology.  
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Workshops with plant experts 
In 2012–2013, I organized two workshops with study participants to empower participating 
plant experts to appraise the interactional consequences of their own talk and use of images 
during public meetings, expert board meetings and interviews. Workshops participants 
reflected upon the consequences of talk-in-interaction on scientific expert–lay and expert–
user relations and metaphorical framings of Phytophthora. Different from the other subsets 
of recordings, discursive action method (DAM) workshops were partly audio-recorded and 
partly videotaped. Chapter 6 provides an analysis of these workshops.  
 
 
Data Used as Background Information and to Place Analyses in a Broader Perspective 
 
Phytophthora research meetings: Interaction between junior and senior plant scientists  
In 2010, I recorded and observed four Phytophthora research meetings in which only plant 
scientists participated. During a typical research meeting, two researchers present their work 
with the help of PowerPoint slides to colleagues who also work on the Phytophthora 
problem. Staff and colleagues give feedback and advice to younger scientists on their work 
and presentation skills. During meetings, talk focuses on research challenges and 
technicalities.  
The meetings provided scientific technical information on crop technology 
development, and this helped me to make sense of some of the jargon used during other 
meetings that I analysed in depth, e.g. the aforementioned expert board meetings.   
 
Interactions between field experts and interactions between plant scientists and members of 
parliament/policymakers 
A communication project linked to the Phytophthora research programmes and funded by 
crop producers focuses on communication and implementation of research outcomes 
discussed in the expert board meetings of Phytophthora research programmes. Plant 
scientists do not partake in these meetings.  
Additionally, some meetings in which plant scientists inform and educate members of 
parliament on stakes and interests in crop technology development were recorded. A 
particular characteristic of this subset of meetings is that parliamentarians discursively treat 
scientists as experts on the public understanding of crop technology such as genetic 
modification, e.g. by quizzing scientists about citizens’ stances on GM. Scientists oblige 
parliamentarians by educating them on crop technology science, in particular with regard to 
applications of genomics and public stances on crop technology. The recordings are used as 
background information in the thesis.  
The different kinds of meetings recorded are summarized in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1   Subsets of recordings and their interactional particulars 
Subsets of recordings Interaction particulars Other information 
25 ethnographic interviews with 
experts from science, government and 
policy, and industry (25 hours) 
Provides insight into crop technology 
science as a field 
Use of innovative metaphors  
All interviews inform analysis of 
(metaphorical) framings  
Interviews were held in 2009–2010 
Scientists discursively construct the 
science–society relationship 
People are the discursive Other 
The 12 interviews with scientists 
were analysed with DP 
 
8 meetings of the expert board 
connected to several research 
programmes (20 hours) 
Much talk about users and 
Phytophthora research  
Users are the Other and alternately 
depicted as reasonable or as 
emotional  
DP analysed, recorded in 2010–2011 
8 public meetings (16 hours) Phytophthora is explained in detail 
and treated as the Other 
Focus lies on accounting for disease 
management strategies  
In later years, more focus on 
interaction with the public,  
recorded in 2009–2013 
2 DAM workshops with crop experts 
and scientists (8 hours; 17 participants) 
Experts reflect on their own talk 
based on excerpts from interviews, 
expert board meetings and public 
meetings 
Audio- and video-recorded material  
Visual material was used during one 
workshop  
Background data   
2  meetings of the expert board after 
its official demise (4 hours) 
Much talk about how to get funding 
for continuation of research  
Discussion of results of various field 
tests 
Not included in DP analysis because 
of loss of mandate, recorded in 2012  
4 internal research meetings  (4 hours) Much technical talk on crop 
technology development  
No analysis is presented of this in 
this thesis, recorded in 2010 
2 meetings of a Phytophthora 
communication project (5 hours) 
Experts from the field discuss 
Phytophthora research and its 
usefulness for farmers and talk about 
absent scientists  
These were the only meetings in 
which plant scientists did not 
participate, recorded in 2010–2011 
Talk-in-interaction with representative 
of parliament + one day course for new 
members of parliament (7 hours) 
Members of parliament treat 
scientists as experts on public 
attitudes towards crop technology 
development (focus was not 
exclusively on Phytophthora 
research) 
No discursive analysis provided  
 
Access restricted, recorded in 2010–
2011 
2 invitational site visits to test fields (no 
presentations) for relations, colleagues 
from university and the media 
Focus on inspecting the field site and 
talking informally to researchers  
Recordings were of limited quality 
and were not discursively analysed, 
visits in 2011 and 2012 
 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis The discursive Other 
In chapter 2, I reflect in more depth on what it takes to conduct discursive analyses in 
specialized interaction environments. I provide a reflective account of how I gained and 
maintained sufficient rapport and understanding of the specialized interaction environment 
of plant technology science to successfully conduct discursive (psychological) analysis.  
 Chapter 3 provides a discursive psychological analysis of ethnographic interviews 
with plant scientists and has been published in Science Communication as ‘Everyone may 
think whatever they like but scientists:’ How and to what end plant scientists manage the 
science–society relationship (Mogendorff et al., 2012). The discursive psychological analysis 
focuses on the interactional consequences and implications of plant scientists’ discursive 
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constructions of the science–society relationship. The journal’s style conventions are 
maintained in the chapter. 
 Chapter 4 provides a discursive psychological analysis of recorded expert board 
meetings connected to different government-funded research programmes in Phytophthora 
research in 2010 and 2011. Chapter 4 has been published in Discourse & Communication as 
We say:’…’ they say: ‘…’: How plant experts use reported dialogue to shelve user concerns 
(Mogendorff et al., 2014). The journal’s style conventions are maintained in the chapter. 
 Chapter 5 is about plant experts’ innovative metaphor use. The focus is on the 
diversity of (metaphorical) framings deployed. Examples are derived from recorded public 
Phytophthora meetings and ethnographic interviews.  
 Chapter 6 is about turning plant experts into self-reflective communicators who are 
able to appraise the interactional consequences their talk generates, intentionally or not. 
Materials used during the workshops are discursively analysed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. This 
means that chapter 6 brings these earlier studies together. 
 Chapter 7 is the final chapter. The research findings of the different sub-studies and 
their implications are discussed as well as the limitations and recommendations that follow 
from the study.   
 Based on the expectation that most readers will limit themselves to reading the 
chapters that interest them the most every single chapter has been equipped with a 
reference list, footnotes and appendix (the latter only when relevant).  
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Appendix: Transcription Notations 
Based on Jeffersonian transcription (Jefferson, 2004): 
(x.x)   Pause of x.x seconds 
(.)   Micro pause, less than 0.2 seconds 
wo:rd   Colons show that the speaker has stretched the preceding sound 
word   Emphasized 
° text °  Speaker is talking softer 
((text))  Transcriber’s remarks 
=   No pause between words or turns 
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2 Discursive Analyses in Specialized Interaction Environments  
An Account of How Access and Insights Were Gained to Enable Analysis of Plant 
Scientists’ Talk  
 
The thesis The discursive Other: Dynamics in plant scientists’ talk on Phytophthora with 
experts and the public analyses what plant scientists say in face-to-face encounters with 
laypeople and plant experts. The research is informed by the understanding that when 
people say something they simultaneously do something (Austin, 1962); by talking to others, 
people not only exchange meanings and ideas, but also create or reproduce identities and 
interpersonal relationships. Put differently, talk tends to have interactional consequences 
(Potter, 1996).  
More precisely, this thesis studies plant scientists’ talk-in-interaction to elucidate 
further how plant scientists’ portrayal of the discursive Other – in this thesis laypeople, users 
and the plant disease Phytophthora – impact on the science–society relationship and the 
science–user relationship (see also chapter 1). Plant scientists discursively treat these Others 
as human (like) Others that are capable of acting in opposition to scientific or field experts in 
plant science. The science–society and science–user relationships are considered to be 
particularly relevant in plant technology science: in part because some plant technologies 
are persistently met with public controversy (Bauer, 2002; De Krom et al., 2012); in part 
because funding bodies increasingly require new technologies to be usable in and for society 
(Leach et al., 2005). It is assumed that public controversy may in part continue because of 
how plant scientists word their arguments and how they respond to lay and user concerns in 
talk-in-interaction (Potter, 1996). Additionally, The discursive Other explores what happens 
when plant experts involved in Phytophthora research are given the tools to appraise how 
their own talk affects the science–society relationship and the science–user relationship: 
How is plant experts’ self-reflective capacity affected and in what ways? (see also chapter 6). 
The research conducted on plant scientists’ talk is data-driven in nature. Analysis is 
largely based on talk-in-interaction that is going on in real-life real-time encounters between 
plant scientists and their relevant Others. Real-life encounters are not initiated by the 
researcher but take place regardless of whether the researcher is present or not (this is 
called naturalistic interaction). Working with what one finds in one’s research setting means 
that researchers may need to adjust their research plans in line with field site realities. For 
instance, when I started to research plant scientists’ talk, the focus was on expertise and 
citizenship. Consequently, I started to search for meetings in which experts either talked 
among themselves about citizens or talked with citizens. I also looked for meetings in which 
citizens discussed plant technologies, but I did not find meetings or discussions in which 
citizens discussed plant technologies or meetings in which plant experts spent considerable 
time discussing citizen concerns. Instead, I found that plant scientists and other plant experts 
tended to talk about prospective users of plant technology during expert board meetings 
and infrequently organized public meetings, talked about laypeople during ethnographic 
interviews and used innovative metaphors to describe and explain Phytophthora and 
genomics during ethnographic interviews and/or public meetings. In accordance with these 
research site realities, I changed the research focus from expertise and citizenship in plant 
experts’ and citizens’ talk-in-interaction to plant experts’ talk about users and laypeople and 
plant experts’ talk in front of laypeople about Phytophthora.  
Another challenge that researchers may encounter has to do with getting the kind of 
access to data that one seeks: one may not get access at all, or one gains access but does not 
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get permission to record data, or one may record some but not all data. Depending on what 
type of access one acquires to coveted data, one may need to change rapport-building and 
data-gathering strategies, e.g. to get access to data that was first denied. If changes are 
made, one may want to reflect upon the consequences of these changes. 
When scientists have acquired the coveted access, it may be that some of the data, 
although they offer relevant insights, are difficult to analyse with the pre-planned 
methodology. Discursive psychological analysis with its reliance on detailed transcription of 
verbal and non-verbal talk-in-interaction requires recordings in which non-verbal nuances of 
talk-in-interaction are hearable, such as intonation. If nuances are not sufficiently hearable in 
recordings, the recordings may nevertheless offer relevant information or insights – e.g. on 
context or language use. In the latter case, it may be worth considering whether these 
recordings can be analysed by other accepted means.  
The study of plant scientists’ talk reflected upon in this thesis is understood to be an 
interdisciplinary endeavour, that is, a main research approach is deployed – discursive 
psychology (DP) – supplemented with anthropological methodology such as ethnographic 
interviews and being there at the research site for an extended time period (see also chapter 
1). Additionally, The discursive Other draws upon insights from plant technology literature to 
the extent that this is necessary to explicate what is going on and at stake interactionally in 
Phytophthora management. In this research, I draw upon anthropological methodology 
because it is designed to gain physical and epistemic access to non-everyday contexts from 
an emic or participants’ point of view (e.g. see Bernard, 2006) whereas discursive psychology 
traditionally focuses on the study of talk in everyday contexts and has only recently begun to 
study talk-in-interaction in more specialized interaction settings (e.g. see Antaki, 2011; 
Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007). 
Anthropological methods may be of help in ensuring that researchers acquire 
sufficient understanding of specialized research settings, and they may be additive in the 
sense that anthropological methodology enables discursive analyses that offer relevant 
insights but do not necessarily have all the characteristics desired in discursive psychology, 
e.g. data are monologues, whereas DP prefers data with a lot of ongoing dialogue (see also 
chapter 1).  
In the rest of the chapter, I explicate how ethnographic interviews, observation 
during recordings and being there at the research site one day a week to talk informally to 
study participants may support and contribute to, in particular, discursive psychological 
analyses13. I do this by reflecting on my own experiences with building and maintaining 
rapport to gain access to data, people and insights; and by reminiscing on my own 
experiences with gathering knowledge and developing insights to pave the way to analysis.  
That researchers tend to have an impact on their research is not to suggest that 
individual researchers necessarily produce unique research outcomes; different researchers 
may come independently to roughly the same conclusions (e.g. see Veldhuijzen et al., 2013). 
Rather, some researchers may be better equipped to conduct particular research projects 
than others. For instance, in societies that are segregated along gender lines, female 
anthropologists may be better situated to research women’s lived experiences than male 
anthropologists, if only because men in these societies are not allowed to be alone with 
women who are not family.  
Put differently, research is in and of itself a profoundly social endeavour; researchers’ 
societal characteristics such as gender, academic title, age, able-bodiedness and ethnicity 
                                                 
13
 The value of analysing interviews with discursive psychology is addressed in chapter 3.  
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may, but do not necessarily, impact on the research conducted. Research is also social in the 
sense that researchers are expected to act in accordance with norms and rules endemic to 
methodologies and research communities. Furthermore, a characteristic of building and 
maintaining rapport is balancing involvement with distance. One needs to be involved 
enough to establish a good working relationship with gatekeepers and study participants, 
and one needs simultaneously to maintain sufficient distance to be able to conduct 
independent analyses (e.g. see Mogendorff, 2007, on inter-subjectivity).  
The social character of research implies that researchers need to account for how 
their (social) characteristics affect their access to data and knowledge, and how researchers 
relate to the norms embedded in methodologies and/or research communities of which 
researchers claim to be a part (see also May & Perry, 2011, on the researcher belonging to 
the research community).   
Before I present my experiences with building rapport and gathering the knowledge 
necessary to conduct discursive analyses, I first discuss in more depth the potential added 
value of providing reflexive accounts of the researcher’s rapport-building and data-gathering 
practices.  
 
 
2.1 The Added Value of Accounts of Rapport Building and Data Gathering 
Reflecting on one’s role as a researcher is broadly propagated in the social sciences. 
Reflexive practices are considered important in determining the extent to which social 
research represents, and is relevant to, societal realities. Moreover, reflection is supposed to 
contribute to the quality of the research and the well-being of study participants (see May & 
Perry, 2011, for an overview of thinking about reflexive praxis in the social sciences). 
However, not all social science disciplines propagate reflexive practices in equal measure. 
Discursive psychology (DP) and conversation analysis (CA) do not have a tradition of 
reflecting on the role of the researcher in his or her research (Wiggins & Potter, 2007). 
Generally, they strive to minimize researcher impact especially in the data-gathering phase 
(e.g. see Potter, 1996).  
DP and CA analysts are generally also not treated as accountable with regard to their 
role in data gathering and analysis. Arguably, the reason may be that until recently CA and 
DP analysts focused on studying talk-in-interaction in mundane or institutional contexts to 
which most people, including analysts, have physical and epistemic access by default 
throughout their lives. For instance, DP and CA researchers study mealtime conversations or 
doctor–patient consultations (e.g. see Heritage, 2004). The consequence of this focus on talk 
in ordinary mundane settings or common institutional contexts is that analysts need to 
gather relatively few data on these mundane interaction environments before they can 
proceed to analysis; one may argue that they already ‘gathered’ relevant knowledge of these 
types of conversations while living their everyday lives.  
This may change gradually now. DP and CA analysts increasingly analyse talk-in-
interaction in applied and/or specialized interaction environments (e.g. see Antaki, 2011; 
Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007). Everyday physical and epistemic access to specialized interaction 
environments is not a given. This implies that analysts who do research in specialized  
environments need to work harder to gain access and relevant knowledge of the interaction 
environments in which they work; they need to familiarize themselves with the jargon, the 
main issues, the stakes and interests that potentially could be made relevant in talk-in-
interaction.  
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DP analysts, irrespective of the interaction environment they study, may encounter 
problems when they seek to record conversations of others. To conduct their analyses, they 
need to build rapport with potential study participants. However, although discursive 
psychologists do engage in rapport-building and data-gathering activities, they seldom report 
and reflect on these activities in their writings (see also Arminen, 2000).  
In this chapter, I argue that discursive psychologists may benefit from reporting and 
reflecting upon their rapport-building and data-gathering activities, in particular if rapport 
building and data gathering are time-consuming and difficult; difficulties that are overcome 
may be seen as accomplishments in their own right. More importantly, transparency about 
knowledge acquisition prior and (indirectly) relevant to analysis may contribute to an 
improved collective understanding of what it takes to pull off interactional analyses in 
specialized interaction environments such as plant technology development (see also 
Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013, on transparency). DP and CA analysts know that their 
analyses are very time-consuming compared to other forms of qualitative or interpretive 
analysis (see also chapter 1). To non-DP and non-CA analysts it may be less clear why exactly 
DP and CA require so much time and effort. Therefore, an account of the preparatory work 
that is undertaken prior to actual analysis may help readers and funding bodies to appraise 
and appreciate discursive analysts’ work and efforts better.     
In the foregoing, I have provided several arguments as to why describing and 
accounting for gaining physical and epistemic access to the research setting may benefit the 
research. However, showing instead of telling how reporting and reflecting on research 
choices may contribute to a better understanding and, arguably, appreciation of the 
research conducted may be more convincing. In the following section, I expound on my 
choices with regard to rapport building and data gathering.  
 
 
2.2 Building and Maintaining Rapport with Plant Experts 
At the end of 2009, I started the research project The discursive Other. Initially, I knew very 
little about plant breeding, genomics and genetic modification of crops, so I needed to 
acquire some basic knowledge on these subjects and to develop a feel for the plant 
technology field that specializes in Phytophthora management: what are the major issues, 
dilemmas and themes? Why do people make such a fuss about genetically modified crops? I 
also needed to establish relations with different Phytophthora research programmes to map 
when and where relevant face-to-face communication was taking place and build rapport to 
get permission to record meetings for further analysis (for an overview of collected data, see 
chapter 1). In this PhD project, relations needed not only to be established with relevant 
actors, but also to be maintained over an extended time period, both of which are discussed 
in this chapter.  
I had several strategies at my disposal to develop a sufficient understanding of, and 
feel for, the plant technology field, its key issues and concepts. I began by reading articles 
and books about societal aspects of plant breeding and genomics, consulted websites and 
blogs of organizations in the field, watched videos and clips on genetic modification and 
plant breeding on YouTube, attended seminars and lectures, stayed one day a week at the 
plant sciences group and interviewed key players.  
To start with the latter: these ethnographic or topic-based interviews served different 
purposes. First of all, the interviews provided information; they helped me to familiarize 
myself with the views and conceptualizations of representatives of government, plant 
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breeding industry and the university on the subject of plant technologies such as genomics 
and genetic modification. The interviews also yielded useful information on how different 
Phytophthora research programmes relate to one another and on the programmes’ policies 
and practices with regard to communicating to laypeople, users and expert actors. Secondly, 
the interviews enabled me to gain access to Phytophthora research meetings and to start 
building rapport with key players and gatekeepers. Thirdly, the interviews provided useful 
material to analyse; in chapter 3, the 12 ethnographic interviews with plant scientists are 
analysed interactionally using DP to shed light on how plant scientists construct the science–
society relationship. In chapter 5, interviewees’ use of innovative metaphorical framing of 
Phytophthora and genomics is discussed.  
The interviews provided insights into key issues and concepts not readily found in 
textbooks; textbooks generally do not expand on underlying tensions and dilemmas in a 
research field. The interviews revealed notable differences and commonalities in how 
various plant experts conceptualized genomics and genetic modification. The differences 
may in part be attributed to the fact that technologies are still under development and in 
part reflect the ambiguities felt amongst scientists with regard to the societal significance 
and necessity of specific plant technologies14.  What these differences and commonalities 
entail, and what their functions are, are discussed in chapter 5.  
Additionally, the interviews caused me to change my initial research focus. From the 
interviews I learned that the Phytophthora research programmes organized infrequent and 
ad hoc public meetings. I also found out that research programmes and individual plant 
scientists infrequently interact directly with laypeople; some of the experts actually said that 
it is not a goal of the programme or part of their job to interact directly with laypeople. Some 
interviewees pointed out that lay–expert communication is not the responsibility of an 
individual Phytophthora project. In practice, experts involved in various research 
programmes talked the most to and with the public. Generally, however, research 
programmes informed the public through the written press. Plant experts also presented 
their research to farmer clubs and other organizations if invited.   
The infrequently organized public meetings and the lack of direct organized 
interaction with laypeople or citizens prompted me eventually to adapt the research focus. 
Initially, the focus was on expertise and citizenship. However, plant scientists rarely invoked 
the citizen category in their talk, and they interacted infrequently with citizens or laypeople. 
Laypeople were generally talked about during interviews but rarely in meetings. Additionally, 
I found that plant scientists and field experts in plant science talked a lot about prospective 
users of plant technology – the crop producers or farmers – but were far less inclined to 
interact with them in person at meetings. So, given these field realities, I changed the 
research focus from citizenship to the discursive Other – or how and to what end plant 
scientists talked about their relevant Others in different interaction settings (see also chapter 
1).  
Plant scientists’ discursive practices with regard to users of plant technology differed 
from how laypeople and their concerns were handled; in contrast to people, users were not 
only informed about Phytophthora research. The Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Economics 
and Innovation required Phytophthora research to be user-friendly. To that end, the 
programmes organized expert board meetings to ensure as much as possible that the plant 
technologies developed to combat Phytophthora were usable in and by society. This led me  
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 In contrast, during public meetings, different technologies are presented as complementary.  
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to record and analyse these expert board meetings for as long as they were organized (see 
chapter 4 for a discursive psychological analysis of these expert board meetings).   
 A problem with mapping expert–lay communication initiatives was that public 
meetings tended to be organized ad hoc, often at short notice; in practice, organizers – with 
whom I was acquainted by then – sometimes forgot to inform me about these meetings. 
Additionally, there was not an ex-ante overview of invitational lectures available of individual 
plant scientists talking on a personal title to non-scientific audiences. The instances of 
forgetfulness were greatly reduced when I came to stay one day a week at the plant sciences 
group. 
My general data-gathering strategy was to record relevant meetings as much as was 
feasible the first two years. After two years it became apparent that I would end up with 
enough data to satisfy qualitative research standards. After some time, a concern became 
that in quite some public Phytophthora meetings content and speakers did not vary much 
although the visitors per meeting changed. Furthermore, visitors generally were granted 
little opportunity to respond to what speakers had to say (visits to test fields excluded; in 
those instances, visitors had more opportunities to ask questions (see also chapter 1, Box 
1.1).  
   Generally, I was granted access to meetings and permitted to make notes whenever I 
requested this. However, I was not informed of all ongoing meetings in advance; 
communication reports mentioned lectures to which I was not privy. When I made inquiries, 
I learned that some lectures were not considered of interest to me; they were considered 
too technical, too monologic or too similar to recordings I already had. I generally agreed 
with these assessments. I was allowed to audiotape almost all research programme 
meetings – there was one exception, but, luckily, I had a recording of a similar meeting. I was 
not always granted permission to videotape meetings or it was unfeasible for me to do so15. I 
was permitted to audio-record meetings of one research project which developed publicly 
contested technology, on the condition that I checked with the project leader whether he 
was agreeable to my using in an article fragments taken from the project recordings dealing 
with the contested technology16.  
The latter arrangement did not cause many difficulties. In most of my analyses, I 
focused on patterns in the data. Patterns may be illustrated and explained with the help of 
different fragments taken from various recordings. Given that the discursive constructs that I 
analysed tended to be non-specific to one particular project or research programme, I was 
generally able to use fragments from recordings that I did not need to check first with 
project leaders before publication.  
To sum up, the foregoing account of the multiple functions of interviews and access 
to meetings illustrates that access to people – either to record meetings or to interview 
them – shapes what researchers – including discursive psychologists – may do with data. In 
the following section, the focus is on maintaining rapport – an important prerequisite to gain 
the ongoing cooperation of study participants.  
 
Maintaining Rapport and the Value of Staying at the Same Place as Study Participants 
Building rapport is not a once-off effort. Rapport with gatekeepers and study participants 
needs to be maintained, particularly if one seeks the goodwill and input of study participants 
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 In some cases, it was unfeasible for me to videotape meetings or audio-record parts of meetings; I am not a 
professional camerawoman; recordings made in the open air in the rain were not always of great quality.  
16
 This requirement was in addition to standard practices to protect study participants, such as anonymization.  
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over an extended time period or at a later time. Maintaining rapport may pose particular 
challenges to discursive psychologists. 
DP practitioners are advised not to partake in the talk-in-interaction they want to 
analyse. Wiggins and Potter (2007) recommend that DP researchers ask study participants to 
record their own talk-in-interaction; after enough recordings of sufficient quality are 
produced, the researcher can pick up the recordings or have the recordings delivered to him 
or her without affecting the research.   
Wiggins and Potter’s (2007) advice makes sense; discursive psychologists tend to be 
primarily interested in how and to what end participants in talk-in-interaction discursively 
handle identities, responsibilities, relationships, stakes and interests. For the same reason, 
DP analysts generally refrain from conducting research interviews – at least not for 
discursive analysis – because the interviewer obviously has an impact on the ongoing talk-in-
interaction. However, De Kok (2008) argues, and Lampropoulous and Myers (2012) show, 
that analysis of research interviews with CA or DP may offer relevant insights to DP and CA.   
One assumption that appears to underlie DP practitioners’ reluctance to conduct 
research interviews is that researchers tend to differ greatly from study participants. This 
may be true in some instances, but not in others. The focus of my research is on the 
interactional consequences of dynamics in lay–plant expert interaction. During the project I 
was practically a layperson on the topic of plant technology. I grew more knowledgeable, but 
I knew that I would never become an expert on the subject. Moreover, the main difference 
between lay participants and me in the study – at least from an interactional perspective – 
was that I had more and better opportunities to ask questions.  
              A problem with DP practitioners’ preference for minimal researcher impact during 
data gathering may be that potential study participants are reluctant to hand over recordings 
of talk-in-interaction to an anonymous researcher, particularly if the recorded talk contains 
sensitive or confidential information. This may pose a problem for discursive psychologists 
and conversation analysts in that DP and CA analysis may require recordings that are not 
freely obtainable (see also chapter 1).  
             Additionally, audio-recordings by themselves generally do not hold much information 
on interaction context idiosyncrasies that may come with individual recordings. For instance, 
if one records mealtime conversations, the eaters’ seating arrangements may not always be 
the same, nor is the recording equipment necessarily positioned in the same way at every 
meal. Seating arrangements may affect who talks to whom, and positioning of recording 
equipment may affect what is hearable and/or visible in the recordings and what is not. The 
latter may affect analysis (e.g. see Goodwin, 2000). It also means that notes accompanying 
the recordings may be of use. 
 Given the public controversy surrounding some technologies central to the 
interaction environment of plant technology science, I did not consider it feasible to hand 
over recording equipment to study participants. Instead, I was present at meetings that I 
recorded to take notes on seating arrangements, who talked to whom and so on. I also used 
meetings to maintain rapport with study participants.  
During research for my master’s degree in communication science, I first noticed that 
avoidance of interaction with study participants for the sole purpose of minimizing 
researcher impact may occasionally be counterproductive; one may be perceived as too 
distant. Moreover, later when I conducted research among young adults with impairments – 
first as a master’s student in anthropology and later as a junior researcher – I experienced 
first-hand that my personal characteristics as a researcher and a person tended to be a 
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resource rather than an hindrance in research; that is, my physical impairments increased 
rapport with disabled study participants (see also Mogendorff, 2007).  
 On the basis of these early research experiences, I decided to be present during 
Phytophthora meetings and to answer the occasional question put my way. I did not partake 
in ongoing discussions on Phytophthora and technology. My presence and note-taking 
enabled me to monitor the quality of the recordings and take notes to make subsequent 
transcription easier. Furthermore, I collect hand-outs used in meetings to aid analysis later. 
Avoiding affecting talk-in-interaction during meetings as required by DP tended to be easy; 
study participants did not expect much of me – a social scientist – in the way of contributing 
to the content of Phytophthora research meetings.  
Nevertheless, when study participants learned that I was a communication scientist 
who analysed talk-in-interaction, some of them asked me to give feedback on their 
communicative performance. I was not happy about these requests because I did not want 
to give participants the impression that I was there to assess them.  After I was asked several 
times to give feedback, I changed my introduction – I introduced myself no longer as a 
communication scientist but as an anthropologist who was trying to discover patterns in talk-
in-interaction across meetings17. The latter resulted in far fewer requests for advice and 
feedback.   
After plant experts became used to my presence, my participation during discussions 
at Phytophthora research meetings generally were limited to short whispered exchanges 
with participants seated next to me (mostly initiated by my neighbours). Together with 
informal conversations with participants during coffee breaks and lunches in between 
meetings, these exchanges helped me to maintain rapport and to clarify unclear terminology 
used during meetings, and they enabled me to learn more about the views, interests and 
backgrounds of individual participants.  
 Additionally, in the expert board meetings, there was a more or less fixed corpus of 
study participants. If one follows and sees people for several years, then, at some point one 
may be asked to contribute to discussions. I was asked to contribute to a meeting by 
presenting my preliminary findings at the last official meeting of the expert board in 2011. 
The latter gave me the opportunity to repay some of the hospitality I received and to 
member-check whether my preliminary findings resonated with study participants (see also 
Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013, on member-checking).  
 In addition to observing and recording various types of Phytophthora meetings, I 
spent one day a week at the plant sciences group for three years when the opportunity 
presented itself. My presence, limited as it was, enabled me to keep better track of 
Phytophthora meetings that were organized ad hoc and at short notice. It also made it easier 
for me to learn more about the different plant breeding practices and how various 
researchers not directly involved in Phytophthora management research but familiar with 
Phytophthora viewed practices and technologies found in the Phytophthora management 
projects.  
Being present one day a week at the plant sciences group also helped in the last 
phase of The discursive Other project. After I had conducted various discursive psychological 
analyses, I planned workshops to explore whether I could turn visitors to Phytophthora 
meetings and plant experts – scientific and field experts – into self-reflective communicators 
able to appraise the interactional consequences of their own talk on Phytophthora. Two of 
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 I am entitled to introduce myself as either since I hold an MSc. in social and cultural anthropology and an 
MSc. in applied communication science.   
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the three planned workshops actually took place. I had to cancel the workshop with citizens 
because I fell one participant short. For the two workshops with experts – one with field 
experts and one with scientific experts – I managed to get enough workshop participants. I 
believe I was more successful at recruiting participants for the expert workshops because for 
these workshops I invited people whom I knew through my research.  
   
   
2.3 Gathering Knowledge and Developing Insights Necessary for Analyses  
Researchers who study social interaction deploy different forms of knowledge to make sense 
of how people engage in face-to-face communication with one another. Firstly, they need to 
have general knowledge of the language and culture in which they are conducting the 
research. They need to understand the language that is spoken, idiom, and the sociocultural 
codes of what may be said when and where (and what may not) in order to be able to 
recognize what is going on in talk-in-interaction. Native speakers possess and use this kind of 
knowledge effortlessly. Discursive psychologists may, however, need various other forms of 
knowledge to successfully conduct discursive psychological analyses.  
Schegloff (1987), one of the founders of CA, acknowledges that students of social 
interaction may need to gather additional information to gain a sufficient understanding of 
the interaction environment. Discursive psychologists need to have extensive knowledge of 
the interaction environment in which they are interested (Potter, 1996). Or as Geertz (1973) 
– a well-known and influential symbolic anthropologist – put it: ‘without knowledge of 
context it is hard to distinguish whether a twitch of an eye is a wink or a blink’. To be able to 
assess what is going on in talk-in-interaction, analysts need to have a basic understanding of 
the content being discussed in encounters. The action performed with talk may contradict 
the literal meaning of talk, but to determine the action and the consequences thereof it is 
still necessary to have some inkling of the semantic meaning of utterances. 
If one studies talk-in-interaction in institutional settings, then an understanding of 
specialized knowledge or jargon is required (Schegloff, 1997). This kind of knowledge is 
generally not gained by listening solely to recordings. Participants in talk-in-interaction may, 
for example, share knowledge of jargon and therefore do not feel the need to explain the 
meaning of specialized terminology to one another in talk-in-interaction.  
For instance, cisgenesis and transgenesis are specialized terms or jargon commonly 
used in plant breeding – concepts that I learned at the beginning of The discursive Other 
project. These terms caught my attention because they appeared to divide plant scientists. 
Cisgenic plant breeding is a form of genetic modification that is said to mimic nature 
(Rommens et al., 2007); the outcome of cisgenic cross-breeding is close to what may be 
accomplished with classical breeding strategies. However, cisgenic modification of plants 
takes place in a laboratory and thus is generally understood to be artificial. Transgenic 
modification is similar to cisgenic breeding in that in the laboratory the same techniques are 
used to create cisgenic as transgenic crops. However, transgenesis is not similar to classical 
plant breeding judged by the end result. Transgenesis involves the cross-breeding of 
different species, resulting in a unique organism. Differences and similarities between 
transgenesis and cisgenesis tend to be deployed discursively for various purposes in the 
political arena. Some plant scientists are lobbying to get cisgenesis exempted from EU 
regulations regarding the testing of genetically modified crops, arguing that cisgenic crops 
cannot be distinguished from crops that have been created with the help of classical 
breeding techniques (Levidow et al., 2000). So far, cisgenesis and transgenesis have been 
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treated in the same manner under EU regulations on the basis that the techniques used for 
transgenesis are the same as those used to create cisgenic crops (e.g. Jacobsen & Schouten, 
2008). A third argument is imaginable: cisgenesis is treated neither as similar to classical 
breeding strategies nor as similar to transgenic breeding. The latter stance is informed by the 
understanding that cisgenesis is an in-between category: the process may be ‘unnatural’ but 
the outcome is ‘natural’. I did not encounter the third conceptualization in the literature, but 
it is a discursive possibility.  
Thus, selective deployments of meanings of complex concepts such as cisgenesis and 
transgenesis may have very real and far-reaching consequences for crop creators. This 
makes it relevant for DP analysts who work in an interaction environment in which GM is 
treated as an important issue to familiarize themselves with how different, sometimes 
contradictory, meanings of complex key concepts may discursively be deployed and the 
potential consequences thereof. If one does not know the meanings and implications of 
these complex concepts, it becomes hard to determine what interactional purposes are 
intentionally or unintentionally served by discursive ‘play’ with meanings of complex 
concepts.  
Furthermore, Schegloff (1997) acknowledges that it is relevant to know how what is 
discussed during meetings relates to issues and concerns on the meso and macro level. For 
instance, without knowledge of how plant technology development is viewed by relevant 
actors, stakeholders, the scientific literature and the public at large, it is hard to establish 
which of the discursive patterns found in expert board meetings merit further analysis 
because they are relevant to study participants, the scientific literature and societal debates.  
For the most part however, DP stresses that only what is made relevant in the 
immediate interaction context really matters in analysis (e.g. see Waring et al., 2012). A lot 
of knowledge someone has may not matter discursively because it is not relevant and not 
invoked in the interaction setting under study. Moreover, according to DP, someone’s 
identity as an expert is not an a priori given but needs to be established in talk-in-interaction 
again and again. Only if participants make the expert identity relevant in talk, e.g. by treating 
someone as an expert, does someone’s expert status matter in an encounter from a CA or 
DP perspective (Schegloff, 1987). But do identities and expertise always need to be 
expressed in talk-in-interaction to be of consequence to the interactional business of an 
encounter? Yes, but how this is done may partly depend on foreknowledge – e.g. 
participants may know the other participants’ field of expertise before the meeting – often, 
that is the very reason that they have been invited to partake in the meeting. If participants 
know prior to the meeting what expertise co-participants bring, participants do not need to 
go through the process of finding out what someone’s nominal status is, although they may 
still need to establish how participants in talk-in-interaction with their various epistemic 
statuses relate to one another in a meeting.  
What may pose a challenge to the analyst is that some of this shared foreknowledge 
between participants in talk-in-interaction indirectly or subtly affects talk-in-interaction (see 
also Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014, for a similar argument), and this is hard to discern by 
analysts who work purely with recordings of meetings. Consequently, some basic 
background knowledge of participants in talk-in-interaction in addition to recordings may be 
useful during DP analysis.   
 Furthermore, what stakes and interests are bound to be relevant? It may be good to 
know what knowledge participants in talk-in-interaction are supposed to have and what 
their societal standing is, even if this knowledge is not made explicitly relevant in talk-in-
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interaction. Ottinger’s (2013) research on refinery expertise shows that the personal 
experiences of experts tend to be treated differently from the personal experiences of 
concerned citizens. Experts’ individual personal experiences tend to be treated as relevant 
evidence in relation to gauging the impact of the refinery on the local community, whereas 
personal experiences of individual citizens are not treated as relevant evidence. However, 
the expert status or citizen status is often not invoked in the telling of the personal 
experiences, except that the personal experiences of experts are treated differently in talk-
in-interaction than the personal experiences of citizens. The reason that expert and citizen 
identities are not invoked may be that participants in talk-in-interaction know who-is-who 
among their co-participants. If, however, analysts have no access to these a priori statuses of 
participants in talk-in-interaction, then they may well be unable to explain the differential 
treatment of personal experiences in the discourse – in Ottinger’s case about how the 
refinery affects community living.  
Another example: in the expert board meetings analysed in chapter 4, there is a 
marked difference in the use of user-references between crop advisors and plant experts. 
Crop advisors deploy factual statements to refer to users – farmers – whereas plant experts 
tend to invoke reported dialogues between themselves and farmers. The explanation 
provided for this phenomenon is that crop advisors are known to visit farmers as part of 
their work on a daily basis to advise on farmstead and crop management, whereas plant 
scientists need ‘to prove’ that they have epistemic access to farmers (for the senior plant 
scientists who partake in the expert board meetings it is not an absolute prerequisite for 
their research to consult with farmers). Had I as an analyst solely relied on audio-recordings 
of meetings, I would not always have known who was who during meetings, and, more 
importantly, I would not have been able to explain the differences in participants’ 
deployment of user-references. I acquired knowledge of expert board meeting participants 
during interviews, by googling participants and by talking informally to participants during 
breaks, and before and after meetings.  
Koole (1997) raises a similar argument with regard to doctor–patient communication. 
According to Koole (1997), how patients respond to their doctor depends not only on what is 
made relevant during a consultation, but also on the fact that the patient and doctor tacitly 
agree on how they relate to each other at the doctor’s surgery: division of institutional roles 
and tasks is clear and relatively fixed prior to the doctor–patient consultation.  
Ottinger’s (2013) and Koole’s (1997) examples, and my example about crop advisors, 
imply that analysts must ensure that they know the identities and roles of study participants 
that may potentially be of consequence in the talk-in-interaction under study; otherwise, it 
may become difficult to understand differences in treatment of, at face value, similar 
experiences. Interviewing participants and gathering relevant documents such as agendas, 
communication plans, minutes, annual reports may be a useful strategy to determine the 
formal purposes of meetings, the designated role of different participants or participant 
groups as opposed to actual events and roles during encounters.  
The same holds true for the interviews. On the basis of what was discussed at 
interviews, I could have focused the analysis on different phenomena. Eventually, I decided 
to analyse how plant scientists tend to construct the science–society relationship. This 
pattern appeared to be relevant to the research aims, to plant scientists and to the wider 
scientific literature on lay–expert communication. 
After the researcher has decided upon what discursive pattern or recurring discursive 
device should be investigated further, the interactional consequences of the pattern or 
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device should be determined. This generally requires knowledge of the DP and CA literature 
as well as extensive knowledge of the sociocultural inferences that may be incorporated in 
the concrete utterances, statements and expressions that make up the discursive pattern or 
devices of interest. Knowledge of stake, interests and dilemmas in plant technology science 
is also salient here in that it tends to help speakers to manage a dilemma, stake or interest 
that others may potentially attribute to them. These stakes, interest and dilemmas may be 
discovered by studying the literature, documents and blogs, and by talking to people 
involved, e.g. by interviewing them.  
If the main tools of discursive psychology – the rhetorical principle and the uptake of 
an utterance by another – can be deployed to a limited extent, e.g. because the talk in 
monologic in character, one may consider whether less time-consuming qualitative analysis 
better fits one’s goals, given time constraints. In The discursive Other project, most public 
Phytophthora meetings contain little expert–lay talk-in-interaction. Partly for that reason, I 
eventually decided to conduct a framing analysis of key concepts in this interaction-poor 
dataset (see also chapter 5).  
The step after identifying the purposes served by a recurring discursive device is to 
place the analysis in its wider societal context; plant experts’ interests, stakes and dilemmas 
are not necessary relevant to a wider academic audience or society at large, and vice versa. 
For that, it may be of help if one familiarizes oneself with the societal and academic debates 
regarding the lay–expert relationship and the technology–user relationship, which are not 
necessarily directly made relevant in talk-in-interaction but are of relevance to what one 
hopes to accomplish with DP analysis, e.g. to contribute to academic and societal debates.  
A final step may be considered after discursive psychological analysis is completed: 
member-checking one’s findings with study participants. This last step is reported upon in 
chapter 6 of this thesis. Knowledge required in this step is empowering in nature in that the 
researcher enables study participants to discursively analyse their own past talk-in-
interaction with an eye to improving their future talk-in-interaction.  
   
 
2.4 Conclusion and Discussion  
This chapter has shown that qualitative interpretive methods such as interviews, observation 
and being present at the research site over a relatively long time period may support and 
complement discursive psychological analyses in complex interaction settings such as plant 
technology science. Knowledge gathering and sense-making activities in discursive 
psychology entail: determining what data need to be gathered, gaining and maintaining 
required access to data, gleaning the meaning of specialized talk-in-interaction, identifying 
relevant discursive patterns, analysing the discursive pattern and placing this analysis in a 
wider societal context. If datasets do not fully meet the requirements that DP transcription 
poses on data (see also chapter 1), other modes of analysis may be considered.   
  In this chapter, I have attempted to show with the help of my own experiences with 
conducting discursive analyses in the specialized context of plant technology development 
that reflecting upon the impact of the analyst – how he or she gained physical and epistemic 
access to the research setting – may be a good thing; outcomes of discursive analyses 
depend largely on the knowledge, skills and competencies of the researcher, in particular if 
access to data and knowledge of the research site and interaction setting is specialized. 
Moreover, transparency potentially enables readers and reviewers to better appraise the 
researcher’s claims and the scope and societal relevance of presented analyses (see also 
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Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013, on the value of transparency). Against this background, 
discursive psychologists may benefit in their future research activities from reflection upon 
how they came by the knowledge and insights that enabled their analyses.  
Discursive psychologists may gain from reflection, in particular if they see reflection 
as a normal recurring process. As we have seen, the data-driven nature of discursive 
psychological research may mean that one has to adapt data-gathering plans to field site 
realities, e.g. because the desired talk-in-interaction is not taking place or cannot be 
recorded sufficiently. Every change invites reflection because what data one may analyse 
potentially affects analysis. It is also good to check whether the actual dataset as opposed to 
the pre-planned dataset still optimally serves the research purposes, or whether one needs 
to gather new or additional data or adapt the research focus.  
Furthermore, reflection may be particularly successful if DP analysts are able to 
balance the involvement with gatekeepers and study participants necessary to build and 
maintain physical and epistemic access to the research setting on the one hand with 
sufficient distance to ensure the scientific independence of the research on the other.  
What interviewees say in interviews may contradict what they do and accomplish 
with their talk; this means that interviews do not necessarily say much about what is 
happening in naturalistic talk-in-interaction (e.g. see Austin, 1962). This chapter has 
demonstrated that this does not render interviews useless in research projects where 
discursive psychology is the main research approach. Interviews may be useful in different 
ways. First of all, interviews tend to provide valuable information on stakes, interests and 
tensions endemic to the interaction environment and that are relevant to the actions 
performed in talk-in-interaction. This knowledge enables analysts to deploy the inference 
richness of specialized discourses.  
Secondly, ethnographic interviews and being there at the research site may play a 
pivotal role in gaining access to relevant data and in rapport-building activities that may 
come in handy especially if, later on, one needs the active participation of study participants. 
Interviews may also be deployed to determine the viability of discursive psychological 
analyses against the background of research aims and questions, e.g. can enough hours of 
recorded naturalistic talk-in-interaction be obtained? Last but not least, interviews may give 
some inkling of the nature and quality of talk-in-interaction that may be recorded. The latter 
helps to determine whether there is a good fit between research focus and data and 
between data and choice of methodology. Given the different functions that interviews may 
play in a discursive psychological research project, one may conclude that interviews may 
indirectly affect analysis (through their impact on access to data and knowledge of analysts) 
and therefore are worth considering.  
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3  ‘Everyone May Think Whatever They Like, but Scientists . . .’  
Or How and To What End Plant Scientists Manage the Science–Society Relationship 
 
Published as: Mogendorff, K., te Molder, H., Gremmen, B., & Van Woerkum, C. (2012). “Everyone May Think 
Whatever They Like, but Scientists...” Or How and To What End Plant Scientists Manage the Science–Society 
Relationship. Science Communication 34(6), 727–751. 
 
In this study the authors examine the performative functions of scientists’ discursive 
constructions of the science–society relationship. They use discursive psychology to analyze 
interviews with Dutch plant scientists and show that interviewees contrast the freedom of 
people in the private sphere with scientists’ responsibilities in the professional sphere to 
regulate “lay” access to science. To accomplish this, interviewees make claims about the 
scientific value of lay views only after they have displayed their tolerance of these views. 
Additionally, many interviewees refer to their own lay status in everyday life. Finally, the 
relationship between findings and recent science communication approaches is discussed. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Notions about how scientists should or best could communicate with different societal 
groups have changed. Policymakers and other stakeholders increasingly recognize that so-
called laypeople18 have salient knowledge and critical perspectives that should be taken 
seriously as inputs into planning, designing, and implementing research (Burchell, Franklin, & 
Holden, 2009; Caron-Flinterman, 2005; Leach, Scoones, & Wynne, 2005). These changes also 
apply to the plant (genomics) field.  
As a result, the old strategy of agro-biotechnologists to treat “scientists” and “the 
public” as mutually exclusive categories in which scientists have relevant knowledge and 
laypeople do not (Cook, Pieri, & Robbins, 2004) may no longer count with scientists and 
other stakeholders as an effective way to manage communication with non-scientists. This 
raises the question of how agricultural scientists now construct the science–society 
relationship and what the possible communicative implications are. Looking at the 
performative functions of plant scientists’ constructions of the science–society relationship 
may be relevant because such an analysis offers other insights than content-oriented 
analyses; there is a difference between the semantic meaning of what people say and the 
communicative actions people perform with what they say (Duranti, 1997; Potter, 1996). For 
instance, Jingree, Finlay, and Antaki (2006) show with an interactional analysis of residents–
service providers meetings that the service providers in the study use empowering words in 
a way that disempowers residents. Simultaneously, the use of empowering words indicates 
that service providers discursively respond to changed notions about how society should 
treat its disabled citizens. The past decades have seen a shift in focus from caring for 
disabled citizens to empowering citizens to take care of themselves (see, e.g., Barnes, Oliver, 
& Barton, 2002). 
A performative analysis contributes to a better understanding of what conversational 
partners do by preferring one account over the other at a certain moment in the interaction. 
Insight into what is accomplished with science–society constructions in plant (genomics) 
                                                 
18
 Where we write about laypeople, one may also read non-scientists. We use the term laypeople to be in 
keeping with the terminology used in the existing lay–expert literature.  
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science may further insight into why exchanges of arguments pro and against plant genomics 
have not resulted in a societal consensus about whether and, if so, when the deployment of 
genomics technology is desirable (Bauer, 2002; Gaskell & Bauer, 2001; Hagendijk, 2004). 
In this article, we present an analysis of Dutch plant (genomics) scientists’ discursive 
constructions of the science–society relationship in 12 interviews. With this, we aim to 
further understanding and raise awareness of how scientists’ discursive constructions 
actively shape communication between science and society and how scientists’ 
constructions are informed by changing notions about how science should relate to society. 
We employ the approach of discursive psychology to look at:  
 How plant scientists discursively construct the science–society relationship in their 
talk. 
 What scientists’ discursive constructions achieve with regard to the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities of both non-scientists and plant scientists in interaction.  
 How plant scientists’ discursive constructions of the science–society relationship 
relate to current science communication models; do current models adequately 
explain how plant scientists construct the science–society relationship, or can these 
models be refined? 
 
To our knowledge, a detailed discursive analysis of plant scientists’ constructions of the 
science–society relationship has not yet been performed. In the following section, we discuss 
the literature on scientists’ understanding of laypeople, including the public engagement 
literature, to sketch how scientists have conceptualized laypeople and to explicate in more 
detail what our research may add to the literature. 
 
 
3.2 Scientists’ Understanding of the Public and Public Engagement 
Research on scientists’ understanding of the so-called public and public engagement is 
diverse19. Studies vary greatly in the methodologies they employ (Hansen et al., 2003). Some 
are based on quantitative data analysis (e.g., Crawley, 2007; Gunter, Kinderlerer, & 
Beyleveld, 1999); others seek to qualitatively interpret observations, individual interviews, 
focus groups, workshops, or portrayals of science in the media (e.g., Davies, 2008; Yearley, 
2000). However, most of these studies agree that scientists still predominantly engage in 
one-way communication with the public. Furthermore, these studies conclude that there 
may be a gap between the theory and the practice of public engagement in science (Barnett, 
Burningham, Walker, & Cass, 2010; Davies, 2008; Wynne, 2001, 2006). Wynne (2001, 2006) 
goes even further and claims that deficit approaches to public understanding of science are 
re-created partly because engagement activities are more about getting potentially 
controversial technologies accepted than ensuring better decision making.  
Studies that take into account the inherently interactional and dynamic nature of 
expertise and language may help us understand the real or imagined gap between theory 
and practice (Carr, 2010; Duranti, 1997). Expertise can be seen as an interactional 
                                                 
19
 We sometimes talk about the public in this article. We primarily use this term to be in keeping with the 
literature on scientists’ understanding of the public and public engagement. However, whenever one reads 
public, one may also read non-scientists. Non-scientists we deem a more neutral term because the term public 
suggests that scientists can totally control with whom they interact. However, in actual practice, non-scientific 
participants are not a passive partner in science communication activities. Non-scientists are likely to decide for 
themselves whether and, if so, when they participate in public engagement activities. 
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accomplishment in that an expert needs to be treated as knowledgeable by participants in 
talk-in-interaction (Antaki, 1994; Carr, 2010; Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, & Tutton, 2007). The 
latter implies that research should not limit itself to content analyses of what people say and 
write. These studies often assume that expertise is primarily something people possess and 
not something people need to establish in interaction over and over again by talking and 
acting like an expert (e.g., see Carr, 2010; Duranti, 1997). For instance, a content-oriented 
analysis of interviews and meetings may reveal the strategies that non-scientists employ to 
be treated as having relevant contributory expertise (e.g., Epstein, 1995). However, from 
these studies we do not learn what discursive constructs people employ at what moment in 
interactions to achieve diverse goals. The latter is important because one discursive 
construct may engender different effects depending on when and where in the interaction it 
is employed (Sacks, 1992). Even scholars who conduct a discursive analysis of science and 
technology debates as part of a study often do not investigate the precise discursive 
circumstances in which the observed phenomenon occurs (see, e.g., Kerr et al., 2007). 
In contrast, the performative analysis we present in this article focuses on how the 
situated use of discursive constructions affects understandings and relationships between 
scientists and non-scientists. More awareness of what talk accomplishes at certain moments 
in interaction may empower stakeholders to better manage relationships (see also 
Lamerichs, Koelen, & te Molder, 2009). We will now discuss the literature on plant scientists’ 
understanding of laypeople given that epistemic cultures differ substantially across the 
sciences (e.g., Knorr-Cetina, 1999). 
 
Plant Scientists’ Understanding of Laypeople 
Empirical studies of plant (genomics) scientists’ understanding of laypeople and empirical 
studies of public engagement are scarce. Burchell (2007a, 2007b), Burchell et al. (2009), and 
Cook et al. (2004) are notable exceptions.  
Based on interviews with 30 senior scientists predominantly working in the medical 
bio-sciences, Burchell et al. (2009) claim that bio-scientists consider it important to include 
laypeople in their deliberations. They also report that bio-scientists say that laypeople are 
generally interested in scientific progress but are easily misled by the media and pressure 
groups (Burchell et al., 2009). However, several studies claim that scientists portray 
laypeople as less positive toward agricultural genomics than toward biomedical genomics 
(Burchell 2007a, 2007b; Burchell et al., 2009; Cook et al., 2004; Hansen et al., 2003). 
Moreover, Cook et al. (2004) conclude that agro-biotechnology scientists in the United 
Kingdom treat “scientists” and “laypeople” as mutually exclusive categories because they do 
not acknowledge their own existence as both scientists and laypeople. However, Cook et al. 
(2004) remain vague about what their informants discursively achieve with this construction 
of the expert–lay relationship. 
Wynne (2001, 2005) and Young and Matthews (2007) argue that scientists’ claim that 
laypeople oppose genetically modified organisms because they do not understand that 
science cannot provide certainties is a self-serving construction. According to them, natural 
scientists try to retain authority and scientific freedom by stating that what laypeople want is 
unrealistic and irrational. These conclusions, however, are not based on a discursive analysis 
of what scientists achieve with their claims about laypeople but on opinion research and 
logical reasoning. In contrast, by analyzing what scientists say in talk-in-interaction, we are 
able to investigate what plant scientists’ discursive constructions of the science–society 
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relationship accomplish independent of what they themselves report that they achieve with 
these constructions. 
 
 
3.3 Participants in Our Study: Data, Method, and Analytical Approach 
Twelve Dutch plant (genomics) scientists were interviewed to identify important issues in 
plant disease management. The interviews are part of a larger study that focuses on how 
discursive constructions in talk-in-interaction may affect intergroup relationships and choices 
in three plant research programs that employ different strategies to combat disease in staple 
crops. Staple crops are a major Dutch export product, which makes plant disease 
management a serious business in the Netherlands. 
The interviewed scientists are or have been involved in at least one of the three 
aforementioned research programs. Participants were interviewed because of their 
knowledge of the plant sciences field and because they have experience with dynamics in 
stakeholder interaction—for example, public resistance to genetically modified crops. The 
latter we thought was relevant because scientists’ past experiences may inform their current 
constructions of the science–society relationship. 
Participants were selected with the snowball method; scientists in multi-stakeholder 
boards connected to the different research programs were approached for an interview and 
asked to name other suitable candidates. At 12 interviews data collection stagnated; 
participants provided names of scientists who had already been interviewed.  
To allow interviewees themselves to introduce relevant issues and let the interview 
resemble an ordinary conversation, a topic list was employed as is the norm in ethnographic 
interviewing (Duranti, 1997). Plant scientists were invited to talk about their education and 
professional background, the plant disease management strategies of the research 
programs, their role(s) in the programs, and the people and groups they interact with. While 
listening to interview recordings and reading through transcripts, we noticed that 
participants consistently and extensively talked about laypeople in a way we have not yet 
encountered in the literature: They did not construct laypeople and scientists as mutually 
exclusive categories (cf. Cook et al., 2004). Therefore, we decided to further investigate the 
purpose of this part of the plant scientists’ talk. 
 
Analytical Approach: Discursive Psychology 
In this study, we employ discursive psychology to analyze science–society constructions of 
plant scientists. Discursive psychologists analyze discourse as a sociocultural practice (Potter, 
1996). The focus is on the situated use and effect of people’s narratives, descriptions, and 
statements (Potter, 1996; Sacks, 1992). Analysis is generally based on a detailed examination 
of discursive actions in sequence. Analysts use the evolving turn-by-turn development of a 
conversation or narrative as a resource to make sense of the social activities that are 
performed with talk. For instance, speakers may render a story about an unexpected 
experience believable by suggesting that they first exhausted rational explanations for what 
they experienced before they turned to the paranormal to make sense of what happened 
(e.g., Wooffitt, 1992). By first narrating how they sought for rational explanations for an 
unexpected experience, speakers demonstrate that they are capable of rational thought, 
undermining the possible inference that they are delusional. 
Discursive psychologists also employ the rhetorical principle (Potter & Hepburn, 
2005; Wooffitt, 1992); analysts ask themselves why a speaker makes a claim in a certain way 
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to demonstrate how speakers routinely undermine possible alternatives of their 
representations of events, subjects, and objects (Antaki, 1994; Wooffitt, 1992). For instance, 
when a mother says that the sports teacher said that her daughter excels at tennis, she 
undermines the possible inference that she – as a proud mother – exaggerates the 
accomplishments of her daughter. 
Analysts prefer to work with recordings of so-called naturalistic interactions: 
interactions in which the analyst does not take an active part either by initiating or by 
participating in the interaction. The advantage of analyzing naturalistic data is that the 
researcher does not directly affect the turn-by-turn development of the recorded talk-in-
interaction. Of course, the presence of the researcher in itself and the act of recording may 
affect the turn-by-turn development of interactions. However, the potential impact of 
researchers on the turn-by-turn development of naturalistic interactions is different from 
researchers’ impact on the turn-by-turn development of interactions in which the researcher 
takes an active part – as in for example, interviews (Duranti, 1997; ten Have, 1990). 
If and how discursive psychologists analyze interviews depends on their research 
questions, the obtainability of recordings of naturalistic interactions, and the kind of 
interactions that are studied. However, interviews are always analyzed as conversations 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2005). An advantage of a discursive analysis of interviews is that 
phenomena may be analyzed that are less likely to be invoked in naturalistic settings but are 
nevertheless considered important, for instance, because they are mentioned in the 
empirical literature (cf. Duranti, 1997). For instance, in a researcher–stakeholder meeting lay 
views may not be discussed because participants already have a shared understanding of the 
relevance of lay views for the research under discussion. Moreover, experts are unlikely to 
state that lay views are irrational in meetings with laypeople. How and when speakers make 
claims and narrate events partly depends on the groups that participate in talk-in-interaction 
and their personal and collectively shared knowledge about events, subjects, and objects 
(Antaki, 1994). Moreover, in research interviews, participants may talk more freely than in 
naturalistic settings in which what they say may have a direct impact on the projects they 
have a stake in professionally (cf. Duranti, 1997). Interviews may enable us to explore the 
performative functions of scientists’ negative statements about laypeople. 
 
 
3.4 Analysis: Scientists’ Construction of the Science–Society Relationship 
A device that scientists in interviews consistently used to make claims about the science–
society relationship is what we named displays of tolerance20. Displays of tolerance are 
statements that express some sort of understanding, lenience, or forbearance, such as I 
understand that, I can imagine something by that, it is okay with me (Participants S2 and S3). 
Typically, displays of tolerance do not explicate what exactly is understood, imagined, or 
allowed. In our data, displays of tolerance refer to laypeople’s views21. The science–society 
construction we found in our data, however, does not solely consist of a display of tolerance 
of lay views but is followed by a claim about the scientific value of lay views—for example, 
but you cannot take that seriously of course (Participant S6). Furthermore, this science–
                                                 
20
 We did not find earlier studies in the literature that discursively analyze displays of tolerance. 
21
 Interviewees generally do not employ the terms laypeople or lay views. They speak of they, people, or 
consumers when they talk about the societal relevance of their work or when they discuss well-known lay 
arguments. In the empirical part of the article, we use the term laypeople as an umbrella category for 
interviewees’ different references to non-scientists. Likewise, we employ lay views to refer to non-scientific 
views. 
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society construction is often supported by membership claims in the lay category, such as: as 
a consumer I have that too (Participant S7). 
The displays of tolerance discursively contrast with the claims about the scientific 
value of lay views that follow it; displays of tolerance are always made in the first person 
singular, whereas claims about the scientific value of lay views are made by using the 
generalized pronoun “you.” We will demonstrate how the differential use of personal 
pronouns serves to delegate lay views to the private sphere and scientific concerns to the 
public sphere (see also Swierstra & te Molder, 2012). We will furthermore show that the 
latter is instrumental in managing the science–society relationship. 
Moreover, claims about the scientific value of lay views are always made after 
displays of tolerance of lay views. Additionally, some participants claim membership in the 
lay category between displays of tolerance and claims about the scientific value of lay views. 
This combination of discursive devices is—as we shall demonstrate—used for one purpose 
only: to manage lay access to science. However, in our data, displays of tolerance of lay 
views and claims in the lay category are not always followed by claims about the scientific 
value of lay views. We also found singular uses of displays of tolerance, singular uses of 
claims in the lay category, and displays of tolerance combined with claims in the lay 
category. 
In the following subsections, we will first discuss the uses to which displays of 
tolerance and claims in the lay category are put before we examine participants’ displays of 
tolerance followed by claims about the scientific value of lay views. 
 
Displays of Tolerance of Lay Views and Membership Claims in Lay Categories 
The following fragment is one of numerous examples in which Scientist S3 uses the specific 
display of tolerance it is okay with me to explain why lay expectations with regard to our 
food system are unrealistic. In Fragment 1, Scientist S3 talks about a media campaign called 
“The Pigs Pay the Price.” The campaign is organized by an action group. Details on transcript 
notation can be found in the appendix to this chapter22. 
 
Fragment 1: Singular use of a display of tolerance 
1  S3:  Yes, it is okay with me to let pigs live 
2         outside in the fresh air (.) 
3         but don’t ask how bad it smells= 
4  K:  =Yes (.) 
5   there are reasons for the way things are done= 
6  S3:  =EXACTLY (.) 
7   people are not told the whole story 
(S3 = interviewed scientist, K = interviewer and first author) 
 
In Lines 1 and 2, Scientist S3 displays his tolerance toward laypeople’s views on stock 
breeding. With this, S3 shows that he has knowledge of lay views. Moreover, he acts as if he 
is entitled to grant or withhold permission to let pigs live in fresh air. A possible explanation 
for why S3 states that it is okay with him to let pigs live in fresh air is that he wants to 
demonstrate that he is not against lay views as such. The display of tolerance is followed by 
the objection but don’t ask how bad it smells (Line 3). Interestingly, this is a common 
                                                 
22
 All fragments are analyzed in Dutch and subsequently translated from Dutch to English by the first author. 
Translations from Dutch are as literal as possible for analytical purposes. 
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complaint about pig farming in the open air. The objection acts as a disclaimer and 
undermines the possible inference that S3 as a private person may support all lay views. A 
display of tolerance of lay views followed by an objection that may also be heard as a typical 
lay view enables S3 both to demonstrate his superior knowledge of lay views and to criticize 
lay views without inviting the potential inference that he is principally against them. S3 
accomplishes superior knowledge of lay views by showing that lay views are not always 
compatible with each other. The latter also enables S3 to dismiss as unrealistic laypeople’s 
specific desire to let pigs live outside in the fresh air. 
The analysis that S3 shows himself not to be against lay views per se, and displays his 
superior knowledge of lay views, is further supported by S3’s statement that people are not 
told the whole story (Line 7). By saying this, S3 claims to know more than laypeople. 
Moreover, he shows that he does not hold laypeople accountable for their unrealistic views; 
laypeople are misled by others. 
Participants’ references to their own layness perform different discursive functions. 
However, there is no exclusive relationship between membership claims in lay categories 
and the discursive actions they perform. For instance, some participants refer to their own 
layness to show that their research is responsive to society; other participants invoke other 
devices to accomplish the same goal. In the following fragment, Scientist S4 answers 
Interviewer K’s query about how he listens to society. K asks him this after he has claimed 
that his research is relevant to society. 
 
Fragment 2: Singular use of scientists’ membership claims in lay categories 
1  S4:  We have contact with breeders and cultivators 
2   with farmers we have little contact 
3   (0.8) 
4   Anyway, you are yourself a consumer (.) 
5   So, naturally, I have my own personal opinion (.) 
6  K:  yes= 
7  S4:  =that are the sources 
(S4 = interviewed scientist, K = interviewer) 
 
In this example, Scientist S4 explicitly claims membership in the lay category in Lines 4 and 5 
to justify why he and his colleagues have little contact with farmers (Line 2). The use of the 
personal pronoun you in Line 4 is ambiguous in that it could refer to S4 and to Interviewer K. 
However, by continuing with I have my own personal opinion (Line 5), S4 makes the 
generalized entitlement to the consumer category applicable to himself. In the following 
fragment, displays of tolerance are followed by a claim in the lay category. 
 
Fragment 3: Displays of tolerance followed by a claim in the lay category 
1  S2:  As a scientist you have to say rubbish (.) nonsense 
2  K:  (.) And as a citizen↑ 
3  S2: I cannot separate them (.) ((both roles)) 
4   NO OF COURSE NOT 
5   (0.6) 
6  K:  okay= 
7  S2: =I do understand that people have no knowledge 
8   of this field ((genomics)) 
9  I can imagine they can be made afraid 
10   ((ten lines omitted in which S2 blames 
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11  Greenpeace for making people afraid)) 
12 K: Citizens are not scientists= 
13  S2:  =Naturally= 
14  K:  =they have different concerns in everyday life (.) 
15  S2:  Naturally (.) of many many things I know nothing 
16   and then I make decisions in a different way 
   (S2 = interviewed scientist, K = interviewer) 
 
In this fragment, Scientist S2 not only displays his tolerance of laypeople (Lines 7–9) but also 
puts limits on his membership in the lay category. In Lines 3 and 4, S2 states that as an 
expert in genomics, he cannot be a layperson on the subject of plant genomics. In Lines 15 
and 16, however, he claims that he often makes decisions like a layperson in everyday life. 
With this, S2 presents layness as a situated practice that is rooted in everyday life and in 
partial knowledge. Of some subjects scientists know much, of many subjects they know little. 
This fragment explicitly shows how by referring to their own experiences as laymen in 
everyday life, participants claim knowledge of how layness is enacted. Moreover, the claim 
in the lay category serves to strengthen S2’s entitlement to judge lay views: an entitlement 
S2 first establishes by displaying his tolerance of lay views (Lines 7–9). This fragment also 
shows that participants do not claim to know exactly the same as laypeople. To the contrary, 
they claim to know more than laypersons on the subject of plant genomics. Put differently, 
layness and scientific expertise are presented as resources that may be invoked by one and 
the same person but as belonging to different spheres of life: Lay views belong to the private 
sphere; scientific views to the public sphere (see also Swierstra & te Molder, 2012). 
 
Displays of Tolerance Followed by Claims About the Scientific Value of Lay Views 
In this section, we examine how and to what ends displays of tolerance followed by claims 
about the scientific value of lay views are invoked by participants. 
 
Fragment 4: Displays of tolerance, claim in the lay category, and claim about scientific relevance of 
lay views 
7  S8:  that is often not true (.) 
8   but well, you may think that= 
9  =EVERYONE MAY THINK WHATEVER THEY LIKE23  
10   Isn’t it↑(.) 
11  K:  mmh= 
12  S8:  =and make their own choices= 
13  K:  =yes (.) 
14  S8:  thus that I mean as well 
15   there is a little piece of irrationality in that ((the 
16   choices people make)) whereof you think= 
17   =that is almost impossible to direct I think 
18   (0.7) 
19   or maybe you can but often it is directed by 
20   (0.3) 
21   things suddenly become scarce or something like 
22   that (.) 
                                                 
23 The Dutch expression Iedereen mag alles vinden is commonly translated in English as Everyone may think 
whatever they like. The literal translation is: Everyone may think everything. 
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23   Or eh popular or modern instantly (.) 
24   that are trends people follow 
25   and they are usually not scientific 
(S8 = interviewed scientist, K = interviewer) 
 
S8 talks in this fragment about the veracity of lay claims. He opens with a rather broad, 
nonspecific statement: Everyone may think everything/whatever they like (Line 9). Everyone 
may think whatever they like first and foremost invokes a sociocultural norm, namely, that 
citizens are free to think and do what they want in their private lives as long as they do not 
harm or hinder others. Also, by stating that everyone may think everything/whatever they 
like, S8 acts as if he has the right to grant or withhold people permission to do whatever they 
like (see also Sneijder & te Molder, 2005). 
Furthermore, the statement everyone may think everything/whatever they like 
contains two extreme case formulations: everyone and everything. Extreme case 
formulations are descriptions that seek by their design to persuade listeners that what is 
stated is believable or reasonable (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998: 209–210). The extreme case 
formulations everyone and everything in this statement serve here to project the curtailment 
that follows later. In everyday life, the statement Everyone may think whatever they like is 
known to be an exaggeration in that it states a moral principle and not a fact of life. People 
cannot always express whatever they like, if only because they need to take into account the 
interests of the people with whom they live and work. Therefore, listeners are likely to 
expect that Everyone may think whatever they like is followed by a disclaimer or restriction. 
Because the curtailment is discursively projected, the restriction that follows appears to be 
reasonable: that are trends that people follow and they are usually not scientific (Lines 24–
25). This restriction enables S8 first to separate lay views from scientific practices by 
allocating them to the private sphere and then to restrict laypeople’s right to make veracity 
claims without appearing intolerant or patronizing. 
 
Fragment 4 (continued) 
26  S8:  thus people have the perception (.) of (.) that is true (.) 
27   that I have too (.) as a consumer (.) 
28  K:  yes 
29  S8:  but if you look at it scientifically (.) 
30   then it is often not true 
31   ((13 lines omitted)) 
32  S8:  we as researchers (.) I want to say 
33   (0.6) 
34   may also be (.) irrational in private life (.) 
35   but as a scientist (.) I think (.) 
36   You should stick to scientific criteria 
(K = interviewer, S8 = interviewed scientist) 
 
Lines 32 to 34 state that scientists may be irrational in their private lives. With this, S8 claims 
that scientists are laypeople in their private lives. In Line 27, S8 is even more explicit about 
his layness in everyday life. By doing so, S8 rules out the possible inference that scientists do 
not understand what motivates laypeople or do not take lay views seriously; on the contrary, 
S8 shows that he has independent access to lay knowledge as a layman in everyday life. 
Moreover, by presenting himself as a scientist and a layperson S8 does claim the capacity 
and the right to determine whether lay views are relevant to science. If S8 claimed 
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membership in only the lay category, he could only claim the right to assess lay views. If S2 
would only invoke his membership in the scientist category, he would put himself in the 
position of being entitled to evaluate scientific arguments only. Moreover, with the use of 
the personal pronoun I in Line 27, S8 establishes that he is only entitled to judge the way 
consumers make choices as a private person. By using I instead of the impersonal you 
preferred by scientists, S8 separates his consumer role from his scientist role (see Myers, 
2006, and Stirling & Manderson, 2012, for more on the uses of impersonal you). Separation 
of these roles is important because S8 has earlier in the fragment restricted laypeople’s right 
to make veracity claims. If S8 had not discursively separated the lay category from the 
science category, he would have curtailed scientists’ right to make veracity claims. 
Furthermore, the statement in Lines 32 to 34, that in everyday life scientists are consumers 
who are entitled to make irrational choices, implies that scientists are able to provide the 
input from a lay perspective if desirable. Finally, by alternately presenting himself as a 
consumer and a scientist, S8 not only portrays himself as capable of assessing lay views but 
also undermines laypeople’s right to assess the relevance of lay views for science. After all, 
laypeople are presented as having access only to lay knowledge whereas scientists present 
themselves as knowledge hybrids (see also Thomas & Twyman, 2004).  
In the following fragment, Interviewer K introduces a well-known lay argument 
against transgenesis—a specific form of genetic modification that employs genes of different 
species to enhance a (food) product or organism. K introduces the argument after scientist 
S2 has extensively discussed two types of genetic modification: cisgenesis and transgenesis. 
Cisgenesis is a form of genetic modification that only uses genes of crossable species. S2 
argues that from a technological perspective, cisgenesis and transgenesis are similar and do 
not warrant differential treatment. Interviewer K then asks what S2 thinks about vegetarians 
who refuse to eat tomatoes that have been modified with mouse genes: 
 
Fragment 5: Displays of tolerance followed by claims about scientific relevance of lay views 
1  K:  No but can you [by that] 
2  S2:  > [I CAN] IMAGINE SOMETHING > by that 
3   and therefore it is so beautiful (.) that you with 
4   Phytophthora (.) ((a plant disease)) 
5   use only eh species’ own genes (.) 
6  isn’t it↑ (.) 
7  K:  [°yes°] 
8  S2:  [so] that is all great (.) 
9   ↑so I understand all that↑(.) 
10   and I can imagine that people can make very beautiful 
11   pictures of it ((Phytophthora)) 
12   (0.6) 
13  and eh it sounds nice and eh eh (.) 
14   You can easily make beautiful posters and scary photos 
15   (0.3) 
16   BUT you cannot take that ((cisgenesis)) 
17   seriously of course= 
18 S2:  =As a scientist you have to say rubbish (.) nonsense 
(K= interviewer, S2= interviewed scientist) 
 
Twice, scientist S2 states that he can imagine (in Lines 2 and 10), and once he states that he 
understands everything (Line 9). By doing this, S2 displays his tolerance of lay views. 
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Secondly, by declaring that he can imagine and that he understands, S2 not only shows that 
he has knowledge of lay views, he also claims the right to assess them. Of particular interest 
here is the use of the personal pronoun I in the displays of tolerance. Choosing I over the 
impersonal you generally preferred by scientists (Myers, 2006) indicates that S2 does not 
claim to understand lay views as a scientist. Displaying his understanding and approval of 
cisgenesis as a private person with the personal pronoun I (Lines 2–10) allows S2 later to 
state that scientists should not take lay fears seriously (Lines 16–17). So what at first appears 
to be a contradiction turns out to be no contradiction at all. But why does S2 positively 
assess cisgenesis before he downgrades this practice from a scientific perspective? 
The admonishing declarative but you cannot take that seriously of course (Lines 16–
17) serves to modify the initial positive assessment of cisgenesis (Lines 3–11) and to 
prioritize scientific knowledge over public concerns. It is okay for scientists to take public 
concerns into account as long as it does not compromise scientific standards. After this 
prioritization, the repetitious labeling of lay concerns as rubbish and nonsense in Line 18 
effectively downgrades lay knowledge. 
To conclude, the initial positive assessment of cisgenesis and its subsequent 
downgrading not only enables S2 to ensure that scientific knowledge is prioritized but also 
grants S2 the freedom to exclude lay knowledge from scientific deliberations. Moreover, 
downgrading lay knowledge after prioritization of scientific knowledge serves to give S2 total 
control over lay access to science, if only because prioritization on its own still implies that 
lay views should be taken into account. Furthermore, S2’s positive assessment of cisgenesis 
before the downgrading of lay knowledge undermines the potential inference that S2 is 
against lay views per se. 
In the next fragment, Scientist S argues that acceptance of genomics technology in 
crops has little to do with facts but more with the sides people take – this in response to 
Interviewer K’s query as to whether S sees the genetic modification controversy as only a 
luxury problem. 
 
Fragment 6: Displays of tolerance followed by claims of the scientific relevance of lay views 
4  S:  we:ll that in the beginning (.) when 
5   the whole movement started (.) 
6   to be against it (.) I think that then 
7   good questions have been asked eh 
8   (0.5) 
9   and also relevant questions= 
10   =and it is good that there are regulations (.) 
11  K:  mmh  
12  (0.6) 
13   S:  BUT eh what you SEE now in the last years is that (.)  
14   whenever we submit a field test >we get always (.) 
15   the same arguments from the same opponents 
16   who do not seem to have learned or do not want to learn= 
17   =that in the meantime we (.) that 
18   scientific progress has been made (.) 
19   and that several things ↑(.) that they claim (.) yes (.) 
20   that already has been [proven] that they are NOT true 
21  K:  [mmh] 
22  S:  and that you then should reconsider your position<= 
23   well you can’t do that when you are an opponent (.) 
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24   I do understand that but ehm= 
25   =So (.) there is not really a discussion 
26   going on with those groups it is more like a trench eh 
27   war (0.2) one against the other↓ 
 (K = interviewer, S = interviewed scientist) 
 
In Lines 14–20, Scientist S is talking in us and them categories, strengthening the opposition 
between scientific experts and laypeople when he does something remarkable. S says, Well 
that you can’t do that if you are an opponent (Line 23), followed by Line 24: I do understand 
that but ehm. Line 24 contrasts strongly with what S says directly before and after it. So why 
does S display his understanding in Line 24? Lines 13 to 23 clearly indicate that S does not 
understand why people do not change their views when new scientific evidence warrants it. 
However, in Lines 23 and 24, S claims to understand that people do not give up their chosen 
positions easily, thereby presenting the lay–expert divide as primarily a relational problem 
rather than an epistemic issue. Moreover, in so doing, S acts as if he is entitled to judge 
whether lay views are relevant in the genetically modified organism debate. 
Additionally, the past performance of the lay movement in science–society debates is 
sharply contrasted with the present performance of the movement from Line 13 onward: 
but eh what you see now. The use of the general personal pronoun you serves here to 
transform Scientist S’s statement into a factual formulation (see also Hutchby & Wooffitt, 
1998; Myers, 2006). You in Line 22 contrasts with the I think in Lines 4 to 9, when S positively 
evaluates the performance of the movement. By using the personal pronoun I, S delivers this 
positive assessment of past performance as an opinion rather than a fact (Myers, 2006). This 
difference is relevant here because statements presented as facts tend to be more 
persuasive than statements presented as personal opinions in matters of societal relevance 
(Myers, 2006). 
Because the present performance of lay representatives is formulated as a fact, it is 
discursively made more important than past performance, which is formulated as an 
opinion. However, the positive evaluation of the past helps S allocate blame to lay 
representatives for the current bad relations between science and society and not directly to 
laymen themselves. This positive assessment also helps invalidate the possible inference that 
scientists are generally hostile toward lay representatives. In addition, S makes lay 
representatives look bad by postulating that laypeople’s representatives did not learn or do 
not want to learn, in Line 16. In a knowledge society such as the Netherlands, unwillingness 
to learn is considered a greater offense than a knowledge deficit as such. This notion is 
reinforced by contrasting lay representatives’ unwillingness to learn with science’s 
willingness to listen; science has listened to representatives in the past and adapted its 
practices, but lay or citizen representatives do not reciprocate this now. Consequently, the 
behavior of representatives is presented as improper in two ways: as unwilling to learn and 
as violating the social norm of reciprocity. Plant scientists on the other hand are portrayed as 
willing to include laypeople’s views if laypeople or their representatives provide good 
arguments. S uses this contrast between laymen and experts at the end of the fragment to 
explain the current lack of contact between scientists and lay representatives and to claim 
the right to decide whether lay views should be included in science–society debates. As in 
the beginning of the fragment, where S acknowledges that laypeople have made a 
contribution to science in the past, S nevertheless leaves open the possibility that laypeople 
or their representatives may be actively engaged in science–society deliberations in the 
future. 
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3.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
Our analysis has shown how and to what ends participants manage the science–society 
relationship. The interviewed scientists always display their tolerance of lay views as private 
persons before they make claims about the scientific value of lay views as scientists. In this 
section, we discuss the implications of our analysis. We look at (a) the discursive functions of 
displays of tolerance, particularly in combination with claims about the scientific value of lay 
views; (b) why displays of tolerance always precede claims about the scientific value of lay 
views; and (c) how plant scientists’ constructions of the science–society relationship relate to 
what recent science communication perspectives claim about these relationships. 
 
The Discursive Function of Scientists’ Displays of Tolerance Combined With Dismissive Claims 
About the Scientific Value of Lay Views 
First of all, displays of tolerance do not simply serve to demonstrate scientists’ 
comprehension of lay views; if that was the purpose, the scientists would have been more 
specific about what exactly they understand or can imagine and would provide proof of their 
comprehension. Second, the interviewed scientists display their tolerance although it is 
formally not part of their job to do so. Because they nevertheless do use displays of 
tolerance, they act as if their capacity to understand, allow, or imagine lay views does 
matter. Moreover, they act as if they are entitled to evaluate lay views. This analysis, as we 
have seen, is strengthened by the participants’ claims in lay categories. Displays of tolerance 
in our data seem to indicate here that scientists are concerned about the societal image of 
their research to some extent; they show with their displays that they do care about lay 
views but that they do not necessarily need to involve laypeople or their views in their 
research practices. 
In combination with claims about the scientific relevance of lay views, displays of 
tolerance achieve yet another purpose. Scientists use membership claims in the scientist and 
lay category to create the freedom to decide for themselves whether they find it necessary 
to incorporate lay views in their research. To accomplish this, they need independent access 
to lay knowledge and the competence and the entitlement to assess lay views. The scientists 
in our data corpus achieve independent access by claiming membership in lay categories; 
they achieve entitlement to assess lay views with their displays of tolerance of lay views; and 
they achieve competence to assess lay views with their independent access to lay and expert 
knowledge in combination with their entitlement to judge lay views. 
As this article has demonstrated, scientists consolidate their right to decide whether 
lay views should be incorporated in science–society deliberations by prioritizing scientific 
knowledge, downgrading lay knowledge, or restricting laypeople’s entitlement to participate 
in scientific deliberations by allocating lay views to the private sphere (see also Swierstra & 
te Molder, 2012). 
Participants primarily achieve downgrading, prioritizing, and restricting by contrasting 
claims in the lay category with claims in the expert category. Interviewed scientists achieve 
contrast by using the following: 
 Nouns/adjectives: for example, cisgenesis is beautiful from a lay perspective, but 
rubbish or nonsense from a scientific perspective. 
 Verbs: for example, laypeople may do whatever they like, but scientists should stick 
to scientific criteria. 
 Personal pronouns: for example, I as a private person versus the impersonal you of 
the scientist. 
   
56 
 
Why Displays of Tolerance Are Always Followed by Claims About the Scientific Value of Lay 
Views 
In the past, plant scientists’ immediate reaction in interviews was that as scientists they 
could not take lay arguments seriously because they were irrational or not fact based (see, 
e.g., Cook et al., 2004). Why do plant scientists now display their tolerance of lay views first 
before they proceed to downgrade lay views and prioritize scientific knowledge? The 
problem of dismissing lay arguments out of hand is that it leaves experts vulnerable to the 
critique that they are not capable or willing to consider lay views: a critique one can do 
without in a context where funding organizations demand that scientists incorporate lay 
views in their research. 
In contrast, scientists who display their tolerance of lay views before they are critical 
about them are less likely to be accused of lack of knowledge, willingness, or competence to 
assess lay views. Of course, scientists could also express their tolerance after they have 
labeled lay views as not relevant to science, but in that case the effect of displays of 
tolerance such as I understand that changes; then these displays primarily serve to soften 
the harshness of the critique that has been offered. 
 
How Scientists’ Constructions of the Science–Society Relationship Relate to Recent Science 
Communication Approaches 
The research presented in this article indicates that the constructions of absent laypeople 
fulfill an important role in plant scientists’ accounts (see also Hacking, 2007; Wynne, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the role that the interviewed scientists allocate to laypeople in their accounts 
is rather limited and passive. Interviewed scientists appear to want to contribute to society 
by giving laypeople the freedom to reject or to use the technologies and knowledge they 
come up with (cf. Benschop, Horstman, & Vos, 2003).  
Our scientists seem to propagate a science for society but not a science in society. 
Their discursive practice still resembles a top-down model of science communication, 
although the role that scientists ascribe to themselves has changed. They present 
themselves no longer primarily as superior knowledge producers for society but more as 
actors who can best regulate the use of different kinds of knowledge if necessary or 
desirable. 
Scientists’ constructions of the science–society relationship appear to be something 
in between a deficit model on the one hand and a dialogue or participation model on the 
other (cf. Burchell et al., 2009; Rowe & Frewer, 2005). We propose to tentatively name this 
phenomenon the “superior capacity model.” We have chosen to use the term model 
because the discursive constructions participants in our study employ indicate that they 
partly orient toward and draw on deficit and participation models to account for if, how, and 
when they communicate with laypeople. Our model is similar to classical deficit approaches 
in that laypeople are conceptualized as lacking relevant knowledge and experience. It is 
dissimilar from deficit approaches in that informing the public is considered less important; 
instead, participants claim that laypeople lack the competence and experience to manage 
different kinds of knowledge needed to solve today’s complex, societal problems. This they 
do by presenting scientists as better equipped to judge different kinds of knowledge than 
laypeople are. Our model is akin to participation and dialogue models in that it shares their 
underlying assumption that different stakeholders may have different types of relevant 
knowledge (Leach et al. 2005).  
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However, contrary to participation and dialogue models, our model does not see 
participation as a precondition for the resolution of societal problems (cf. Burningham, 
Barnett, Carr, Clift, & Wehrmeyer, 2007). The participation of particular groups may offer no 
added value, partly because of the existence of knowledge hybrids, as our participants 
present themselves, who simultaneously possess and competently combine lay and expert 
knowledge (see also Thomas & Twyman (2004) for the uses of knowledge hybrids). Another 
reason why lay participation may not offer added value is that participants in our study 
allocate the relevance of their own and others’ lay views to the private sphere (see also 
Swierstra & te Molder, 2012); in everyday life, it is okay for scientists to make decisions as a 
layperson. However, interviewed scientists claim that, in a scientific context, different rules 
for decision making apply.  
This superior capacity model is a construction that seems to serve interviewed 
scientists rather well; they retain their scientific autonomy without contradicting the 
assumption of funding agencies and others that laypeople have salient knowledge. However, 
our study leaves many questions unanswered. First of all, further research is needed to 
determine whether scientists in other epistemic communities employ the discursive 
construction/model we found and whether the function of the construction is the same in 
different settings. Secondly, it remains to be seen whether plant scientists’ science–society 
constructions will hold when scientists interact with different stakeholder groups and 
(representatives of) laypeople in the flesh. 
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Appendix: Transcription Notations 
Based on Jeffersonian transcription (Jefferson, 2004):  
[ text ]   Overlapping speech 
(x.x)   Pause of x.x seconds 
(.)   Micro pause, less than 0.2 seconds 
(text)   Speech unclear 
↑word,↓word Onset of noticeable pitch rise or fall 
wo:rd   Colons show that the speaker has stretched the preceding sound 
word   Emphasized 
WORD  Speaker is talking louder 
° text °  Speaker is talking softer 
((text))  Transcriber’s remarks 
=   No pause between words or turns 
>text<   Fast speaking 
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4 We Say: ‘. . .’, They Say: ‘. . .’  
How Plant Science Experts Draw on Reported Dialogue to Shelve User Concerns 
 
Published as: Mogendorff, K., te Molder, H., van Woerkum, C., & Gremmen, B. (2014). We say: ‘. . .’, they say: ‘. 
. .’: How plant science experts draw on reported dialogue to shelve user concerns. Discourse & Communication 
8(2), 137–154. DOI: 10.1177/1750481313507152 
 
This study aims to increase insight into the uses of experts’ references to physically absent 
technology users in government-funded plant science. A discursive psychological analysis of 
expert board meetings shows that experts invoke various forms of reported 
dialogue/thoughts and dispositional statements when problems with technology and with 
program funding are discussed. Forms of reported dialogue serve to demonstrate that 
experts engage in dialogue with users, understand and are reasonable about users’ concerns, 
and that the content of user concerns does not agree with expert views. Dispositional 
statements allow users’ feelings rather than users’ knowledge to be acknowledged as 
relevant. By establishing that user concerns contrast with expert concerns in type and content 
and by not discussing how users’ feelings may be incorporated into technology, experts 
shelve user concerns. This practice may hinder the development of user-friendly technologies.  
 
4.1 Introduction  
Increasingly governmental funding bodies expect scientists to develop new technologies 
that match prospective users’ requirements and serve societal goals (e.g. see Leach et al., 
2005). This also applies to the specialized field of plant science in which prospective users 
of technology are farmers and plant breeders. 
  However, technologies that primarily serve societal goals such as the reduction of 
agrochemical use may compromise farmers’ boundary conditions: if farmers do not apply 
agrochemicals in sufficient amounts they may lose their harvests to pests and diseases. 
With our study we seek to provide insight into how plant experts deal with the dilemma 
of how to treat user concerns face-to-face other – often competing – concerns in 
technology development. 
  We investigate to what interactional ends plant experts refer to users in 
institutional meetings that aim to ensure that new plant technologies are user-friendly. 
This perspective is relatively new, for, despite it being widely acknowledged that 
prospective users are central to the enterprise of technology development, it is rarely 
investigated how experts interactively deal with concerns of users of technology 
(Mejlgaard and Stares, 2012; Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2005) or how the articulation of user 
concerns in talk-in-interaction affects technology development. 
  Studies that do investigate how users matter in technology development tend to 
offer insights into the content of arguments that key players use to explain existing 
relationships and dynamics in biotechnology (e.g. see COGEM (The Netherlands 
Commission on Genetic Modification), 2007; Yamaguchi, 2007) or they provide insights 
into how conceptions about ‘lay’ participants affect who gets the opportunity to voice 
‘lay’ concerns during deliberations and who does not (Felt and Fochler, 2010; Michael, 
2009; Powell et al., 2011). Studies such as these teach us that engagement activities may 
not be designed to give all relevant actors the opportunity to voice their concerns. 
Consequently, much depends on how actual participants voice their own and others’ 
concerns. 
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  In the discourse literature there are hardly any studies about technology 
development in dyadic or multi-party settings. An exception is a two-party study by Veen 
et al. (2012) that looks at dynamics in interactions between prospective users of medical 
technology and experts. Moreover, conversation analytic studies that look at how 
participants voice others’ concerns in interaction overwhelmingly favor dyadic 
interactions over multi-party interactions (Holt and Clift, 2007). The latter is problematic 
because the interactional dynamics in multi-party settings are more complex than in 
dyadic settings, and most deliberations in technology development take place in multi-
party settings – settings in which three or more actors participate. 
  The discursive psychological analysis of experts’ user-references we present in 
this article is situated in a setting in which four types of experts participate and therefore 
may shed some new light on dynamics in multi-party settings. In the following sections 
we will first discuss relevant literature on user-references and the complex, non-
everyday context of interest – plant disease management science – before we present 
our analysis. Some basic knowledge of the context of plant disease management we 
deem necessary to be able to appreciate the discursive practices themselves and their 
social scientific relevance (see also De Kok, 2008; Moerman, 1990; Stokoe, 2012). 
However, we do not purport to claim that the discursive practices we explore are unique 
to the study setting, nor that they are universal practices. 
  User-references may take different forms. We focus on how users are commonly 
invoked in the context at hand: by invoking the speech or thoughts of absent others 
(Holdsworth and Morgan, 2007) and by voicing dispositional statements of users 
(Edwards, 1994, 1995). 
 
4.2 Invoking Users: The Role of Forms of Reported Speech and Dialogue 
Reported speech is a real or constructed quote of another (Holt and Clift, 2007) such as 
‘they say: “but then I don’t”’. Not all reported speech is projected by a reporting verb 
such as say in the example. However, recipients easily recognize quoted speech because 
it tends to be accompanied by a shift in intonation or, as Wooffitt (1992) calls it, active 
voicing. Generally, the function of active voicing is to animate speech and to objectify 
accounts in which reported speech/thoughts is used to corroborate claims (Potter, 1996: 
161; see for a similar use of reported inner speech, Lamerichs and Te Molder, 2009).  
  Several authors have criticized the concept of reported speech (Buttny and 
Cohen, 2007; Tannen, 1989). We agree with Tannen (1989) that much reported speech is 
dialogical in nature and that it is important to call reported speech dialogue if dialogue is 
reported or invoked; with reported speech speakers may achieve other ends than with 
reported dialogue. For instance, reported dialogue may be preferred in institutional con-
texts in which demonstrated actual engagement with users is greatly valued, as is the 
case in technology development (Leach et al., 2005; Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2005).  
  Participants tend to use different forms of reported speech, thoughts or dialogue: 
direct reported speech (he said ‘. . .’), indirect reported speech (he said that they say ‘. . 
.’), hypothetical reported speech (then he will say ‘. . .’), reported thoughts of others (he 
thinks: ‘. . .’) and plural or prototypical speech (they say that: ‘. . .’). Direct reported 
speech tends to signal direct epistemic access to the quoted, whereas indirect reported 
speech generally signals indirect epistemic access (Holt and Clift, 2007). Studies that 
investigate thoughts tend to focus on speakers’ self-quotes or reported thoughts are 
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treated as reported speech (Holt and Clift, 2007: 150–151). However, one could say that 
quotes of others’ thoughts imply access to the verbalized and non-verbalized thoughts of 
the other and that, as such, reported thoughts signal greater access to the quoted than 
reported speech. 
  According to Buttny (2003: 106) direct reported speech tends to refer to quotes 
of individual people but not of a social category: ‘Direct reported speech purports to 
quote the words of the individual while prototypical speech purports to capture the 
words of the group, as articulated through the individual.’ Prototypical speech is kindred 
to what Wooffitt calls plural speech (Wooffitt, 1992, on plural quotes in Potter, 1996: 
161) in that the speech of the group rather than the individual gets reported. Plural 
speech tends to make the inference available that the plural quote relates to ‘a general 
experience of a range of people’ (Potter, 1996: 162). The latter may be useful if one 
wants to present utterances as representative of a group.  
  According to Myers (1999b) hypothetical reported speech does not refer to 
something that has been said, but to what may be said or could have been said. 
Hypothetical speech may be useful if one does not want to reveal the identity of the 
quoted or one’s relationship to the quoted in that it tends to invoke events that may 
happen or might have happened. 
  The functions reported dialogue serves partly depend on its specific features. 
Typically, reported speech and dialogue convey something about the relationship 
between the quoted and the quoter (e.g. see Buttny and Cohen, 2007; Duranti and 
Goodwin, 1997). Generally, direct quotes say something about quoters’ epistemic access, 
for example, that the speaker has independent access to a knowledge source. Epistemic 
access, in turn, may be used for ends such as providing evidence for a particular position 
or claim (e.g. see Clift, 2006).  
  Moreover, the purposes reported speech or dialogue serve also depend on the 
context of use. As Buttny (1998) and Buttny and Cohen (2007) point out, speakers take 
the quote out of its original context and incorporate it in a new one. This feature of 
quotes-in-use enables speakers to deploy one and the same quote for different 
purposes. Functions, to which contextualized reported speech may be put, include but 
are not limited to blaming others for specific events or lack of results, avoiding 
responsibility for a controversial statement and probing what participants’ stance is on 
certain issues (see Myers, 1999a, for more on functions of reported speech). 
  Finally, reported dialogue may be combined with other kinds of user-references 
such as dispositional statements. Talk about others’ disposition to act in a certain way is 
a device commonly produced to make assertions about others more believable by 
presenting behaviour of a person or group as prototypical of that person or group 
(Edwards, 1994, 1995), for example, ‘He is a jealous type of person’. Dispositional 
statements may refer to cognitive or emotional states of people and are generally 
informed by category-bound inferences. For instance, conservativeness and common 
sense are inferences that tend to be attributed to farmers. Dispositional statements are 
not easily challenged; to challenge them is to challenge widely accepted sociocultural 
inferences (Edwards, 1994; Emmison et al., 2011).  
  In this study, we explore the functions that experts’ active voicing of users’ utter-
ances– user-oriented reported dialogue/thoughts – and dispositional statements fulfil in 
plant technology development. 
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4.3 The Research Setting: An Expert Board in Plant Science 
Eight successive meetings constituting 20 hours of talk of a Dutch expert board con-
nected to several research programs in plant disease management in staple crops were 
recorded in 2010 and 2011. The formal aim of the expert board was to ensure as far as 
possible that the technology developed in plant disease management research programs 
can and will be used by prospective users: crop farmers and/or plant breeders. The 
research discussed in the fragments of this article are – like almost all research discussed 
by the board – governmentally funded. All research discussed by the board is linked to 
the plant disease Phytophthora.  
  Technologies discussed in the board meetings aim to increase the environmental-
friendliness of disease management in staple ‘crops’ by reducing farmers’ dependence 
on agrochemicals or by decreasing staple ‘crops’ susceptibility to Phytophthora, either by 
increasing Phytophthora-resistance of crops or by reducing the virulence of 
Phytophthora itself. These different disease management strategies are met with various 
forms of public and user resistance.    
  Experts who participate in the meetings are government representatives, plant 
scientists and representatives of the plant breeding industry. In half of the meetings crop 
advisors who formally represent farmers were invited to partake in the discussions as 
well. Farmers as a group are excluded from participation on the board24. Plant scientists 
monitor and conduct research and report on research findings, puzzles and problems in 
board meetings. Representatives of the plant breeding industry contribute by bringing in 
their own particular expertise with regard to disease management and they provide the 
technology for field tests. Representatives of government chair meetings explain 
governmental procedures, report back to the Ministry and utilize their contacts in 
support of board decisions.  
  The expert board has formally existed for almost a decade from 2002 to 
December 2011. According to old plans the research programmes and its expert board 
would have been dissolved in 2012 and not in 2011. However, the government decided 
to cut the yearly budget for 2012 in 2011. Consequently, in the meetings from the end of 
2010 till the end of 2011, problems with field tests were drawn upon to argue for 
continued public funding of the research. Because our research project started at the 
end of 2009 we only recorded the board meetings from the start of 2010 onwards.  
  The first author was present at the meetings and took notes about ongoing 
interactions and seating arrangements. To minimize researcher impact on interactions 
during meetings she did not partake in the discussions. However, she talked informally to 
participants during breaks and lunches in between and after meetings. Notes on informal 
talk with board members, PowerPoint presentations and documents used in the meet-
ings were studied to learn more about the context of plant disease management: the 
stakes and interests, the meaning of key concepts and some basic knowledge of the 
technical terminology used during meetings (see Duranti, 2003, for more on this mode of 
data-gathering). These additional data facilitated subsequent transcription and analysis: 
they helped us to understand what experts were saying, what alternative actions experts 
do not effectuate when they speak as they do, and it helped us to decide which recurrent 
                                                 
24
 None of the participants interactively present themselves as farmers during board meetings. However, during 
informal talks and interviews we learned that some of the participants were raised on a farm or are living on a 
farm. Nonetheless, farming is not the main form of employment or source of income of participants. 
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discursive practices in talk-in-interaction related to crop disease management in a 
meaningful way. 
  We listened several times to the recordings. During listening the variety and 
prominence of forms of reported dialogue in talk about users caught our attention. And 
given the importance attributed to user engagement in technology development, we 
decided to focus on experts’ user-references. Sections that had user-references in them 
were transcribed by the first author following Jeffersonian transcription conventions 
(Jefferson, 2004) and subsequently translated (from Dutch) into English. Translations are 
as literal as possible and include non-verbal cues such as pauses, changes in loudness and 
speed of utterances. 
  Additionally, key players in the board were interviewed with the help of a topic 
list. In this article we draw upon these interviews to place participants’ user-references in 
the wider context of plant technology development (for a discursive analysis of a 
selection of the 25 conducted interviews, see Mogendorff et al., 2012).  
 
 
4.4 Analytical Perspective: Discursive Psychology 
In our study we deploy discursive psychology (DP) to analyse experts’ deployment of user-
references. DP is a form of discourse analysis and kindred to conversation analysis (CA), the 
empirical study of the structure and sequence of conversation. In DP and CA talk is seen as 
action oriented: language is studied as a participants’ resource to conduct a wide range of 
social actions such as ‘doing being’ an expert (Potter, 1996). Interactionally, expertise is 
accomplished if participants behave and are treated as experts: typically, experts claim to 
know more about specific subjects relative to others and are treated by others as an 
authority (see also Carr, 2010).   
  Conversation analysts generally look for discursive patterns across datasets to under-
stand the social organization of interaction (Heritage, 2004; Potter, 1996), for example, to 
investigate how a telephone conversation is typically started or ended. Discursive 
psychologists investigate the purposes language-in-use serves by paying close attention to 
how psychological characteristics, events and descriptions are made available, ascribed, and 
resisted by participants. Discursive psychology shares the conversation analytic focus on the 
turn-by-turn development of a conversation as a resource to make sense of the social 
activities that are accomplished. Furthermore, it uses the rhetorical dimension of 
conversation by comparing actual accounts of speakers with potential alternative versions of 
these accounts (Potter, 1996). 
In this article, we focus on problem talk – partly because experts in the recorded 
meetings refer to users most often when they discuss problems in technology development, 
partly because this focus may add to the Science and Technology Studies literature where 
taking the user perspective into account is primarily presented as a way to prevent causing 
problems in technology development (Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2005).  
  However, first we provide a description of how and when experts in multi-party 
meetings generally employ user-references before we zoom in on fragments that 
demonstrate how experts deploy variations of reported dialogue/thoughts and/or 
dispositional statements about users’ emotions. This way we somewhat accommodate 
Jahoda’s (2012) critique that discursive psychological analyses do not always pay enough 
attention to the wider context in which the analysed interactions take place. 
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4.5 Reasons for User Absence and User-References in Stakeholder Board Meetings 
During interviews by the first author about strategies in plant disease management and 
the role of the expert board in it, board members said that individual farmers are unable 
to represent collective interests of farmers: ‘The risk is that they only further their own 
individual interests. After all, they only know their own situation.’ And: ‘Farmers are 
interested in the practical uses of technology not in technical details of the research.’ 
And finally: ‘Crop advisors are better equipped to represent farmers as a collective than 
individual farmers.’ For these reasons, farmers are formally represented by crop advisors 
during meetings. They supposedly know farmers’ concerns because they regularly visit 
farmers to advise them on agrochemical use, technology and corporate management. 
Crop advisors’ interest in participating in the board is that they can adapt their advice to 
farmers’ needs based on the newest research insights discussed during board meetings. 
  Generally, scientists are the most talkative participants. This is in large part 
because they present their research to the board during meetings with the help of 
PowerPoint. Research reports may take 30–60 minutes (questions asked about the 
presented material included). 
  Together experts in the boards devote on average 30 minutes per recorded 
meeting to talk about users. To refer to users the words the field, farmers and/or 
breeders, they or people are deployed. Experts, except crop advisors, primarily use these 
user-references in the form of direct reported dialogue, for example, farmers and 
breeders say that: ‘. . .’, whereas we say that ‘. . .’. Experts use forms of reported dialogue 
most often in discussions about current problems with technology. Additionally, experts 
invoke future-oriented reported or hypothetical dialogue in talk about the future of 
Phytophthora research. Overall, they devote more time to discussing problems with 
technology than discussing future funding of research.   
  Furthermore, in problem talk experts do not discuss all possible causes of 
suboptimal functioning of technology: problems with the technology itself are hardly 
discussed, whereas users’ stance on technology, the growing virulence of Phytophthora 
and crop advisors’ inability to entice farmers to use new technologies as intended, are 
talked about extensively.  
  Moreover, in talk about current problems and in future oriented talk, experts – 
except crop advisors – employ forms of reported dialogue/thoughts25. However, the form 
reported dialogue takes, appears in part to be linked to how users get depicted. In talk 
about current problems, users are constructed as part of the problem with the help of 
direct reported dialogue in the present tense and with statements about users’ 
emotional dispositions; in future-oriented talk or with the help of hypothetical dialogue, 
users are depicted as potential allies. 
  All participants in the meetings use reported dialogue except crop advisors, who 
tend to employ factual statements such as farmers still think that . . . when they talk 
about prospective users of technology. The following fragment shows how crop advisors 
tend to talk about farmers in the recorded meetings (see the Appendix for details on 
transcript notation).  
  Just before the start of the fragment a policy worker from a plant breeding 
company B2 asks the crop advisors (CAx) what is essential for the continuation of the 
disease management research programme: 
                                                 
25
 Reported thought is only used by one participant (not a crop advisor). 
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Fragment 1 Crop advisors’ non-use of reported dialogue 
22  CA1: And I think that we at this moment 
23  still underestimate to what extent (.) this is (.) 
24   when I see how many spraying schemes are based 
25  on the discussion of 0.3 or 0.25 liter Shirlan 
26   ((Shirlan is an agrochemical)) 
27   and people ((farmers)) as yet do not realize at all 
28   what is at stake now (.)  
29  B2:  that is naturally also a piece of (.) 
30   that is a part of that eh 
31   the pathway from research to application. 
  (CAx = crop advisor; Bx = representative of breeding company) 
 
Crop advisor CA1 just tells, not shows, B2 what the concerns of users are (lines 24–28). B2 in 
turn accepts CA1’s authority in this matter by agreeing to what CA1 says: that is naturally 
also a piece of (.) that is a part of that eh the pathway from research to application (lines 29–
31). Moreover, CA1 connects a personal observation of spraying regimes – when I see how 
much spraying schemes are based on the discussion of 0.3 or 0.25 liter Shirlan (lines 24–25) 
with an ‘objective’ assessment of users’ state of knowledge: people as yet do not realize at 
all what is at stake now (lines 27–28). 
This fragment is typical of how crop advisors in our data talk about users: they pro-
vide ‘objective’ assessments of users’ technology uptake based on personal observations 
about user practices26. And these statements are accepted. With this, crop advisors’ formal 
role in the board as representatives of farmers is supported by how crop advisors formulate 
their claims and how recipients treat crop advisors’ claims about farmers. 
Moreover, the crop advisor in the fragment talks about farmers in the plural. The use 
of the plural in reported dialogue between farmers and experts and dispositional statements 
is typical of expert talk in our data. In the one and only instance in our data that a board 
member initially bases his claim on an experience of an individual farmer, this is not 
accepted by the others as relevant to the business at hand: evaluating field tests outcomes 
in Phytophthora management (Fragment 2). 
Just before the beginning of the fragment, representative of industry B3 uses the 
experience of his neighbour – a farmer – to argue that the widely applied agrochemical 
Shirlan is not effective anymore and that therefore the advice module in the decision 
support technology system may need to be updated. 
 
Fragment 2 Uptake of individual experiences of farmers  
1  B1:  Of that you need to be 100 per cent sure  
2   [because] perhaps your neighbour too has timely changed chemicals=  
3  S8:  [yes]  
4  B3: =>NO NO< he didn’t (.) no no I am sure of it (.)  
5  B1:  no WELL YES you say↑ I [am sure but]  
6  C2: [no no but]  
7   but we are not going to communicate results based on  
8   experiences of individual farmers with all due RESPECT  
9  B3:  the feelings of farmers should be noted here↓ (.) 
                                                 
26 Objective in the sense of using terms that index qualities of an object rather than suggesting a personal 
stance (Wiggins and Potter, 2003). 
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10  C2: that’s right. 
              (Bx = representative of industry, Sx = scientist, C = civil servant or policy worker) 
 
In this fragment, users’ collective emotional dispositions are treated as relevant. This civil 
servant C2 succeeds by forcefully rejecting individual experiences of farmers as relevant for 
decision-making (lines 7–8). In line 9 B3 corrects his ‘mistake’ by making farmers’ collective 
emotional dispositions relevant: the feelings of farmers should be noted here. In response, C2 
endorses B3’s correction (line 10).  
By acknowledging that farmers’ feelings do matter, B3 and C2 display their under-
standing that farmers-as-a-group need to be taken seriously as an actor in technology 
development; farmers’ emotional dispositions towards technology could affect the adoption 
of new plant technologies. Moreover, with the exception of this fragment, experts quote 
users exclusively in the plural or suggest plurality through the words of a prototypical 
member (see also Wooffitt, 1992, on plural quotes in Potter, 1996: 161 and Buttny, 2003, on 
prototypical speech). 
Future-Oriented Talk: Hypothetical Dialogue 
The form reported dialogue takes partly varies with how technology development gets 
positioned in time. When our experts discuss current problems with technology they 
always use forms of direct reported dialogue or thoughts in the present tense and dispo-
sitional statements about users’ emotions. When experts discuss how to prevent 
possible problems in the near future then they deploy instances of hypothetical reported 
dialogue such as they will say: ‘but then I will not keep spraying’. 
  We will show that experts’ use of hypothetical dialogue in future-oriented talk 
and their deployment of direct reported dialogue in problem talk produces seemingly 
contradictory depictions of the prototypical user. 
 
Fragment 3 Use of hypothetical dialogue 
1  B4:  You end something you see? (.) 
2   The first question that the farmer asks is (q) ↑WHAT now? (q) (.) 
3 S8:  Yes= 
4  B4:  =So you probably need to say (q) ↑all right then, this initiative is finished (0.8) (q) 
5   but in the programs eh we continue with Phytophthora (.) cause otherwise 
6   it becomes a story like eh (q) ↑ oh the problem has been solved (q) = 
7  B5:  =yes EXACTLY= 
8  B4: =when everyone is flooded with Phytophthora. 
  (Bx = representative of industry; Sx = scientist) 
 
In this fragment, B4 enacts the possible uptake by the prototypical farmer of the news that a 
research program in plant disease management ends in the near future whereas 
Phytophthora is not yet under control (lines 2, 6). The hypothetical status of the reported 
dialogue is discursively signaled by the modal need in line 4. Furthermore, B4’s use of the 
particle oh in line 6 signals surprise of farmers (e.g. see Hutchby, 2001, on ‘oh’). The 
hypothetical surprise of farmers indicates that the research program is terminated 
prematurely. Moreover, surprise is here constructed as a reasonable response from the 
farmers’ perspective. Also the invocation of farmers’ common sense goes unchallenged. 
Possibly, because it is in line with the category-bound inference that farmers are the epitome 
of common sense. 
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In the following fragments we will show that in discussions about current problems 
with technology other inferences about farmers are made available, both with the help of 
reported dialogue/thoughts in the present tense and with dispositional statements: namely, 
that farmers are reluctant or scared to use new technology. The latter depiction of users 
contrasts with the depiction of users as common-sensically acting humans we just saw in 
Fragment 3. 
 
Problem Talk: Dispositional Statements about Users and Plural Speech Attributed to Users 
In the following we analyze instances of talk about current problems in technology 
development. Typically, experts deploy reported thoughts/dialogue in the vicinity of 
dispositional statements about users. The latter suggests contiguity – dispositional state-
ments and quotes lie side by side in space and time but are not necessarily connected by 
causality or some other principle. 
We start with the first occurrence in our data of a negative emotional disposition 
attributed to users (the second meeting of 2010 and the first meeting after a major 
Phytophthora outbreak). Experts are discussing the possible causes of the failure of a multi-
sited field test with a newly developed decision support system that advises users about 
when they should spray what agrochemicals in order to sufficiently protect their crops 
against Phytophthora. At the start of the fragment, the discussion focuses on the frequency 
of spraying intervals of agrochemicals in relation to crop protection. 
 
Fragment 4 Users’ dispositions and reported thoughts  
1  S11:  But this then could be a system that would give a breeder (.) mo:re (0.4)  
2  CA5:  confidence?=  
3  S11: =yes (.) would appeal ((to a breeder)) more↓ it is (.)  
4   five sprayings is perhaps too little eh↑  
5   they find that SCARY (.)  
6  CA5: yes  
7  S11: (.) yes I just say it like it is  
8  ?:  yess .hh=  
9 S11: =and eight sprayings they may find a little bit less scary, isn’t it? 
10  CA5:  (.) yes 
11  S11:  (.) I think that was also the idea behind these modules 
12   to come somewhat closer to (0.9) the (.) well yes (0.4) 
13  the risk perception of the breeder eh↑ 
14   whereas anyhow Phytophthora is fought appropriately 
15   and then (.) well yes if it is possible with 
16  CA5:  (0.7) yes= 
17  S11: =less agrochemicals (.) or just as much agrochemicals 
18   (0.4) 
19  B2:  It is not so much [that he finds it scary] 
20  C4:  ((in the background)) [that it goes wrong] ((in the background)) 
21 B2: but more like that he thinks ↑ I have to do something 
22   because it is not totally zero ((the risk of Phytophthora)) 
  (Sx = scientist, CAx = crop advisor, Bx = representative of industry) 
 
In line 5 scientist S11 attributes to users a negative emotional disposition towards tech-
nology: they find that scary. This dispositional statement is preceded in lines 1–4 by S11’s 
suggestion that a higher frequency in crop protection spraying intervals would appeal more 
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to farmers and breeders. Moreover, S11 appears to be searching for the right expression. 
The latter may indicate that S11 is aware that his suggestion of changing the spraying 
intervals may be treated as self-interested (see also Potter, 1996: 131–132, on subtlety and 
managing stake). 
After the dispositional statement is confirmed by a crop advisor (line 6), scientist S11 
offers a reflexive assessment on his dispositional statement: yes I just say it like it is, pre-
emptively denying any bias from his side (line 7). In line 9, S11 continues by providing a 
specification of what farmers and breeders find scary, ending with a tag question that invites 
support. In line 10, S11 gets a minimal confirmation from a crop advisor. This appears not to 
satisfy S11, for in lines 11–17 S11 elaborates on his dispositional statement by reporting his 
thoughts on the rationale behind the decision support systems. By specifying his 
dispositional claim, scientist S11 seems to seek to objectify his statement about users’ stance 
towards technology (see Tracey and Durfy, 2007: 240, on objectification). 
Finally, in lines 19–21, representative of industry B2 challenges S11’s statement that 
they find it scary (line 5) by denying the dispositional statement: it is not so much that he 
((the prototypical farmer)) finds it scary (line 19) and by subsequently reporting thoughts 
that users may have had: but more like he thinks I have to do something . . . (line 21). 
It seems that experts – except crop advisors – cannot content themselves with simply 
stating that users’ emotional dispositions affect technology development. B2 sets the 
example by challenging a claim about farmers’ dispositions that is not demonstrably based 
on interaction with farmers but on factual statements about farmer behaviour and by 
backing up his counterclaim with reported thoughts of the prototypical farmer. 
 
Fragment 5 Emotional dispositions and reported dialogue  
1  S11: Another issue that keeps coming back  
2   is eh the accumulation of agrochemicals eh  
3   because last year was of course a dry spring=  
4  C2: =yeah  
5  S11:       eh or yes dry first part of the season  
6   that the syste:ms advised longer spraying intervals  
7   (0.3)  
8   eh two (.) three weeks  
9  S11:  .hhh and that many people still also consider scary (.) eh  
10   eh they say (q) ↑ yes but then I do not keep spraying  
11   and then I keep- the protection eh level goes down ((against disease)) (q) 
12   (q) and I need to keep spraying those agrochemicals 
13   because the level of protection builds up (.) eh 
14   and when the weather changes then I have 
15   at least a reasonably protected crop eh (q) 
16   whereas we always say eh .hh (q) yes (.) 
17   you need to spray at the right moment 
18   and then your crop is protected just fine 
19   what you did before that↑ does not matter (.) (q)  
  (Cx = civil servant or policy worker, Sx = scientist) 
 
This fragment is part of a lengthy discussion about the possible role of users’ dispositions 
and behaviour in the underperformance of decision support systems technology. And that 
many people still also consider scary (line 9) is an explicit claim about farmers’ and breeders’ 
emotional dispositions towards the decision support system. The utterance suggests that 
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farmers and breeders are reluctant to adhere to spray intervals that are longer than they are 
used to (line 8); moreover, attributed to farmers is the belief that longer spraying intervals 
mean less direct and indirect crop protection against Phytophthora (lines 6–15). 
In lines 10–19, scientist S11’s dispositional statement is directly followed by reported 
dialogue. The they in line 10, and the I in lines 10–12 and line 14, refer to the prospective 
users of the technology, and the we in line 16 to the technology developers. The start of 
reported dialogue is signaled by the reporting verb say in line 10 followed by a change in 
intonation; the they in line 10 signals that scientist S11 first enacts the speech of farmers and 
breeders and the I after they say indicates that the I is a prototypical farmer. 
One may ask why S11 uses an assessment of a past event – a major outbreak of 
Phytophthora in 2010 – to claim that users’ judgement is clouded by emotions. He could also 
have used the event to question the efficacy of the decision support technology but he does 
not do that. Instead, by invoking users’ dispositions and users’ speech S11 focuses the 
attention on the user. The use of reported dialogue also backs up S11’s claim that user logic 
does not agree with scientific logic. 
Interestingly, S11 neither provides nor is asked to provide an account of what he has 
done to reconcile user logic with expert logic. The latter suggests that experts such as S11 
are free to decide how to combine user logic with expert logic after they have demonstrated 
that they have considered users’ views. 
In the following fragment a policy worker from a breeding company, B2, distinguishes 
between theoretical and pragmatic feasibility of crop protection spraying schemes. 
 
Fragment 6 Emotional dispositions and reported dialogue  
1  B2:  We always say at first communication wise↑  
2   (q) spray only when there is a critical period (q)  
3  Then it becomes apparent in practice that that is not feasible (.)  
4   and people do not dare to do it (.)  
5  then at some point you go back to say well (q)  
6   oka:y what do you want then↑ (q)  
7   (q) we want a kind of week scheme together with (q)  
8  then you take (.)  
9  it makes little sense to have a fantastic management strategy  
10   that is 100 per cent effective=  
11  C2:  =yes= 
12  B2: =that in practice will not be used (.)  
13   then you come a day after the fair= 
14  C2/S8:   =yes (.)  
15  B2:  then you have to meet each other halfway 
16   I think we have done that quite well.  
  (Bx = representative of industry, Cx = civil servant) 
 
In this fragment, industry representative B2 provides an emotional dispositional statement: 
people do not dare to do it (line 4) with regard to limiting spraying to critical periods: 
intervals in which a Phytophthora outbreak may occur. The statement presents the lack of 
daring of users as prototypical of farmers by making available the sociocultural inference 
that farmers are conservative and reluctant to change their behavior with regard to 
agrochemical spraying. Furthermore, do not dare implies that farmers tend to be too scared 
to reduce their agrochemical use in line with expert advice. 
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In Fragment 4 we saw that B2 did provide evidence to counter scientist S11’s claim 
about users’ stance toward technology. However, the primary function of dispositional 
statements and reported dialogue here is to demonstrate that the expert board has taken 
users’ feelings and user engagement seriously by engaging in dialogue with users, and by 
respecting user concerns irrespective of whether users’ dispositions are compatible with 
scientific logic. Furthermore, users’ dispositions towards technology are presented as 
constructive: they are not invoked to provide a possible explanation of the underper-
formance of technology, but as a starting point for dialogue between users and experts. 
This fragment also differs from Fragment 5 in that B2 here adds something about 
how differences between user and expert logic should be handled: then you have to meet 
each other halfway (line 15). Notwithstanding this addition, B2 remains vague about how 
users’ concerns should be handled exactly and he is not asked to be more specific. Put 
differently, the practicalities of combining user logic with scientific logic are not treated as 
relevant. With that, it is left to technology developers to decide how to combine these two. 
 
4.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
We have seen that experts treat user engagement as relevant in technology 
development by enacting dialogues with prototypical users. However, different from the 
formal goal of the expert board, user-references do not primarily serve to elucidate the 
implications of users’ concerns for new technologies. Instead our data suggest that users 
are of strategic importance in technology development. Experts produce assertions 
about users’ negative emotional dispositions towards technology and reported 
dialogue/thoughts when the underperformance of new technologies is discussed. In 
these instances users tend to be depicted as possible threats to the success of plant 
technologies (Fragments 4, 5 and 6). In contrast, users are portrayed as allies when the 
continuation of research programs is discussed with the help of hypothetical reported 
dialogue (Fragment 3). However, these two seemingly contradictory user depictions both 
show that for better or for worse users matter in technology development. This is all the 
more apparent, given the amount of time experts devote to talking about users’ stances 
relative to other potential causes of suboptimal functioning of technologies. 
  Furthermore, our analysis indicates that users’ concerns do matter in a different 
way from experts’ concerns. Users’ collective feelings are treated as relevant to 
technology development (fragments 2, 4, 5, 6) whereas experts’ feelings are never 
treated as relevant. Different from Cook et al. (2004), we found that experts 
acknowledge that users’ concerns – that is, feelings – make sense from their own life 
world and are therefore legitimate from that perspective. This finding is in agreement 
with a study of plant scientists’ discursive practices we conducted earlier (Mogendorff et 
al., 2012). In the latter study we found that scientists acknowledged that non-scientists’ 
concerns have legitimacy in everyday life but not in science. 
  The analysis presented in this article also demonstrates that experts’ displays of 
understanding of the user perspective do not necessarily mean that users’ concerns are 
incorporated in technology. With plural reported dialogue in the form of they say ‘. . .’, 
whereas we say ‘. . .’, experts demonstrate that the content of expert and user logic 
tends to be incompatible. And by treating expert knowledge and users’ feelings as 
relevant, with the help of dispositional statements participants accomplish two things. 
First, they establish that user concerns and scientific concerns are not of equal value; 
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emotions tend to be treated as less valuable than knowledge in technology development 
and science. Simultaneously, experts make it hard, if not impossible, to compare experts’ 
and users’ concerns; feelings and knowledge relate to one another as apples to grapes. 
  To conclude, by establishing that user and expert logic are of two worlds that are 
both to be respected but as such incompatible, experts in our study effectively retain the 
freedom to choose if, how and when to follow up user logic in technology development. 
Or to paraphrase Gieryn (1982: 792), experts maintain their autonomy over professional 
activities by enacting dialogue between experts and absent users, by producing disposi-
tional statements about users, and by saying nothing about how they incorporate users’ 
concerns in technology. 
  This conclusion is quite remarkable. Because the central aim of the board we 
studied is to ensure that new plant technologies are user-friendly, one would expect that 
scientific experts are asked to account for how they plan to incorporate users’ concerns 
in technology. As we have seen, our experts were only required to demonstrate that 
their claims are rooted in direct interaction with users and that they seriously consider 
user concerns. A possible explanation for this may be that if board members were to 
demand that experts account for how they have inscribed users’ concerns in technology, 
then experts could easily treat this as a contestation of their expertise. 
  Moreover, reported dialogue is ideally suited to acknowledge others’ concerns or 
emotions without necessarily endorsing their content. The production of reported dia-
logue/thoughts enables experts in our data to suggest that their claims about users’ 
emotional dispositions are the outcome of their reflection on interactions with a range of 
users. With the latter, speakers may project an image of themselves as reasonable and 
consistent beings who understand and are sympathetic to users’ concerns but do not 
necessarily agree with them. In addition, by acting reflectively experts also project the 
suggestion that users are less reasonable than they are (see Locke and Edwards, 2003, 
for more on speakers’ reflexivity). In doing so, experts create the possibility to not take 
into account, that is, to shelve, user concerns. 
  Now we can also try to interpret crop advisors non-use of reported dialogue: 
advisors’ tell, not show, what user concerns are and they get away with it. By not inviting 
crop advisors to elaborate on their epistemic access to users, their epistemic access to 
farmers is treated as self-evident. This interactional treatment of crop advisors is 
commensurate with their formal role as representatives of farmers. 
  Finally, this study raises the question what functions we would prefer experts’ 
knowledge of and experience with users to perform in publicly funded research. Is it is 
always wise to leave unquestioned how experts apply their expertise? Or is it justifiable 
to sometimes investigate this at the risk of triggering a hostile response because one 
ventures into the professional domain of another? The first step lies in making expert 
participants aware of how they currently deal with user concerns, as many of these 
practices are persistent but often have little, if nothing, to do with conscious motives or 
intentions (see Lamerichs et al., 2009, for a discourse-based reflection method for 
practitioners). 
  If one wants to ensure that technologies are user-friendly, our explorative study 
indicates that it is not enough that experts account for their engagement with users. 
They also need to account for how users’ concerns in practice affect new technologies 
under development. It may also be a good thing to invite users to partake in expert board 
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meetings; they have a vested interest in demanding that experts account for how they 
inscribe users’ concerns into technology. 
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Appendix: Transcription Notations 
Based on Jeffersonian transcription (Jefferson, 2004): 
[ text ]    Overlapping speech 
.hhh    A hearable in breath, the number of h’s signals the length 
(x.x)    Pause of x.x seconds 
(.)    Micro pause, less than 0.2 seconds 
↑word,↓word  Onset of noticeable pitch rises or fall 
Wo:rd    Colons show that the speaker has stretched the preceding sound 
Word    Emphasized 
WORD   Speaker is talking louder 
° text °   Speaker is talking softer 
((text))   Transcriber’s remarks 
=    No pause between words or turns 
>text<    Fast speaking 
(q) text (q)   Constructed speech or reported dialogue  
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5   ‘He [Phytophthora] Is Exceptionally Clever’ 
  (Metaphorical) Framings at Work in Conditions of Controversy 
 
This chapter examines the type of innovative framings that Dutch plant experts deploy to 
explain key concepts in plant technology science: genomics, genetic modification and the 
plant disease Phytophthora. Awareness and insight of how these framings, including visual 
and verbal metaphors, are used in plant technology and plant disease management may 
stimulate a more reflective, deliberate use of such framings.        
Plant experts’ framings are largely but not always metaphorical in nature. The various 
verbal and visual framings used by plant experts in interviews and public meetings purport to 
explain the necessity of controversial GM crops, to separate genomics from controversial GM 
and to project the image that plant experts are well-equipped to fight the long-standing 
problem of Phytophthora. Implications of plant experts’ framings and avoidance of 
addressing the GM controversy are discussed.  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Plant technology science is a highly specialized and rapidly evolving field, upsetting 
previously taken-for-granted collective understandings of life processes and how humankind 
may manipulate nature (Hocquette, 2005; Keller, 2000). The unfinished or evolving status of 
many new plant technologies and techniques makes communicating new technologies to 
non-scientific audiences a challenge. This is especially true when these evolving technologies 
are met with public controversy, as is the case for genetically modified (GM) staple crops 
(Hagendijk, 2004; Moore, 2001; Prakash, 2001; Wynne, 2001, 2006). In this context, plant 
scientists may frame problem-technological solutions in different ways to, for example, 
account for their involvement in publicly controversial research or to explain novel 
technologies; how plant experts frame publicly contested Phytophthora research may help 
shape decisions about the continuation of research funding, what technologies are 
developed, and used or rejected. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to examine plant experts’ 
framing of key concepts in talks prepared for lay audiences.  
In this chapter, the focus is on framings of genomics, genetic modification and 
Phytophthora in plant experts’ talk (Phytophthora is a major plant disease). Framing is 
considered to be ‘an action accomplished through language use’ (Dewulf et al., 2009: 164). It 
is a situated practice that is accomplished in talk-in-interaction between two or more people 
and/or achieved by deploying the rhetorical dimension of talk, that is, speakers routinely 
make use of sociocultural inferences imbued in talk by comparing the actual framing of 
events, descriptions or concepts with their alternatives (Hutchby &Wooffitt, 1998), thereby 
following the interactional framing paradigm in the framing literature (Dewulf et al., 2009).  
Studies differ in what gets framed – issues, identities, relationships (Dewulf et al., 
2009). The discursive resources that people deploy to frame issues may also vary. Plant 
experts may, for example, draw upon various co-existing conceptualizations of the role and 
function of science in society to frame key concepts, or they may deploy more generally 
applicable framing resources such as metaphors. Metaphors like framing enable action 
through language use (or through use of visuals). In this chapter, metaphors are understood 
to be a specific form of framing (see also Hellsten & Nerlich, 2008, on metaphorical framing).  
Metaphorical framings may be seen as a strategy for dealing with a situation (Van der 
Geest & Whyte, 1989: 353). A common way in which metaphors enable people to deal with a 
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situation is by making the inchoate concrete or more specific; the new and difficult to grasp 
is described in terms of the familiar and the already known (Chandler, 2007; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980; Van der Geest & Whyte, 1989)27. Metaphors may, e.g. through 
concretization, make elusive or difficult to grasp concepts or experiences more accessible 
and therefore ready for action. Van der Geest and Whyte (1989) argue how the largely 
elusive experience of pain can be made more accessible by likening pain to a vice. Through 
metaphor, others can more easily relate to one’s pain. Moreover, therapeutic action can be 
designed because the doctor knows now how the pain affects the patient. More generally, 
through concretization, metaphorical framings tend to enable action. 
  Framing is not always accomplished by likening one entity to another based on 
similarity as tends to be the case in metaphorical framing; it may also be that one entity is 
used to refer to another based on some other sort of connection. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 
38–39) mention part–whole, producer–product, object–user as potential other connections 
that may be used in framing. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 38–39) call this metonymic framing 
which, like metaphorical framing, helps to concretize  and structure people’s actions by 
grounding them in everyday experiences and the natural world. Framing thus constructs the 
meaning of the situations it addresses (Edwards, 1997). 
 
Study Questions 
In this chapter, the focus is on what meanings and actions plant experts’ framing of the key 
concepts genomics, GM and the plant disease Phytophthora enable and suppress in talk-in-
interaction. And given that in the life sciences issues are often metaphorically framed in 
discourse aimed at the public: what do the purposes that the (metaphorical) framings enable 
tell about the science–society relationship?  
Genomics and GM are supposed to help plant experts to keep Phytophthora once 
and for all definitively under control. The focus in this chapter is on plant experts’ use of 
verbal metaphorical framings in Phytophthora research talk in recorded interviews and 
public Phytophthora meetings. Additionally, the visual metaphor that plant experts most 
commonly deploy in public meetings to explain the necessity of GM is analysed.   
Little is published about the verbal and visual (metaphorical) framing of plant 
diseases that affect major staple crops, and, to my knowledge, nothing about the plant 
disease Phytophthora Infestans which has been a veritable pest since the Irish famine in the 
19th century.  
  
 
5.2 Framing Resources: Conceptualizations of Science and Metaphors 
Speakers may draw upon various framing resources. Plant experts may, for instance, draw 
upon different conceptualizations of science in their talk. May and Perry (2011) distinguish 
between excellence and relevance in science. According to them, funding bodies increasingly 
require scientific research to be excellent according to academic criteria and relevant 
according to societal norms. May and Perry (2011) argue that this conceptualization of 
science is problematic in the sense that excellent science is often not considered directly 
relevant – e.g. research on black holes – and relevant research is often not considered 
excellent – e.g. action research. This is not to say that excellent relevant or relevant excellent 
research does not exist but that it is difficult to conduct research that optimally satisfies both 
scientific and societal criteria. 
                                                 
27
 In this chapter, the terms metaphor and metaphorical framing are used interchangeably.  
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In talk-in-interaction, plant experts may selectively draw upon the excellence and/or 
relevance discourse in science, e.g. to frame their research in such a way that choices in 
research may be viewed as theory driven or driven by societal problems. Depending on how 
research is exactly framed, plant experts may project that they do or do not take 
responsibility for the societal relevance of their research.   
Metaphors are also a common framing resource in the life sciences. Many 
metaphorical framings are common expressions, e.g. ‘life is a journey’ and may be used 
habitually without conscious thought (e.g. see Hellsten & Nerlich, 2008). In this chapter, the 
focus is on Dutch plant experts’ use of so-called innovative metaphors, that is, metaphorical 
framings that are not used by default but stand out either because they describe and explain 
(relatively) new concepts or they contrast starkly with the standard way of explaining 
concepts or processes. Innovative metaphorical framings may increase insight into how plant 
experts attempt to manage dilemmas or tensions in Phytophthora research and the science–
society relationship. 
Framings may be studied in different types of settings. The focus in this chapter is on 
talk; analysis of experts’ metaphorical framings in face-to-face encounters in the bio-sciences 
is relatively new. Most discourse (metaphor) studies in the life sciences are on (mass) media 
coverage or how metaphorical framing connects different discourses (e.g. see Carver & 
Pikalo, 2008). Moreover, they are generally not based on real-life talk-in-interaction but on 
content analyses and/or interviews (e.g. see Hellsten & Nerlich, 2008). 
Studies on (metaphorical) framing differ in their focus. Differences in foci have to do 
with differences in underlying ideas about the nature of (metaphorical) framings. As Dewulf 
et al. (2009: 163) in their overview article state: there are roughly two framing paradigms. 
The cognitive paradigm focuses on information representation and processing; in this 
paradigm, frames represent what people believe about the external world. The interaction 
paradigm, in contrast, focuses mostly on interaction processes and sees framing as 
perspective-based co-constructions of the meaning of the external word. In the latter case, 
framings ‘embody seeds for subsequent future action’ (Yanow in Carver & Pikalo, 2008: 227). 
Studies that focus on the performative function of talk explore what actions metaphors allow 
or enable to be accomplished in concrete practices. As already stated, in this chapter the 
emphasis is on what purposes (metaphorical) framings of technology in plant technology 
science allow or project, given that (metaphorical) framings tend to enable or project 
different interpretations and uses.  
Framings may also vary in modality: most (metaphorical) framing studies focus on 
verbal utterances. Visuals are rarely the object of study in their own right, although they are 
often used to communicate ideas or support verbal communication in public science talks 
(Beers & Veldkamp, 2011; Van den Broek et al., 2010). Given their importance in science 
communication, visuals deserve more scientific attention. This study seeks to contribute to a 
greater awareness of the relevance of performative visual metaphor analysis. A visual 
metaphor used by plant experts to explain the necessity of GM in Phytophthora 
management is analysed for this purpose.  
  This chapter focuses on the actions that metaphorical framings of key concepts in 
plant technology science enable and, implicitly, suppress. The following section therefore 
focuses on metaphor use in the life sciences, with specific attention on technology and 
disease metaphors.  
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A Specific Type of Framing: Metaphors in the Life Sciences  
In the life sciences, metaphorical framings such as the ‘book of life’ and the ‘blue-print’ 
became popular in the media during the years prior to, during and after the launch of the 
human genome project in 1990 to communicate and promote the research on human and 
non-human genomes (Hellsten & Nerlich, 2008; Nerlich & Hellsten, 2004, 2009) 28. Despite 
their popularity, their use is not unproblematic. According to Brown (2003), life science 
researchers and non-scientists tend to be insufficiently aware that the language and images 
that they hear and use are in large part metaphorical in nature and therefore do not depict 
reality one-to-one. 
For example, bio-scientists hypothesized the blue-print metaphor commonly used in 
popular science programmes to be true when they first set out to map the genome (Brown, 
2003; Hellsten & Nerlich, 2008; Keller, 2000). However, life-scientists’ understandings of 
genomes have evolved since then; nowadays, scientists are well aware that genes are not 
blue prints; genes do not translate into phenotypical traits one-to-one. For instance, when 
one has a ‘disease gene’, one does not necessarily develop that disease later in life. Whether 
one develops a disease depends on a great many factors of which genetics is only one. Thus, 
the imagery of science tends to represent phenomena in keeping with scientists’ incomplete 
knowledge at a particular moment in time.  
  However, this is not a disqualification of metaphors as framing devices. Metaphors 
may be very useful to frame concepts and issues; after all, people often learn about the 
unknown in terms of the already known (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Still, metaphors may easily 
generate misunderstandings. Many people are not aware that popular scientific concepts are 
metaphorical in nature (Chandler, 2007; Dorst, 2011; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Analysis of 
metaphorical framings may help raise metaphor and framing literacy: the ability to appraise 
what meanings and courses of action (metaphorical) framings project and suppress. 
Awareness of what interpretations specific metaphors enable may shed light on how 
the use of metaphors may potentially (unintentionally) affect people’s actions and decisions. 
For instance, women with a breast cancer gene are known to have amputated their healthy 
breasts to avoid cancer. Amputation may actually be the best option available to these 
women individually. However, a choice of amputation should preferably not be based on the 
false premise that a breast cancer gene will always result in cancer later in life without 
mastectomy.   
In science and technology studies (STS) of laboratory life, several metaphors are 
described that scientists tend to use in their work practices. Interesting studies on 
metaphors include Pulaczewska’s work on aspects of metaphors in physics (Pulaczewska, 
1999) and Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) work on epistemic cultures. According to Pulaczewska 
(1999), physicists use a hunting metaphor in their science discourse. This metaphor implies a 
quest and a prey that is hunted on purpose.   
Scientists may make different aspects of the hunting metaphor relevant (Knorr-
Cetina, 1999). When scientists talk about their quest, then they usually refer to the 
knowledge that they desire and therefore seek. However, the knowledge sought after is not 
killed and destroyed; but as Knorr-Cetina (1999: 125) shows, scientists in the laboratory may 
seek to hunt and kill background in order to arrive at the sought after insights and 
knowledge. The power of the hunting metaphor as expressed in the expression killing 
background lies in the fact that people who do not have a clue as to what killing background 
                                                 
28
 See Drogosz (2012) on Darwin and metaphors; see Keller (2000) on evolvement of the gene and genome 
concept. 
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entails still tend to understand that the background is apparently so undesirable that it 
needs to be eliminated to generate useful insights.  
  The hunting metaphor may also generate confusion. Recipients may assume 
implicitly that the research described with the hunting metaphor may involve doing harm to 
someone or something when caught. Crucial is here that people have sufficient 
understanding of science and the metaphors-in-use to discern what aspects of the metaphor 
apply to science and what aspects do not. The process of finding out how the familiar relates 
to the new and unknown may result in faulty assumptions and, ultimately, faulty actions. 
Raising awareness of the metaphorical nature of talk about new technologies may help 
prevent actions informed by misattributions.  
  Disease metaphor studies focus on how people make sense of human illness and 
suffering with the help of metaphors. Metaphors help to resolve what the illness causes, 
who is to blame and what needs to be done to cure the disease (Van der Geest & Whyte, 
1989). Plant diseases tend to be under-represented in metaphor studies. In what follows, I 
discuss studies of human disease metaphors insofar as they appear to be relevant in the 
context of plant technology disease management.  
Arguably, the best known studies of disease metaphors are Susan Sontag’s classic 
(2002) Illness and its metaphors & AIDS and its metaphors. Sontag shows that, in discourse 
on disease, metaphorical framings abound. One metaphor commonly found in disease 
discourse, including that relating to cancer and AIDS, is the militaristic or war metaphor. 
Diseases are said to invade the human body and need to be eradicated, destroyed or fought. 
According to Sontag, these metaphors imply that people may be held morally responsible for 
keeping their bodily defences up; whoever falls ill or sick may not have taken proper care of 
his or her body – the body’s defences – he/she lacks moral character. Via this route, 
militaristic metaphors tend to blame patients for their state, e.g. think of smokers who fail to 
quit smoking although they know that smoking is bad for their health. Put differently, the 
war metaphor stresses counteraction: one can do something to fight the disease, one is not 
helpless. Sontag’s war or militaristic metaphors when applied to plant diseases are likely to 
function somewhat differently, if only because it is easier to blame people for their 
behaviour than plants and crops for theirs. However, with the help of the militaristic 
metaphor, farmers may be accused of not properly protecting their crops against disease.  
The militaristic metaphor makes it also difficult to decline to fight the enemy, 
whether this is an aggressive neighbouring country or a disease. For instance, if one objects 
to the spending of money or proposes budget cuts, one may be accused of being a traitor 
who does not want the best for one’s country. An ill person may be accused of not trying 
hard enough to regain health, burdening society unnecessarily.  
Finally, a special type of metaphorical framing found in the biological sciences is 
personification: a figure of speech in which agency and human traits are given to a plant, 
animal, object or concept (see Dorst, 2011; Drogosz, 2012; MacKay, 1986). Personification 
generally makes it easier for people to relate to what is personified.  
In this section, I have shown that metaphors may enable specific meanings and may 
inspire particular, sometimes far-reaching, actions and decisions, e.g. for people who are 
seriously ill or have the ‘wrong’ genes. In the latter sense, metaphorical framings may greatly 
affect people’s lives. In the following section, I introduce the context in which Dutch plant 
experts deploy metaphorical (framings) to describe and explain genomics and Phytophthora 
to laypeople and users.  
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5.3 Analytical Approach and Data  
In this chapter, the focus is on plant experts’ innovative metaphor use in real-life PowerPoint 
presentations about Phytophthora research to laypeople and users (public meetings 
recorded tended also to be visited by crop producers). I am primarily interested in how plant 
experts explain key concepts in Phytophthora research projects: genomics, genetic 
modification and the plant disease, Phytophthora. At public meetings, plant experts provided 
explanations to laypeople and users. During ethnographic interviews, they explained key 
concepts to a social scientist – me – who knew very little about genetic modification and 
next to nothing about Phytophthora and plant genomics before the interviews.  
This chapter provides a performative analysis of plant experts’ use of innovative 
(metaphorical) framings drawing on the inference richness of language relating to three 
important concepts in Phytophthora management. The analysis presented is not principally 
at odds with the main research approach of this thesis: discursive psychology; actually, the 
procedure is inspired by it, but it is somewhat different (see also chapter 1 on discursive 
psychology).  
In keeping with discursive psychology (DP) and interactional framing (see Dewulf et 
al., 2009), I assume that the content of plant experts’ metaphorical framings does not 
necessarily reflect reality one-to-one or that framings represent people’s thoughts for that 
matter. For instance, as we shall see, plant experts tend to personify the plant disease 
Phytophthora – an oomycete29 and not a humanoid – in their talk. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that plant experts believe that Phytophthora has human traits.  
Like discursive psychology, I deploy the inference richness of language in analysis (see 
Potter’s, (1996) chapter on semiotics). More concretely, during analysis, analysts compare 
alternative ways of wording a message with the rhetorical principle. For instance, people 
may say no to an invitation in different ways: they may say: ‘we cannot come’; ‘we do not 
accept the invitation’; ‘we would like to come/accept but, unfortunately, are unable to make 
it’. All these different ways of in essence saying no to an invitation project slightly different 
interpretations. The last alternative ‘we would like to come but, unfortunately, we are 
unable to make it’ projects regret on the part of the invitees and signals that declining 
invitations is a delicate matter. In contrast, ‘we do not accept the invitation’ is a direct 
factual decline of the invitation which projects that saying no is not so difficult; this may 
indicate that the event to which the invitee is invited is not that important to the inviter and 
invitee or that the invitee does not need to take into account the feelings of the inviter (e.g. 
because they hardly know each other). 
 Thus, every meaningful utterance including plant experts’ framing of key concepts 
projects something and thus is analysable with the rhetorical principle. Additionally, DP 
analysts may look at what discursive actions performed through talk may be achieved, 
intentionally or not, in talk-in-interaction. For instance, they may examine what acting like an 
expert, e.g. by using jargon and objective assessments, accomplishes. The latter depends on 
how co-participants in talk-in-interaction respond to the discursive action of acting like an 
                                                 
29 Oomycetes, also known as water moulds, are a large group of terrestrial and aquatic eukaryotic organisms. 
Although they superficially resemble fungi in mycelial growth and mode of nutrition, molecular studies and 
distinct morphological characteristics place them in the kingdom Chromalveolata (phylum Heterokontophyta, 
the 'stramenopiles') with brown and golden algae and diatoms (Heffer Link et al., 2002).  
.  
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expert, e.g. co-participants may endorse the speaker’s expertise by treating his or her 
arguments as more valid than non-expert arguments. Given that recipient uptake is largely 
missing – during analysed talks people can hardly ask questions directly after talks – in the 
data analysed in this chapter, only what is projected and enabled by metaphorical framings 
can be analysed, not how it is taken up by the public.   
 In keeping with qualitative performative analysis, the analysis provided is broader 
and more diverse in its scope than most discursive psychological analyses. Plant experts’ 
framings of three different concepts are explored and various verbal and visual 
(metaphorical) framings, whereas a typical discursive psychological analysis entails the 
detailed analysis of one recurring discursive pattern or device that manages a problem or 
participant dilemma in a specific interaction settings.  
I first looked at the range of genomics definitions that plant experts voiced in 
interview recordings and transcribed them verbatim. Genomics is a central concept in plant 
breeding for resistance against diseases such as Phytophthora. I noticed that plant experts’ 
defined genomics in three different ways that all differed from a common definition of 
genomics found in the literature (Barnes & Dupré, 2008: 400). The latter intrigued me and 
lead me to examine what interpretations these definitions of genomics project or what 
discursive work they actually appear to enable and suppress. For instance, what purposes do 
definitions of genomics as data project in the context of partly controversial Phytophthora 
research?  
I also looked at plant experts’ use of visuals in talks at public Phytophthora meetings. 
I noticed that during PowerPoint presentations a visual was repeatedly used to explain the 
benefits of GM compared to classical plant breeding as a Phytophthora management 
strategy. This visual was metaphorical in nature and central to PowerPoint-assisted accounts 
of Phytophthora research. Given my limited knowledge of GM as a social scientist, I decided 
to ask plant experts involved in Phytophthora research what interpretations these visual 
metaphors project and suppress during a workshop in which plant experts were taught to 
deploy the discursive psychological perspective themselves (see chapter 6 for more on the 
workshops).  
Thirdly, I examined how plant experts explained Phytophthora in short introductory 
lectures with PowerPoint presentations during Phytophthora meetings open to the public 
(meetings were recorded, PowerPoints gathered). I noticed that plant experts deploy 
personification – a metaphorical framing – to explain and account for their Phytophthora 
research and that this was generally received with friendly laughter from the audience 
(usually 30 or more people). Consequently, I decided to examine what interpretations of 
Phytophthora management plant experts’ actual use of the personification metaphor 
projects and suppresses: personification may greatly affect whether genetic modification is 
accepted by so-called laypeople as a strategy to fight Phytophthora. Finally, I looked at 
benefits and disadvantages of (metaphorical) framings.  
 
Data: Ethnographic Interviews, Public Meetings about Phytophthora Research and a 
Workshop 
Plant experts’ talk was examined in settings in which plant experts explained and accounted 
for Phytophthora research to non-expert audiences. Eight public meetings and 25 topic-
based ethnographic interviews with plant experts (plant scientists, representatives of the 
plant breeding industry and civil servants working at the Ministry of Economics, Agriculture 
and Innovation) were recorded and analysed. The aim of the interviews was to familiarize 
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myself with the research of plant experts who are or have been connected to Phytophthora 
research projects. I wanted to know what the rationale was behind their research, what 
motivated them, and what they hoped and expected to accomplish with their research.  
The public Phytophthora meetings were recorded to gain insight into how plant 
experts explain their research to laypeople and users (in turned out that full and part-time 
farmers tended to attend public meetings alongside other visitors). A limited number of 
experienced speakers tend to give Phytophthora talks – these talks vary relatively little in 
content, but who attends the meetings may differ. Plant experts’ talks in lecture halls tend to 
display little talk-in-interaction.  
 Additionally, a workshop was organized and recorded to discover what plant experts 
themselves would make of their own image use aimed at explaining the necessity of 
controversial genetic modification to the public. In this workshop held in 2013, 11 plant 
experts participated. Most workshop participants also participated in the aforementioned 
interviews and public meetings (for more on the workshops, see chapter 6). An underlying 
idea of the workshop was that, if plant experts are able to appraise and appreciate the 
interactional consequences of their talk, then their future talks might be less plagued by 
tensions in the relationship between people/users on the one hand and plant experts on the 
other.  
I was present during the recording of public meetings to make notes and to converse 
with visitors to these meetings during breaks; I was also the interviewer who conducted and 
analysed the ethnographic interviews. The meetings and interviews were audio-recorded. 
Public meetings varied in length but generally lasted 2–2.5 hours. Additionally, public 
meetings in part took place indoors in lecture halls, and partly in the open air (see also Box 
1.1 in chapter 1). Interviews also varied in length but on average took one hour. As I was 
listening to the recordings, plant experts’ flexible and innovative use of metaphors caught 
my attention, in particular because plant experts’ (metaphorical) framings of Phytophthora 
and genomics/GM appeared to do important discursive work. Relevant fragments were 
transcribed verbatim following general accepted transcription norms in the social sciences.  
 
 
5.4 The Research Context: Plant Technology Science  
Plant experts engage in crop breeding: the science of crossing offspring of different crop 
varieties with the aim of maintaining an existing crop variety or creating a new one (the 
latter is called a cultivar) that meets the needs and wishes of crop producers and consumers 
(Acquaah, 2007). Plant experts claim that crop breeding techniques or technologies create 
profit, benefit people and are good for our planet (Haverkort et al., 2008).  
Plant breeders create cultivars and improve existing crop varieties to ensure that they 
and crop producers (farmers) make a profit. To accomplish this goal, they work to create 
high yielding and disease-resistant cultivars. A boundary condition for profit is that 
consumers want to buy the crops that are produced (see also chapter 4). Additionally, 
people and society are expected to benefit from high-yielding disease-resistant crops; if 
farmers can sell more they will earn more, and fewer people will die of hunger30. Plant 
experts also argue that the planet may benefit from applications of genomics knowledge; 
genetically enhanced disease-resistant crops are expected to require less use of 
agrochemicals (Haverkort et al., 2008).  
                                                 
30
 See Haverkort et al. (2008) on societal costs of late blight; see Zerbe (2004) for a critical analysis of the GMO 
eradication of hunger discourse. 
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          The economic stakes and societal value or usefulness of plant breeding is generally not 
called into question. Classical breeding tends to be a tacitly accepted practice; tacitly, 
because ordinary citizens generally do not know what classical breeding entails. Since 1866, 
when Gregory Mendel (Mendel, 1866) – the so-called father of plant breeding – published a 
paper about plant hybridization in peas, classical breeding techniques have been 
systematically applied (e.g. see Levidow et al., 2000). 
         In contrast, more recently developed technologies, such as genetic modification, for 
the definitive management of plant disease are conceived as controversial by politicians, 
farmers and breeders, action groups and the public at large (Jacobsen & Schouten, 2008). 
This is believed to be true of transgenesis in particular: genetic modification that involves the 
cross-breeding of different species (Holm et al., 2013).  
Public controversy may have concrete and far-reaching consequences: in the 
Netherlands and other European countries, field sites where genetically modified crops are 
tested are with some regularity damaged or destroyed by action groups such as the Field 
Liberation Movement (e.g. see De Krom et al., 2012; Duarte, 2011). In the 1990s and early 
2000s, there were several societal debates about the genetic modification of food crops (e.g. 
see Hagendijk, 2004; Marris, 2001; Moore, 2001; Prakash, 2001; Tijdelijke Commissie 
Biotechnologie en Voedsel, 2002; Wynne, 2001). Despite this, to date, blogs, sites and 
newspaper articles continue to pay much attention to genetically modified crops. Scholars 
have sought to explain the continuing public controversy surrounding some plant 
technologies (Gaskell & Bauer, 2001, 2006) (for explanations of public GM controversy found 
in the literature, see chapter 1).  
The persistence of the public controversy surrounding plant technologies such as GM 
crops raises the question of how plant experts communicate their partly contested research 
to non-expert audiences: plant technologies such as GM are instrumental in fighting the 
plant disease Phytophthora. Therefore, an analysis of which metaphors are used, how and to 
what end in conditions of publicly controversial Phytophthora research may prove useful; it 
may help to appraise the actions that plant experts’ innovative metaphor use discursively 
enable, and how plant experts’ metaphor use may help reduce or reproduce public 
controversy with regard to GM.   
 
 
5.5 Results I: Plant Experts’ Framings of Genomics  
The 25 plant experts interviewed claim that genomics is either technology or knowledge, or 
they draw analogies between genomics and widely accepted forms of technology such as 
information and communication technology. In contrast, Barnes and Dupré (2008: 400) 
maintain that genomics tends to be defined as both knowledge and technology at once or as 
technology and knowledge about doing and knowledge of technical systems (Bond, 2003).   
 I now discuss three examples that represent the range of innovative genomics 
framings deployed by interviewed plant experts and government representatives (during 
public meetings, plant experts talk about GM or cisgenesis and not about genomics). The 
fragments are transcribed verbatim. Fragments were translated by the author from Dutch to 
English. An interviewee P1 explains what genomics is:  
 
Example 1 
I:   Can you tell me what according to you genomics is?  
P1:  Genomics is knowledge of genomes. This knowledge can be used for different purposes. One 
needs to separate the production of knowledge from its applications.  
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I:  Such as genetic modification? 
P1:  Yes. 
(…) 
I:  But (genomics) knowledge is produced for a purpose. Knowledge is here not produced for its 
own sake. 
P1:  Well yes, but they are still not the same. Genomics can be used for different purposes. So you 
need to separate genomics from its applications. That is what we say.  
(Px = study participant; I = interviewer and author) 
 
Study participant P1, like many interviewed plant experts, separates the production of 
knowledge from applications based on the knowledge produced. The interviewer first asks 
for clarification: such as genetic modification? P1’s response indicates that he indeed means 
that genomics should be seen as separate from GM. This separation of knowledge 
production and potential practical applications of that knowledge projects the interpretation 
that plant experts do not want to be held responsible for what is done with the genomics 
knowledge they produce.  
Different from plant experts, laypeople often equate genomics with genetic 
modification, which has a negative public image, and this is also why the interviewer objects 
that knowledge is not produced for its own sake (I know this because I conducted the 
interviews myself). Against the background of publicly controversial GM crops, separating 
knowledge from its applications signals that interviewees specifically seek to avoid the 
transference of negative connotations associated with GM to genomics – knowledge 
produced in the lab.   
 In contrast, other interviewees focus on the technological dimension of plant 
genomics. In the following example, interviewee P2 – a plant scientist – is talking about 
transgenesis – interspecies breeding – and cisgenesis – intra-species breeding. Transgenesis 
is met with public controversy. Cisgenesis is presented as less controversial (e.g. see Holm et 
al., 2013). For that reason, the plant scientists I followed have opted to use cisgenesis to 
create a Phytophthora-resistant potato crop and to stop producing transgenic crops to 
manage Phytophthora. However, according to P2, transgenesis and cisgenesis are not very 
different, at least not from a technological perspective, and to suggest otherwise is immoral 
because it is not an honest depiction of how things are:   
 
Example 2 
P2:         You could say we are fooling the public. From a scientific perspective, the distinction    
 between transgenesis and cisgenesis is nonsense; with cisgenesis and transgenesis you use  
  the same techniques.  
 
By stating that the distinction between cisgenesis and transgenesis is nonsense and by 
focusing on the similarities between transgenesis and cisgenesis – a purportedly less publicly 
controversial application of genomics than transgenesis – the public controversy with regard 
to transgenesis is being dismissed as irrelevant from a technological perspective; the 
techniques used for cisgenesis and transgenesis are presented as similar or the same. 
However, the knowledge required to conduct cisgenesis is different from the knowledge 
required to conduct transgenesis, e.g. transgenesis requires knowledge of what genes – 
relevant to one’s purposes – may be found in what species.  
           According to Jacobsen and Schouten (2008) and Levidow et al. (2000), the concept of 
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cisgenesis was invented in response to public resistance to transgenesis. At EU level, experts 
are lobbying to get cisgenesis exempted from stringent EU regulations with regard to GM. 
Against this background, Example 2 may be read as a critique of scientists who 
engage in cisgenesis. The complaint is that these scientists have succumbed to irrational 
public concerns. Moreover, implicitly P2 projects the image that one’s research strategy 
should only be informed by scientific considerations. By doing this, P2 fails to take into 
account the context in which the decision is made to limit oneself to creating disease-
resistant crops with cisgenesis, and he does not visibly take into consideration knowledge 
that is a prerequisite for conducting various forms of GM (the knowledge required may not 
always be exactly the same).  
When I asked P2 during the interview why he considers societal concerns irrational, 
he maintained that transgenesis does not threaten the diversity of the gene pool. From a 
biotechnological perspective, it is not problematic that species disappear or change as long 
as the diversity of the gene pool is guaranteed. From a societal perspective however, it may 
be argued that the disappearance and creation of species is problematic; in society, species 
tend to be a more relevant social category than gene pools. This may indicate that public 
controversy surrounding transgenesis vis-à-vis cisgenesis is largely ontological in nature (see 
also De Krom et al., 2012).   
 In a less commonly deployed metaphorical framing, a government representative 
(P3) likens genomics to information and communication technology: 
 
Example 3 
P3:   Genomics is data. In ICT you work essentially with data.  
               So, it is very similar to that. And people are happy to use ICT applications...  
I:   Yes, but that is different for biotechnology.  
P3:   True enough. I just want to say, personally, I have no problem with genomics.  
               (P3 = interviewed government representative; I = interviewer and author) 
 
In Example 3, genomics is likened to data in information communication technology (ICT) by 
interviewee P3. This is only done by interviewed government representatives. ICT is widely 
accepted; it tends to be an uncontroversial technology. Therefore, by likening plant 
genomics to ICT, it is suggested that plant genomics may eventually be as essential to 
people’s everyday lives and as uncontroversial as ICT. This particular metaphorical framing 
seems to discourage discussion of the public controversy surrounding plant genomics: one 
does not have to discuss things that will become uncontroversial by themselves, in particular 
if it is not one’s explicit responsibility to address these kinds of issues.  
 
Discussion of Framings of Genomics  
In their framings, plant experts tend not to acknowledge the dual nature of genomics as at 
once a technology and a body of knowledge, as propagated by Barnes and Dupré (2008: 
400); acknowledging the dual nature of genomics would imply that there is no sharp 
distinction between genomics on the one hand, and publicly controversial applications of 
genomics such as GM on the other. One may conclude from this that plant experts with their 
framings of genomics try to avoid any hint of public or societal controversy about their 
research. Moreover, they have an interest in avoiding associations between controversial 
GM crops and genomics: publicly controversial crops are hard to sell.  
The technology paradoxes of the technology philosopher Andrew Feenberg (2010) 
may help to deepen understanding of why the use of metaphorical framings of genomics 
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technology is not necessarily an effective discursive strategy. One paradox that appears to be 
relevant here is the paradox of the part of the whole (Feenberg, 2010: 4):  
 
The apparent origin of complex wholes lies in their parts but, paradoxical though it seems, in 
reality the parts find their origin in the whole to which they belong.  
 
People tend to realize implicitly or explicitly that in reality – that is, in everyday life – the 
parts that constitute the whole, in this case knowledge and technology, are linked or, as 
Feenberg (2010: 4) puts it: ‘find their origin in the whole’. This is not to say that 
distinguishing between genomics and GM is without merit; as an analytical distinction it may 
have its purposes.  
Additionally, criticism of cisgenesis from colleagues in plant science as demonstrated 
in Example 2 may in part also be informed by the understanding that plant experts in general 
and plant scientists in particular have a vested interest in distinguishing cisgenesis from 
transgenesis. As already stated, as Jacobsen and Schouten (2008) show, plant experts are 
lobbying in Brussels to get cisgenesis exempted from the stringent EU regulations that apply 
to transgenesis. This suggests that the choice of cisgenesis over transgenesis is partly 
informed by politics. In Example 3, genomics is equated to data and likened to ICT. The 
problem here is not so much that the context in which cisgenic crops are developed is 
ignored but that it is changed from biotechnology to ICT. Changing the context is potentially 
problematic because technologies tend to be developed in particular contexts for specific 
purposes. Transferring it to another context may generate specific problems.  
 To sum up, we have seen that plant experts deploy various framings to disassociate 
genomics from the public controversy surrounding GM. Genomics is likened either to 
technology or to knowledge or data in ICT, although genomics, as Barnes and Dupré (2008: 
400) argue, is understood to be both at once, technology and knowledge. Examined framings 
are not without their problems: they may oversimplify complex matters such as technology 
and its development, and in the context of technology development they may generate 
problems if only because technologies are increasingly required to be usable in and by 
society (e.g. see Leach et al., 2005)31. The latter raises the question of whether plant experts 
are well-advised to put much effort into avoiding associations between genomics and 
genetic modification, and thereby avoid addressing the underlying non-scientific concerns 
that inform public controversy.   
 
 
5.6 Results II: Visual Metaphorical Framing of Genomics/GM 
During public meetings, different images are used to tell the story of Phytophthora. Plant 
experts tend to narrate first how this immigrant disease travelled and ultimately came to 
plague potato farmers in Europe and the Netherlands. Then they continue with how plant 
scientists and breeders with classical breeding strategies have attempted to keep 
Phytophthora under control. These strategies were moderately successful; with classical 
breeding strategies it may have taken more than 10 years to create a disease-resistant 
potato, but they worked reasonably well. However, plant scientists claim that over the last 
decades Phytophthora has become more aggressive (Kimmann et al., 2002) and nowadays 
breaches potato resistance in three or four years (see also Haverkort et al., 2008). After plant 
                                                 
31
 In the interviews, plant scientists also say that they want to help resolve societal problems with their 
research.  
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experts have painted this stark reality, they present their solution: speeding up the crop-
breeding process with the help of genetic modification, that is, cisgenesis.  
How GM in the cisgenic variety may be the solution to Phytophthora, plant scientists 
explain with the so-named chain picture [Kettingplaatje in Dutch] (Figure 5.1) at public 
meetings about Phytophthora or about potato research when Phytophthora research is 
discussed32.  
 
Figure 5.1 Chain picture showing the classical plant breeding and genetic modification processes 
 
This schematic depiction explains how genetic modification saves time compared to classical 
crop breeding strategies. Plant scientists point out that genetic modification in the 
laboratory entails the selection of the desired gene in the donor potato and the subsequent 
transmission of the desired gene to the host potato that scientists seek to make 
Phytophthora resistant. In contrast, classical breeding techniques are depicted as not that 
precise. Classical breeding entails the selection and subsequent transmission of a great many 
genes – desired and undesired ones – from the donor to the host. 
 
Audience Responses to Scientists’ Chain Image-Assisted Framing of Genetic Modification 
Non-scientists in the audience do not comment or ask questions about this chain picture 
during or after plant experts’ PowerPoint presentations. However, plant experts – colleagues 
of the presenters – who attend public meetings alongside non-scientists tend to be critical of 
the depiction of genetic modification. They do not challenge presenters directly, but their 
critiques can be heard as background mutterings during meetings if one sits close to them 
(as I did in some cases). Critics find the picture too neat, ‘it misleads more than it explains’ 
and ‘the chain image suggests that genetic modification is fool proof’.  
Critics argue that, although it is true that the transmission of genes is more precise in 
genetic modification than in classical breeding, it is still difficult to insert the desired gene at 
the exact spot on the host genome where it is believed to be most effective. The spot where 
the genetic material ends up is important: location may affect the expression of genes in the 
cultivar’s phenotype. In response to this critique, presenters mention in later meetings that 
the chain picture is an idealization of genetic modification, in that, in actual practice, it is still 
difficult to insert the desired gene at exactly the right spot on the genome of the host.  
                                                 
32
  Originally, the chain picture was in Dutch, so I covered the Dutch text with English text boxes. The chain 
picture was developed by Timon van den Heuvel: a former PhD candidate at Wageningen University who 
graduated in 2008 and who gave his permission to use the picture.  
Desired gene 
Desired gene 
Many genes are transmitted 
Only the desired gene is transmitted 
Classical plant breeding 
Genetic  modification  
Desired
gene 
 
  
 
Chain picture 
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Plant Experts’ Appraisals of the Chain Image during a Workshop 
What interpretations does the chain image enable and what interpretations does it 
suppress?  To shed more light on this, the chain image was presented to 11 plant experts 
during a workshop (see also chapter 6). The following statements show how workshop 
participants (Px) appraised the framing effects of the chain image: 
 
P5: I see beads… That says next to nothing [about genetic modification], it is like fiddling. 
  
P9: Beads on a chain that is something little girls may fiddle with. 
 
P6: This image is value free but not very powerful. You would like to see a diseased 
potato next to it. Or add an image of healthy wild potato plants.  
You could actually do both.  
 
P7: The actual problem is not in the picture here. In that sense it accomplishes very little.  
(P5, P6, P7 and P9 are plant experts who participated in meetings and a workshop).  
 
From the workshop participants’ responses, one may conclude that the chain image does 
explain cisgenesis in an abstract manner but does not convey what the technology of 
cisgenesis may contribute to Phytophthora management. Participants did not think the 
image very useful in its own right, but in combination with other images they thought the 
image potentially very powerful. Interestingly, the responses of P5, P6, P7 and P9 suggest 
that a so-called neutral, impartial and abstract image may not be very powerful when it 
comes to communicating the relevance and urgency of resolving problems as efficiently as 
possible, as the chain picture is designed to do.     
 
 
5.7 Results III: Personification or Metaphorical Framing of Phytophthora 
In ethnographic interviews and during public Phytophthora meetings, plant experts who are 
also experienced speakers personify Phytophthora – they attribute agency and human 
characteristics to Phytophthora. In Example 4, derived from an ethnographic interview with 
senior plant scientist P4, P4 points out that Phytophthora was long regarded as a fungus or 
mould but is nowadays considered to be an oomycete. He proceeds to explain with the help 
of personification how Phytophthora infects a potato plant.  
 
Example 4 
P4:  Well the idea that Phytophthora will disappear, that is not going to happen 
 it is an extraordinarily smart fungus or oomycete if you heard [name of another plant expert]. 
 You are not allowed to say mould, so, it is an oomycete 
I:            [smiles] that acts like a fungus 
P4:  that acts like a fungus 
 enneh he is exceptionally clever,  
       has an enormous amount of genes to, you know, 
      to cause infections. Different genes… 
I:     Yes 
P4:  that is very smart to, at some point, through mutation or recombination with other... 
       to create a different, another pallet of genes to outwit resistance. Just like that.  
       Enneh he [Phytophthora] has so many of them [other genes] 
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 if you let him [Phytophthora] be then all resistance genes would be – fast I will not say – 
 but resistance would be breached [by Phytophthora] 
 
In this example, P4 communicates that Phytophthora is an extremely sharp-witted opponent 
who cannot totally and utterly be eradicated. However, he also suggests that with much 
effort and vigilance Phytophthora may be kept under control. The personification or 
humanization of Phytophthora by attributing human traits such as cleverness to the 
oomycete seems here to underline the unpredictable, difficult nature of Phytophthora. Like 
humans, Phytophthora can quickly adapt himself to new situations (apparently oomycetes 
are of the male gender as the he of P4 suggests). The latter appears to serve the purpose of 
persuading others that Phytophthora needs to be monitored constantly. If plant experts do 
not stay alert, then Phytophthora may run unchecked, destroying food crops in its wake. The 
personification metaphor also serves to justify why considerable resources have been spent 
and need to be spent on Phytophthora research.  
  Not only during ethnographic interviews but also during recorded public meetings, 
Phytophthora is personified as Example 5 demonstrates (this fragment is also used during 
workshops analysed in chapter 6). The extent to which speakers attribute human traits to 
Phytophthora varies; it is not done by all speakers who present their work at a meeting – 
many speakers limit themselves to agentification in keeping with handbook texts on crop 
breeding (e.g. see Acquaah, 2007; Drogosz, 2012) – but some recurring experienced speakers 
at public meetings may personify Phytophthora.  
 
Example 5  
Prof 2:   And ehm if if ehehm a Phytophthora thinks  
               yes this doesn’t work this is a potato then he may mutate,  
               so  produce a somewhat different Phytophthora protein  
               that this potato does not recognize and then…  
               he [Phytophthora] fools the potato and eh then he dies. 
 
Here, Phytophthora is presented as a fickle, devious enemy who can reflect on his or her 
own actions and those of others and adapt his or her strategy accordingly. The implication is 
that there is no shame or embarrassment in being tricked over and over again by a smart, 
worthy enemy such as Phytophthora. Reflexively it is suggested that, in order to combat 
Phytophthora, a strong capable opponent is required, in this case, plant experts.  
 Example 6 shows how personification is or, better yet, is not taken up by a non-
scientist or layperson (L1) in the audience (L1 asks his question after all experts have 
delivered their talks): 
 
Example 6 
L1:        How does Phytophthora spread itself?  
Prof1:  I did show that eh a leaf like that looks murky and fungal flakes land… 
             (L1 = layperson in audience, Prof1= professor) 
 
L1’s response indicates that the story of how Phytophthora thinks and acts does not provide 
laypeople with enough insight into how Phytophthora may rapidly spread and destroy 
potatoes on a large scale. Moreover, in his answer to L1’s query, Prof1 uses agentification of 
Phytophthora – ascribing agency without humanization (Drogosz, 2012). Unlike 
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personification of Phytophthora, agentification does not invite any questions (but that may 
be in part because visitors have little opportunity to ask questions after talks).   
To sum up, personification of Phytophthora turns a plant disease into a worthy 
opponent that plant experts may fight successfully. By talking about Phytophthora in this 
way, they show not only that Phytophthora is very clever and versatile, but also that they 
know how Phytophthora thinks and acts. The latter reflexively implies that plant experts 
know Phytophthora sufficiently well to come up with a viable strategy to fight the disease. 
However, Example 6 indicates that personification of Phytophthora perhaps does not 
sufficiently answer all farmers’ or laypeople’s questions. 
 
 
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
Central to this chapter was the following question: what interpretations do plant experts’ 
framings of genomics, genetic modification and Phytophthora project in plant experts’ talk 
on Phytophthora research? And what are the implications with regard to the science–society 
relationship?   
 The various framings of genomics suggest that genomics is either knowledge or 
technology, but not both at once as Barnes and Dupré (2008: 400) maintain. The purpose of 
individual genomics framings appear to be: avoiding association with controversial genetic 
modification by invoking older conceptualizations of science as largely separate from society; 
but discursively avoiding association with the publicly controversial GM does not change the 
fact that the reality of technology development is complex (e.g. see Gremmen, 2007). 
Nowadays, technologies or knowledge are not developed for their own sake but are meant 
to contribute to high-stake societal issues such as eradication of hunger (e.g. see Zerbe, 
2004). Avoidance of engagement with public controversy may also be understood as a denial 
of laypeople’s concerns – something that is unlikely to further lay–expert dialogue.  
Plant experts’ depiction of GM in the chain picture looks neutral and harmless: beads 
on a chain that is something little girls may fiddle with. Again one may ask whether this 
depiction serves Phytophthora research in the long run. And what about depicting a 
contested technology – GM – as something abstract and harmless? Would that under 
conditions of controversy persuade people that GM is truly harmless and able to contain 
something as versatile and fickle as Phytophthora?  
 This chapter has shown that the personification of Phytophthora plays an important 
role in managing tensions that plant experts experience in their quest for a durable solution 
to the age-old problem of Phytophthora. Plant scientists only succeeded in keeping 
Phytophthora under control for several years before Phytophthora breached crops’ disease 
resistance yet again. This implies that Phytophthora requires a worthy and versatile 
opponent, in a conflict that may only be mastered – as the framing with the personification 
metaphor suggests – by smart plant experts who have developed a controversial but 
potentially effective technology: genetic modification (cisgenesis). With that, the designated 
purpose that personification of Phytophthora serves appears to be clear. Furthermore, 
personification is a common strategy used in biological education for children (Byrne et al. 
2009; MacKay, 1986), suggesting that personification may be taken up as a form of 
amusement or belittlement. 
 If we look at plant experts’ overall framing of concepts as discussed in this chapter, 
then we see that public controversy surrounding plant technologies such as GM crops is 
avoided, not addressed. This is not a constructive stance that invites dialogue. Moreover, 
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one may ask whether avoidance does anything to improve the plant science–society 
relationship. Laypeople may not question GM’s efficacy, but they may question whether GM 
is compatible with their health and values, that is, it may be more relevant to them how GM 
may affect their own lives (see also Burchell, 2007). Framings of genomics, furthermore, 
indicate that plant experts do not claim responsibility for the societal relevance of their 
science (in interviews they claim that they practice societally relevant science; see also 
chapter 3). 
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6 Turning Plant Experts into Self-Reflexive Speakers 
An Exploratory Study of the Discursive Action Method at Work 
 
Submitted as Mogendorff, K.G., te Molder, H., Gremmen, B., Van Woerkum, C. (2014). Turning Plant Experts 
into Self-Reflective Speakers: An Exploratory Study of the Discursive Action Method at Work.  
 
Plant experts tend to focus on the scientific relevance of content in public science talks, 
thereby running the risk of alienating their publics in the process. This chapter explores 
whether and in what ways plant experts can be empowered to appraise the interactional 
consequences of their own talk about others. In two discursive action method (DAM) 
workshops, 17 plant experts analysed the interactional effects that their own talk projected.    
  Participants confirmed a number of the interactional effects that were distinguished 
by the authors in earlier studies, e.g. they indicated that displays of tolerance of lay views 
projected the image that plant scientists have sufficient access to lay concerns to assess the 
relevance of lay views for science. Participants’ appraisals generated new insights with 
regard to the double duty or ambiguity of utterances, e.g. user-references help to uphold 
scientific norms but do not enable the user-friendliness of technologies.  
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In science and technology studies (STS), bio-scientists focus on the scientific relevance and 
correctness of talk-in-interaction, and the dismissal of lay concerns as irrational is considered 
problematic (Bubela et al., 2009; Burchell, 2007; Wynne, 2001, 2006). For instance, Wynne 
(2005) criticizes life scientists’ focus on ‘the facts’; he points out that publics are well aware 
that complex societal issues cannot be reduced to mere technical-scientific facts. In keeping 
with this, Cook (2004) and Cook et al. (2004) found that plant scientists may explicitly label 
lay concerns irrational or unscientific in opposition to rational science.  
Another concern of scientists has to do with how research can be best explained to 
the public. Burchell (2007) and Myers (2003) demonstrate that (plant) scientists are 
concerned about how media allegedly explain to laypeople publicly controversial research 
such as genetic modification (GM). They show that plant experts often believe that 
journalists ‘dumb down’, oversimplify or misrepresent scientific facts (see also Bubela et al., 
2009). Moreover, scientists in Davies’ study (2008: 422) believe that they need to be careful 
about how they communicate their research to laypeople, whom they conceptualize as 
persons lacking in the ability to handle science correctly. Davies (2008) also found that 
scientists prefer one-way communication over dialogue.  
Regardless of whether life scientists’ treatment of lay concerns and public 
communication is justified, how experts talk about non-scientists – laypeople and users – 
may affect how experts explain their research to publics and what they do with non-scientific 
concerns in science and technology development (see also Davies, 2008).  
Moreover, given how life scientists talk about laypeople and their concerns and to a 
lesser extent tend to talk with them at public meetings, it may be fruitful to investigate 
whether (scientific) experts can be made aware of what they project and accomplish 
interactionally with how they discursively treat non-scientists’ concerns in their talk about 
them and what they project while presenting their research in front of them. Turning plant 
experts into self-reflective communicators may potentially change how experts talk about 
and with non-scientific Others.  
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The exploratory study reported upon in this chapter focuses on plant experts who 
use genomics knowledge and GM to help manage the problem of Phytophthora – a major 
plant disease – in staple crops. We investigate whether and in what ways we can turn plant 
experts involved in partly publicly controversial Phytophthora research into more self-
reflexive communicators who can appraise the interactional effects of their own talk about 
their ‘significant’ Others in different interaction settings: laypeople, users and personified 
Phytophthora. Phytophthora is included because plant experts tend to discursively treat 
Phytophthora as a veritable humanoid Other, that is, an opponent with human 
characteristics. We do this by letting plant experts examine their own talk from an 
interactional perspective. Are plant experts, for example, able to distinguish that a focus on 
‘the facts’ in talk may signal a monopolization of expertise and/or a disregard of lay and user 
concerns? As far as we know, this has not been done before in the green life sciences.  
To realize our aim, we organized two workshops in which in total 17 plant experts 
participated. In the workshops, these experts appraised the interactional effects of their own 
talk-in-interaction in fragments that represent different discursive patterns that we found 
them to deploy in their talk about laypeople, users and the plant disease Phytophthora. 
Discursive analysis of plant experts talk prior to the workshops yielded various insights about 
how (scientific) plant experts discursively manage the science–society and the science–user 
relationship in talk-in-interaction, including how plant experts attempt to manage public 
controversy surrounding GM crops (see also Mogendorff et al., 2012, 2014). If plant experts 
can appraise the interactional effects of their own talk about Others, they may reconsider 
how and to what effect they communicate with users and laypeople about Phytophthora 
research, and this may increase insight into how (plant) experts’ science communication may 
be influenced.   
  
 
6.2 Published Interactional Analyses of (Plant) Experts’ Talk 
It is rarely investigated how plant experts try to ensure that the focus during deliberations 
stays on, or shifts towards, ‘correct’ arguments (i.e. correct from a scientific perspective). 
Ottinger’s (2013) research on refinery expertise suggests that one way experts try to ensure 
that only objective or ‘valid’ concerns are put on the agenda is by dismissing individual non-
experts’ experiences with technology as personally motivated and therefore irrelevant to 
science and policy (e.g. see Ottinger, 2013; Mogendorff et al., 2014). In contrast, Ottinger 
(2013) found that the individual everyday experiences of experts are more likely to be 
treated as valid input (see also Padmos et al., 2006). This indicates that the societal status of 
speakers may indirectly be made relevant in conducting interactional business.  
Mogendorff et al. (2014) offer other insights; they found that plant experts treat 
users’ emotions rather than users’ knowledge as relevant to technology development. 
Emotions and knowledge are generally not considered of equal value in technology 
development; thus, by focusing on user emotions, plant experts indirectly present user 
concerns as of less value than scientific concerns, and they portray themselves reflexively as 
reasonable and rational (see Locke & Edwards, 2003; Mogendorff et al., 2014). Framing user 
concerns as emotional dispositions rather than knowledge makes it difficult to incorporate 
user concerns in technology development; emotions and knowledge are difficult to weigh 
against each other (Mogendorff et al., 2014).  
However, this does not mean that nothing has changed in how experts handle lay 
concerns in their talk. Mogendorff et al. (2012: 743–746) found that experts are responsive 
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to the critique that they disregard lay concerns. They largely avoid these kinds of instigations 
by invoking displays of tolerance of lay views, e.g. I understand that…. With these displays of 
tolerance, they project the image that they are entitled to assess the relevance of lay views 
for plant technology development. They do this by demonstrating that they have knowledge 
of lay and scientific concerns (Mogendorff et al., 2012). However, these displays of tolerance 
do not guarantee that lay views are in fact considered in technology development.  
On the contrary, Mogendorff et al. (2012: 734 and 739) show that displays of 
tolerance and claims of lay membership, such as that I have too as a consumer, may help 
plant scientists to claim lay views as legitimate in everyday life but not in science. This 
interpretation is strengthened by statements about the value of science that follow displays 
of tolerance of lay views, which tend to implicitly downgrade lay views. However, plant 
scientists do not totally banish people’s concerns to the private sphere; some of them 
acknowledge that non-scientists came up with good arguments in the past (Mogendorff et 
al., 2012: 743; see also chapter 3). By displaying their tolerance, caring and knowledge of lay 
views before subjugating lay concerns, plant experts establish that they are the best 
equipped to assess when and where lay views may be relevant to science.  
  
Communication Training Literature  
The literature on communication education mentions various tools or methods to improve 
professionals’ interaction skills. Interventions vary from general, decontextualized 
communication guidelines to video-reflexive methods to stimulate recall and reflection on 
what went on and wrong in face-to-face encounters (Iedema et al., 2009; Veldhuijzen et al., 
2013). These tools differ in their efficacy.  
  DeNeve and Heppner (1997) show that role-play and simulation techniques yield 
better results than lectures in terms of communicative performance. However, recently 
Stokoe (2013) criticized the use of traditional simulations or role-play; skills learned in role-
play – generally based on hypothetical scenarios or past encounters – are found to be of 
limited use in real-life communicative encounters (see also Alexander & Le Baron, 2009). 
To overcome these weaknesses, Stokoe (2013) developed the conversation analytical 
role-play method (CARM). This method draws upon real-time encounters and conversation 
analytical insights to enable participants in training to apply directly what they have learned 
in their everyday professional practices.  
Another relatively new method is the discursive action method (DAM). This method 
differs from other training methods in that it does not try to improve participants’ interactive 
skills directly, e.g. by letting participants practice their interaction skills or pointing out what 
has gone on in their past interactions. DAM focuses on stimulating participants to develop 
their analytical capabilities to appraise the interactional consequences of their own talk, e.g. 
participants learn to discern how the use of different discursive devices such as quotes or 
factual statements may affect the speaker’s designated epistemic status. After workshop 
participants (WPs) have become aware of the interactional effects projected by their talk, 
they have the tools to appraise all their future talk and make choices therein (see also 
Lamerichs et al., 2009). Given that we want to achieve the latter with plant experts, we 
chose to deploy DAM.   
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6.3 The Discursive Action Method  
Sneijder et al. (2007) first described the DAM for health practitioners; Lamerichs et al. (2009) 
first published about DAM in an academic journal, where they explain DAM’s purpose and 
procedure. Haen et al. (2014, forthcoming) use DAM and scenarios to foster mutual 
responsiveness in food innovation.  
  DAM entails teaching workshop participants to analyse their own talk using discursive 
psychology (DP) – a discourse analytical approach. Like DP, DAM makes use of the fact that 
the interactional effects that talk-in-interaction unintentionally generates partly depend on 
the ‘it could have been otherwise’ quality of descriptions (e.g. see Edwards, 1997; Potter, 
1996). For instance, speakers may strive to be treated as an expert in different ways, e.g. 
they may state that they are an expert or they may talk like an expert, e.g. by using jargon. 
Speakers tend to produce versions of reality to resist potential versions of what is being said. 
This is known in DP as the rhetorical principle. Inspecting stretches of discourse for these 
alternative versions helps the analyst to make sense of actions performed. Additionally, the 
uptake of pre-designed messages by co-participants tells the DP analyst what the 
interactional effect of talk is, e.g. whether a speaker’s utterance is treated as disrespectful or 
accepted at face value (see also Veen et al., 2011).  
Typical of the fragments deployed to turn WPs into self-reflective communicators is 
that they display little dialogue between plant experts and other speakers. Therefore, the 
principle of recipient uptake can only be sparingly applied in the workshops; the focus lies on 
applications of the rhetorical principle.  
The aims of DAM differ from those of DP. Discursive psychology seeks to analyse 
what (un)intended purposes talk-in-interaction accomplishes in real-life real-time practices 
to gain a better understanding of complex societal problems, whereas DAM deploys 
discursive psychology to empower participants to appraise the interactional consequences of 
their own talk for their own future benefit.  
Participants in DAM workshops need to go through various steps to achieve an 
interactional perspective on talk (adapted from Lamerichs et al., 2009: 1166–1170). The first 
steps entail adopting a non-cognitive view by focusing on the management of interactional 
dilemmas or problems. People tend to routinely link what people say to what they think. 
According to DAM, people’s words do not need to correspond with reality, or with people’s 
thoughts or beliefs.  
In DAM workshops, participants are invited to shift their focus from the correctness 
and relevance of the content of utterances to the functions that different versions of the 
same utterance may serve in managing interactional dilemmas. For instance, different 
parties’ concerns may be presented in opposition to one another by deploying ‘they’ (users) 
and ‘we’ (experts) constructions (e.g. see Mogendorff et al., 2014). This framing of concerns 
in dual terms tends to pave the way to treat concerns of the Other party differently than 
one’s own concerns.  
After workshop participants have shifted their focus, they are ready to explore the 
discursive functions of their talk. This entails determining how an interactional problem is 
handled discursively and what the intended and unintended interactional effects of the 
discursive strategies deployed may be. Lastly, WPs jointly discuss the significance of 
identified functions and effects for their communication practices.  
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Aims and Setup of DAM Workshops  
Two DAM workshops with 17 plant experts were conducted, recorded and analysed to 
explore whether plant experts are capable of identifying and reflecting upon how talk – 
intentionally or not – manages central interactional dilemmas in plant technology science. 
The participating experts were involved with research projects focusing on Phytophthora 
management in staple crops in the Netherlands and tended to be linked to previously 
analysed meetings or interviews focusing on the analysis of plant expert talk (Mogendorff et 
al., 2012, 2014).  
WPs’ involvement with Phytophthora research varied. They did one or more of the 
following: conducted, supervised or managed Phytophthora research; communicated 
findings to users and the public; and/or designed and facilitated communication activities 
relating to crop breeding. All participants had knowledge of Phytophthora and crop breeding 
in general; two of them were also communication professionals with a background in the life 
sciences. Workshop participants were interested in optimizing their communication in face-
to-face encounters.  
  A workshop entailed an introduction to DAM, discussion of fragments in small groups 
and a plenary discussion in which implications of the small groups’ findings were discussed. 
Given that fragments were discussed in five small groups for approximately one hour, the 
workshops yielded eight hours of recorded talk-in-interaction (an individual workshop lasted 
2.5 hours). During small-group discussions, the workshop leader (first author) and her 
assistants (second and third author) circulated to observe how participants were doing and 
to answer questions. 
 After the group discussions, findings and their implications for communication 
practices were discussed in a plenary session. The first author translated the fragments and 
quotes cited in this paper from Dutch to English. The quotes represent how participants 
made sense of the fragments with the help of DAM.  
 
Fragments Deployed during DAM Workshops and Instructions to Participants 
In the workshops, the focus was on what designated purposes plant experts’ talk about 
relevant Others served, irrespective of plant experts’ intentions or thoughts about these 
Others. The Others were in this context human or non-human actors whom plant experts 
discursively treated as human(oid) agents central to the interactive management of a 
problem: laypeople, users and the plant disease Phytophthora. Phytophthora is considered 
an Other because plant experts tend to treat Phytophthora in public talks as an agent that, 
like people, can think and deceive. Moreover, personification of plants and animals in 
biology education is not uncommon (Dorst, 2011; Drogosz, 2012). WPs were given one 
fragment on plant experts’ typical talk about users, one fragment on how plant experts 
typically talk about laypeople and two small fragments on how they talk about Phytophthora 
in front of laypeople and users.  
 To apply DAM, several auxiliary questions accompanied every single fragment 
provided to small groups of workshop participants such as ‘What is the speaker’s dilemma 
here?’ If WPs know what the speakers’ problems are, they can more easily identify and 
appraise the interaction effects. Another auxiliary question was: ‘Of what could the speaker 
be accused here?’ We also asked the participants to consider possible alternative 
formulations to what was being said in the provided fragments. In doing so, the workshop 
participants worked with the aforementioned rhetorical principle, which proposes that 
descriptions are typically organized to argue against a possible contrasting version (see also 
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Lamerichs et al., 2009).   
 Non-verbal aspects of talk-in-interaction were transcribed with Jeffersonian 
transcription notation (Jefferson, 2004). WPs were given a copy of the appendix of transcript 
symbols when they split up into small groups to appraise the interactional effects of the 
fragments (see appendix at the end of this chapter).  
 
DAM Criteria 
The first step is to help WPs to adopt an interactional perspective on talk and serves to 
ensure that they feel secure enough to critically assess their own talk-in-interaction. Only 
then can participants freely discuss the intended, unintended and potentially negative 
purposes achieved or projected by utterances in the fragments. In addition to a sense of 
security, familiarity is an important criterion.  
Does the discursive pattern look familiar, is it representative? Familiarity is important 
to establish the relevance of the interaction pattern analysed for workshop participants and 
says something about the representativeness of fragments. Utterances such as ‘I could have 
said that’ or ‘that is typical of how plant experts talk to the public’ imply familiarity with the 
discursive pattern. 
DAM participants should also be able to identify the main functions that talk-in-
interaction serves and to reflect upon the interaction effects this generates, e.g. how plant 
experts draw boundaries between science and society and how this affects the science–
society relationship discursively.  
 
 
6.4 Results: Turning Plant Experts into Analysts of Their Own Talk  
During workshops, plant experts examined excerpts of their own talk about non-scientific 
Others: one fragment focused on plant experts’ references to users, one focused on plant 
scientists’ depictions of laypeople and one fragment showed how plant scientists humanize 
Phytophthora in front, and for the benefit, of laypeople and users. The anonymized 
fragments represented a recurring discursive pattern analysed prior to the workshops (for 
these analyses, see chapter 5 and Mogendorff et al., 2012, 2014). The discursive pattern is 
central to handling a participant dilemma.  
  The discursive patterns and the dilemmas they handle looked familiar to WPs, as 
utterances such as ‘I could have said that’ and ‘that is indeed a problem’ indicate. During 
workshops, participants made jokes and were critical of their own and others’ talk; they 
appeared to feel secure enough to appraise their own or others’ talk-in-interaction.   
Workshop appraisals of interactional effects are presented per fragment: the 
fragment that workshop participants were asked to appraise is introduced, followed by the 
WPs’ appraisals and findings in plenary discussions. Workshops participants’ statements 
were transcribed verbatim in keeping with social scientific transcription conventions. The 
fragments that workshops participants appraised were transcribed in keeping with 
Jeffersonian conventions, as is the standard in discursive psychology (Jefferson, 2004).   
 
Fragment 1: Use of Reported Dialogue 
Mogendorff et al. (2014) analysed plant experts’ references to users in expert board 
meetings that aim to increase the user-friendliness of plant technologies. The talk analysed 
covers eight meetings in two years (20 hours of talk). Mogendorff et al. (2014) show that 
user-references mainly serve to shelve user concerns by contrasting the emotional 
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dispositions of users with the knowledge of plant experts. Workshop participants examined a 
fragment that demonstrates how plant experts in expert board meetings typically deal with 
user concerns.  
 
Fragment 1 
1  Researcher:  Another point that keeps coming back  
2              is eh the accumulation of agrochemicals eh  
3                       because last year was of course a dry spring=    
4  Policymaker:  =yeah 
5  Researcher:   eh or yes dry first part of the season  
6                          that the syste:ms advised longer spraying intervals  
7               (0.3) 
8                          two (.) three weeks  
9  Researcher:   .hhh and that many people still also consider scary (.) eh 
10               eh they say (q) ↑ yes but then I do not keep spraying      
11                        and then I keep- the protection level goes down (q)  
12                        (q) and I need to keep spraying those agrochemicals  
13                        because the level of protection builds up (.) eh  
14                        and when the weather changes then I have      
15                        at least a reasonably protected crop eh (q)    
16               whereas we always say eh .hhh (q) yes (.)   
17               you need to spray at the right moment    
18               and then your crop is protected just fine     
19                        what you did before that↑ does not matter (.) (q)  
               (Mogendorff et al., 2014: Fragment 5) 
 
Decision support systems are designed to advise farmers and breeders on what 
agrochemicals to spray when in order to prevent their crops being affected by Phytophthora. 
When farmers spray agrochemicals partly depends on the weather, partly on the lifecycle of 
potatoes and Phytophthora and partly on farmstead characteristics. People in this fragment 
are users of the decision support systems.  
In this fragment, users’ emotions rather than their knowledge are made relevant by a 
researcher (Line 9). And after that, in Lines 10–19, the researcher enacts a dialogue between 
we – scientists – and users of the technology – they. This dialogue allows researchers to 
demonstrate that their claims are based on actual dialogue with users. The contrast made 
between the researchers’ perspective and the users’ perspective serves to show that user 
concerns are hard to reconcile with scientific concerns. The latter is reinforced by the fact 
that feelings are less valued than knowledge in technology development. Overall, the 
enacted dialogue in Fragment 1 enables plant experts to shelve user concerns (see also 
Mogendorff et al., 2014).  
 
Workshop participants’ appraisal of Fragment 1 
All workshop participants (Px) note that a contrast is made between scientists and laypeople:   
 
P5:  Scientists are presented as rational, self-assured. Users are presented as conservative 
and hesitant.   
 
Workshop participants do not really consider the dialogue in the fragment to be a dialogue:  
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P7: It is not a dialogue, it is a quoted dialogue.  
 
Also, study participants think that the dialogue is well-structured, attractive, life-like and 
ensures that the speaker keeps the attention of his audience. Moreover, they agree that the 
contrast made in the dialogue between experts and users produces distance between 
experts and users: 
 
P2: Directive as in: you need to do it...  
 
P4: A quote that is not your own words. You are not responsible for its content. The 
quote could have been more neutral. Now as it is, [the quote] plays more on the 
person.  
 
Workshop participants also express their thoughts on what the function is of the reported 
dialogue (RD) in Fragment 1: 
 
P2: With it [the quote] you come closer to people, you make things more concrete. And 
with it [the quote] you say: ‘if we work together, I understand what the sensitive 
issues are’. And that the problem is not with the DST [decision support technology 
discussed in Fragment 1].  
 
P8: The researcher shows with the dialogue that he has had contact with farmers; that 
he has stood in the clay with his feet. He derives authority from that. And [he shows] 
that he knows best.  
 
What if the researcher had not ‘quoted’ a dialogue? Participants agree that the reported 
dialogue demonstrates that plant scientists have knowledge of user concerns: 
 
P9: If there was not a dialogue [in the fragment] between scientists and users, he [the 
scientist] may have been accused of being pig-headed. 
 
P5: Then the expert [in the fragment] may be accused of lack of knowledge of the user 
perspective on things.  
 
P12: Without the quoted dialogue, he [the scientist] would appear to be nagging, 
obstinate.  
 
Furthermore, workshop participants provided alternatives to talking about user concerns in 
dual terms and could voice disadvantages of the use of RD: 
 
P8: It would be better NOT to talk about science versus farmers. In the actual DSTs 
[decision support technology], differences between farmers and scientists are 
respected. You could also do that [respect differences] in dialogue. There is no talk 
about differences between farmers and differences between potatoes, although they 
are respected in the DST.   
 
P11: Now [with the dialogue], he [the scientist] does not explain why it does not matter 
whether it [agrochemicals] built up. He could have done that instead, stick to the 
facts. 
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And according to workshop participants, the researcher in the fragment shows himself not to 
be very empathetic:   
 
P2: The researcher could have said: ‘farmers need to make choices as well. So, I can 
understand it’. That would have been more empathic [than what he actually says].  
 
To sum up, workshop participants recognized what discursive actions plant experts 
performed with RD and were critical of its use. WPs indicated that RD helps plant scientists 
to project the image that they have sufficient access to user concerns, so as to generate the 
interactional effect that they are best equipped to determine what should be done in 
technology development without appearing to be pig-headed. However, the talk about users 
in oppositional ‘we’ (scientists) and ‘they’ (users) terms was seen as not conducive of a 
discursive exploration of the merit of actual user concerns. As a negative interactional effect, 
WPs mentioned that RD appeared to disrespect important differences between various users 
and diverted attention away from potential problems with the DST.    
 
Fragment 2: The Discursive Construction of the Science–Society Relationship   
We found in an earlier study (Mogendorff et al. 2012) and in the literature (e.g. see Leach et 
al., 2005) that plant experts struggle with the dilemma of how best to account for public 
concerns with regard to plant technology development – e.g. think of publicly controversial 
GMOs – without implicitly renouncing their scientific independence.  
Fragment 2, analysed with DP in Mogendorff et al. (2012: 737–739), demonstrates in 
an exemplary way how plant scientists discursively manage the science–society relationship 
in the face of publicly controversial GM crops.  
 
Fragment 2  
1 Scientist:  EVERYONE MAY THINK WHATEVER THEY LIKE isn’t it? (.) 
2 Interviewer:  mmh= 
3 Scientist:  =and make their own choices= 
4 Interviewer:  =yes (.) 
5 Scientist: thus that I mean as well 
6  there is a piece of irrationality in that whereof you think= 
7  =that is almost impossible to direct I think 
8  (0.7) 
9  or maybe you can but often it is directed by 
10  (0.3) 
11  things suddenly become scarce or something like that (.) 
12  or eh popular or modern instantly (.) 
13  that are trends people follow 
14  and they are usually not scientific. 
15 Scientist:  thus people have the perception (.) of (.) that is true (.) 
16  I have that too (.) as a consumer (.) 
17 Interviewer:  yes= 
18 Scientist: =but if you look at it scientifically (.) 
19  that is often not true 
20  ((13 lines omitted)) 
21 Scientist:  we as researchers (.) I want to say 
22  (0.6) 
23  may also be (.) irrational in private life (.) 
24  but as a scientist (.) I think (.) 
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25  You should stick to scientific criteria 
(See also Mogendorff et al., 2012: 737–739)  
 
Mogendorff et al. (2012) found in Fragment 2 that the scientist displays his tolerance of lay 
views (Lines 1–3) and shows that he has access to lay views and purports to know how lay 
views are produced, namely, in an unscientific manner (Lines 6–14). Moreover, the scientist 
acknowledges that scientists may also be irrational in private life (Line 16 and Lines 21–23).  
However, in lines 18-25, the scientist proceeds to contrast lay concerns (Lines 1–16) 
with scientific facts. The import of this is that scientists cannot simply incorporate non-
scientific concerns that are produced in the private sphere in technology development that is 
ruled by scientific standards. Scientists are also presented as having knowledge of both lay 
and scientific concerns and therefore as best equipped to decide when and where non-
scientific concerns may be included in technology development.  
 
Workshop participants’ appraisal of Fragment 2 
WPs almost all considered the utterance everyone may think whatever they like isn’t it? to be 
potentially disrespectful of the views of laypeople because of the isn’t it at the end of the 
utterance. Workshop participants (Px) agreed unanimously that the scientist in the fragment 
clearly indicates that people are ill-advised to think whatever they like; that is, if they want 
their concerns to be taken seriously in science and technology development:  
 
P3: More like, everyone may think whatever they like as long as it is scientific. Then it is 
good. 
 
P5: He says this [everyone may think whatever they like] but he actually means the 
opposite33. 
 
All participants agreed that the expression Everyone may think whatever they like isn’t it? 
projects the subsequent discussion of the downside of this ‘live and let live’ stance: You feel 
there is a but coming….  
 In Fragment 2, the scientist presents himself as a researcher and a consumer. WPs 
saw that presenting oneself as both a consumer and scientist may not be a good thing for 
non-scientists, in that non-scientists may end up not talked to and not listened to: 
 
P4: It [the scientist claiming membership in the lay category] shows that scientists can 
see things, in a different, broader perspective.  
 
P2:  He [the scientist] knows it all. That is a stereotype of course; he doesn’t really know it 
all.  
 
P3: It [claiming membership in the lay category] means that he doesn’t really need the 
input of consumers.  
 
                                                 
33 Fragment 2 is the first fragment that workshop participants analysed. As some of the quotes indicate, 
workshop participants occasionally used cognitive language. Given the duration of the workshop, we did not 
expect them to master all aspects of DP perfectly.  
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Moreover, a participant said that claiming membership in the lay category may weaken the 
scientific standing of the scientist. An admission of irrationality in everyday life may suggest 
that one has the ability to act irrationally as a researcher also:  
 
P4: It [claiming membership in the lay category] may harm his scientific reputation. It 
means that he may be irrational sometimes as a researcher.  
 
Furthermore, WPs considered the contrast made between the lay and the scientific 
perspective in Fragment 2 functional for the scientist:  
 
P7: It [the contrast] is clearly functional in that it projects an image of the scientist as 
reasonable and knowledgeable about scientific and lay issues. Lay issues are also 
portrayed as less. So, he establishes the superiority of scientists about how things 
should be done.   
  
P4: I would, as a researcher, not talk in that way about society, I would keep to myself. I 
think that the researcher creates space for differences between science and society.   
 
According to the WPs, the overall effect of the interactive pattern in Fragment 2 appears to 
be that scientists ascertain that, in the end, they know best; they alone have access to both 
scientific and lay knowledge. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the scientific 
perspective is also presented as superior to the lay perspective:  
 
P8: Scientists follow rules; lay people do just what they like. 
 
To sum up, in keeping with the authors’ analysis (Mogendorff et al., 2012), WPs discern that 
displays of tolerance and contrastive statements about science do not so much project 
empathy and tolerance as help plant scientists to interactively effectuate the image that they 
are ultimately best equipped to judge when and where lay concerns should be taken into 
account in technology development; and that in that sense it helps plant scientists to 
discursively uphold their scientific independence, or rather, superiority.  
 
Fragments 3a and 3b: Personification of Phytophthora 
Plant experts have been trying to defeat Phytophthora for decades. So far, they have 
managed to produce crops that temporarily withstand Phytophthora. This raises the 
question of whether plant scientists may eventually control Phytophthora definitively. If the 
answer is no, funding bodies may conclude that financing Phytophthora research is a waste 
of money. 
Thus, plant scientists may have an interest in presenting Phytophthora, and the 
technologies with which to fight it, in a way that logically explains why science may now 
succeed in controlling Phytophthora. The 17 WPs appraised two short fragments on how 
plant scientists manage this participant dilemma during public Phytophthora meetings.  
Phytophthora research programmes organize public meetings to present research 
findings and to give visitors the opportunity to ask questions after plant scientists have 
delivered their talks. Fragment 3a represents the standard way in which Phytophthora is 
presented; the portrayal in Fragment 3b is specific to public Phytophthora meetings.  
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Fragment 3a 
1 Prof1:  And in fact you could say that ehm ehm you (.) 
2               Phytophthora’s potential to create new isolates  
3                          that are much more aggressive  
4                          than the existing isolates has increased enormously  
 
 
Fragment 3b  
In this fragment Prof2 explains how Phytophthora makes a potato ill.   
 
1 Prof2:  and eh when when a ehehm Phytophthora thinks↑  
2  (q) yes this does not work this is a potato↑ (q) 
3  then he can mutate (.) 
4  thus make a somewhat different little Phytophthora protein34   
5  that is not recognized by the potato (.) 
6  and then he cons it ((the potato)) and then eh he dies 
7  well yeah where there is a need there is a way (.) 
8  ((line omitted)) 
9  that is looking for resistance genes of the potato 
10  and several mechanism (.) these little proteins Phytophthora makes 
11  that fight eh that is eh at the heart of the matter  
 
The authors found that in particular the use of the personification metaphor in Fragment 3b 
helped to project the image that the fight against Phytophthora is not totally helpless, 
whereas the use of agentification – attributing agency to Phytophthora – in Fragment 3a 
does not. The personification metaphor implies that the strong and cunning Phytophthora 
needs strong capable opponents in the form of plant scientists.  
 
Workshop participants’ appraisal of Fragments 3a and 3b 
WPs consider the agentified and personified portrayal of Phytophthora as correct and 
familiar (Px):  
 
P10: Both [representations] are correct. It is vague talk, typical of how professors talk. 
 
However, Fragment 3a offers little hope, whereas Fragment 3b offers much hope: 
 
P8: Of Fragment 3a you could say that Prof1 propagates: ‘We should stop eating 
potatoes’. It is hopeless. Prof 2 says: ‘There are possibilities, there is hope. You 
cannot eradicate it [Phytophthora] but you can manage it’.  
 
P2: In Fragment 3a, Phytophthora is portrayed as a pathogen that becomes more 
aggressive as if it is out of control. The impression you get from this is that nothing 
can be done to contain Phytophthora except perhaps spray till Phytophthora is truly 
dead. 
 
In Fragment 3b, Phytophthora is personified – Phytophthora thinks, it cons, it decides what it 
wants to do (see also Dorst, 2011, on personification). Furthermore, the fight against 
                                                 
34
 The Dutch diminutive eiwitje is used, here translated as little protein. 
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Phytophthora is depicted as a war between plant scientists and Phytophthora – a war that 
may go on indefinitely but is worth fighting: 
 
P6: Prof2 personifies Phytophthora. Phytophthora thinks, Phytophthora is a challenging 
opponent.  
 
P3: It is almost as if a war is going on between Phytophthora and scientists [referring to 
Fragment 3b]. That may be a smart move to get money for research. He [Prof2] is 
talking about tackling underlying mechanisms [of Phytophthora], fundamental 
research. Fragment 3a is more about applied research.  
 
Moreover, participants say that Prof2’s portrayal would probably generate more funding 
than the description provided by Prof1 in Fragment 3a; fundamental research requires more 
investment than applied research:  
 
   P5:      Prof2’s image of Phytophthora implies that money is always needed [to fight  
                          it]. And: Prof1 needs money temporarily.  
 
Furthermore, according to the participants, the two fragments differ in how much they are 
designed with the lay audience in mind:   
 
P7: Prof2 attempts to talk in ordinary language so that people who are not familiar with 
scientific language may understand it as well.  
 
P10: In part, the language is patronizing; the use of diminutives such as little protein [in 
Fragment 3b] may implicate that people, citizens are not taken seriously.  
 
P1: Fragment 3b is also more interesting and entertaining. With Prof2, Phytophthora is a 
little bit like a funny animal.  
 
P3: Prof2 is telling a story; Prof1 is factual/paints the depressing reality.  
 
One participant jokes that Prof2’s portrayal of Phytophthora implies that Phytophthora may 
be intelligent and able to talk:  
 
P2: In the fragment with Prof2 it is like: we are going to talk [with Phytophthora]; it is like 
the United Nations [laughs]. 
 
To summarize, WPs were able to discern that the personification of Phytophthora in 
Fragment 3b generates other effects than the agentification of Phytophthora in Fragment 
3a. Fragment 3b invited some good-natured fun-making, but WPs were also critical of the 
use of personification. In particular, the use of diminutives in Fragment 3b was considered to 
potentially project the image that plant scientists patronize the public or that plant scientists 
may risk not being taken seriously because personification is presented as a joke.   
 
Plenary Sessions  
In the plenary session of the workshop, WPs reflected on what they discovered in the small 
group discussions. They marvelled at what could be learnt from looking at the alternative 
wording of utterances, what (unintended) interactional effects they project. Participants 
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differed in how they related to fragments: some identified functions as neutral analysts; 
others mentioned what they would do (differently). WPs also identified what they assumed 
to be disadvantageous effects of the discursive constructions used.  
They agreed that the fragments investigated displayed too little actual dialogue and 
that the framing of lay and user concerns in dual terms in Fragments 1 and 2 does not really 
invite dialogue between scientists and non-scientists; in particular, the RD in Fragment 1 was 
considered too polarizing for that. However, WPs recognized that RD has its uses. According 
to them, plant scientists project an image of themselves as know-it-alls with RD; they do not 
really need laypeople – be it citizens or users. The same is projected with Fragment 2 when 
the scientists contrast unruly lay concerns with rule-based science. Furthermore, WPs were 
concerned that displays of tolerance of lay views did not project real tolerance or empathy 
with laypeople. They were charmed by the personification metaphor, in the sense that it was 
considered effective in projecting the image that investing in Phytophthora research may be 
worthwhile. However, personification is also risky in that it may generate the effect that 
members find that they are patronized – everyone knows that plant diseases cannot think 
and act like people. The use of diminutives in the personified Phytophthora narrative was 
believed to strengthen this latter projection. 
Finally, WPs agreed that the talk about users and laypeople partly projected 
undesirable effects and that something should be done about this. They concluded that they 
should talk more with than about users and laypeople and that they should avoid language 
that could be interpreted as childlike, patronizing or inauthentic. More concretely, they 
thought that the use of diminutives and too much talk in dual or oppositional terms should 
be avoided.  
WPs found it hard to directly translate gained insights into concrete communication 
activities. There was also relatively little time during workshops to discuss implications for 
communicative practice in depth. A difficulty mentioned during the workshops was that 
utterances often projected positive and undesirable effects at once (e.g. see Heritage, 1984, 
on double duty). Further research may shed more light on how best to translate discursive 
appraisals of talk about laypeople and users into communication activities that truly 
propagate scientific engagement with non-scientific concerns.   
 
 
6.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
Can plant experts be made aware of how their talk about laypeople and users, and talk 
about Phytophthora in front of a lay audience, not only transmit a particular content but also 
project or generate intended and unintended interactional effects? It appears that this is 
possible.  
WPs clearly enjoyed analysing the fragments; the small group discussions were 
animated and occasionally accompanied with joking and laughter. Participants’ critical 
remarks on discursive patterns show that they felt secure enough to appraise their own talk-
in-interaction in the presence of others. Apparently, the DAM criteria of security and 
familiarity were met, and discursive patterns were recognized from real-life. Workshop 
participants also showed that they were able to critically appraise the main interactional 
effects that the fragments intentionally and unintentionally projected, in line with 
Mogendorff et al. (2012, 2014). Therefore, the DAM criterion of being able to assess 
functions of talk appears to have been met.   
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WPs noted that RD in dual ‘we’ and ‘they’ terms in Fragment 1 helped plant experts 
to shelve user concerns; additionally, they recognized how the contrast between lay 
concerns and scientific concerns in Fragment 2 enabled plant scientists to maintain control 
of how and when non-scientific concerns are weighted in plant technology development. 
And they noted that different portrayals of Phytophthora may discursively project different 
assessments about the usefulness and feasibility of Phytophthora research.  
To conclude, WPs can discern that it matters what discursive devices are used, 
consciously or unconsciously, to communicate with and about Others. For instance, in the 
discussion in Fragment 1, they demonstrated awareness that speakers are responsible for 
the content of their factual statements but not for the content of quotes and that, therefore, 
quotes may elicit other responses than factual statements. WPs also saw that how 
Phytophthora is presented to the public matters greatly; depending on the kind of metaphor 
used, the interpretation that funding of Phytophthora research may produce durable results 
is projected, or the opposite. Participants also clearly recognized that what people say does 
not necessarily reflect people’s thoughts or reality, e.g. that the use of RD does not 
necessarily mean that a dialogue has taken place between scientists and users. WPs also 
concluded that scientists’ displays of tolerance as exemplified by Fragment 2 clearly did not 
necessarily signal true tolerance of lay views.  
Moreover, WPs saw more sharply than the authors that utterances may 
simultaneously enhance and undermine plant scientists’ positions; With regard to Fragment 
1, WPs agreed that the RD in dual ‘we’ (scientists) and ‘they’ (users) terms came at the cost 
of paying attention to relevant in-group differences between users and diverted attention 
away from potential problems with technology. They concluded that shelving user concerns 
has its uses but may not contribute to user-friendly technologies. In Fragment 2, a 
participant noted that claiming membership in the lay category may project the image that 
plant scientists are sufficiently knowledgeable about lay views in order to retain control over 
when lay concerns are considered in technology development but may simultaneously 
diminish plant scientists’ professional identities as rational beings (e.g. see also Heritage, 
1984: 182, on double duty of talk).  
With regard to Fragments 3a and 3b, WPs concluded that plant scientists’ use of the 
personification metaphor is risky. On the one hand, the metaphor projects the image that 
funding Phytophthora research is useful. On the other hand, the use of personification in 
combination with the use of diminutives may be interpreted as child’s talk and project 
belittlement. WPs found that the latter projection should be avoided. However, they 
generally found it hard to translate insights that they gained into concrete communication 
actions. 
To summarize, this chapter indicates that plant experts can be made to consider 
interactional consequences of their talk with the help of DAM, and that WPs’ appraisals may 
offer interesting insights in their own right. On the basis of the research presented here, we 
cannot say that WPs deployed the insights that they gained during the workshop in their talk 
about or with laypeople or users later on. However, after the workshops, WPs ceased using 
diminutives and the personification metaphor in public talk about Phytophthora and tended 
to devote more time to talking to laypeople at public meetings. This suggests that there is 
hope; in particular if we gain more insight into how, from an interactional perspective, 
communication activities can be improved.  
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Appendix: Transcription notation 
Based on Jeffersonian transcription (Jefferson, 2004): 
.hhh  A hearable in breath, the number of h’s signals the length  
(x.x)   Pause of x.x seconds 
(.)   Micro-pause, less than 0.2 seconds 
↑word,↓word  Onset of noticeable pitch rises or fall 
Word   Emphasized 
WORD   Speaker is talking louder 
((text))   Transcriber’s remarks 
=   No hearable pause between words or turns 
(q) text (q)  Constructed speech or reported dialogue    
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7        Conclusions and Discussion 
           Implications, Limitations and Recommendations  
 
7.1        Introduction 
This thesis sought to explore how Dutch plant scientists who work on the problem of 
Phytophthora – a major plant disease – make use of relevant non-scientific knowledge of, 
and non-scientific takes on, the Phytophthora problem in society. This was explored by 
looking at plant experts’ actual talk about users and laypeople and how they talked in front 
of laypeople and users (plant experts followed for this study do not frequently engage in 
dialogue with laypeople and users). How plant scientists talk about their research and how 
they refer to the role of laypeople and users in it may affect how they talk with laypeople 
and users and may, ultimately, affect the science–society relationship, the science–user 
relationship and, indirectly, public controversy surrounding genetically modified crops. 
The decision to start studying plant scientists’ talk-in-interaction about laypeople and 
prospective users of plant technology was partly motivated by the fact that the usability of 
technologies depends at least in part on how concerns of different relevant actors are 
accounted for and/or incorporated in technologies (Veen et al., 2011) and that some plant 
technologies – such as genetically modified crops – are persistently met with public 
controversy in Europe (e.g. see Gaskell & Bauer, 2001, 2006).  
It is interesting to study talk in conditions of controversy. Controversy generally 
brings to light what is important to people and why. It evolves around high-stakes issues on 
which various parties have different takes and stances – stances about which they tend to be 
passionate. Public controversy in plant technology science as studied in this thesis is about 
genetic modification (GM) of potato crops – the third staple food in the world. Technologies 
that purportedly put our sustenance on the line – as genetically modified staple crops are 
framed to do, e.g. by the media – may be met with opposition or hotly debated. It may also 
be societally relevant to study technology development in conditions of controversy; 
policymakers and others may be interested in how the energy and passion that proponents 
and opponents put into (re)producing public controversy unintendedly with their talk may be 
constructively redirected to explore what people consider essential with regard to food and 
food production systems.  
In the context of technology development, controversy may pose a problem to those 
who develop plant technologies: it may undermine user adoption of technologies (e.g. see 
Leach et al., 2005). People consume what plant technology users – farmers – produce: food 
crops; if a substantial number of members of the public are unwilling to buy GM crops, then 
users may be hesitant to use GM technology (see also chapter 4). Public controversy may 
also be costly; fields where GM crops are tested are destroyed with some regularity (e.g. see 
Duarte, 2011). Thus, public controversy in plant technology development is about how 
science relates to society and users; how research excellence relates to the relevance of 
science (see also May & Perry, 2011).  
Discursive psychology (DP) was chosen as the main research approach; by design, DP 
examines talk-in-interaction in real-life real-time settings. It focuses on what interpretations 
co-participants in talk-in-interaction enable with their talk, how talk is heard by recipients 
and what interactional achievements are accomplished with talk (Potter, 1996). The general 
aim of discursive psychological analyses is to provide insights into how discursive 
phenomena help to reproduce or resolve societally relevant dilemmas.  
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DP is well-suited to examine sensitive or controversial issues because of its 
separation of mind and word: what people say and accomplish with their talk does not 
necessarily reflect their underlying intentions or thoughts (Potter, 1996; chapter 1 this 
thesis); Talk does not need to represent reality as speakers see it to have very real 
consequences (cf. Merton, 1995, on the Thomas theorem). Discursive psychologists tend to 
point out the intended and unintended interactional consequences of participants’ talk, e.g. 
how speakers manage participant dilemmas with their talk. This thesis has taken discursive 
psychological analysis a step further by first analysing plant experts’ talk and then teaching 
plant experts to adopt a discursive psychological outlook on talk-in-interaction in order to 
enable them to critically reflect on the interactional consequences of their own talk (see also 
chapter 6).  
 
 
7.2        Main Findings and Their Implications   
Plant experts in the study tend to talk more about laypeople and prospective users of 
technology than with people and users about plant science; and, if they talk to publics, they 
tend to largely favour one-way public communication (see also Davies, 2008). With their talk 
about laypeople, plant experts carefully avoid projecting the image that they are ignorant of 
lay views and user concerns. Chapter 3 shows that plant scientists’ references to laypeople 
appear to be vague but empathetic; they say that they understand or can imagine people’s 
concerns; and some scientific experts claim membership in the lay category by saying things 
such as: I have that too as a consumer. The primary function of displays of tolerance of lay 
views and membership claims in the lay category is that they signal access to laypeople’s 
knowledge and experience.  
That these statements about lay views or people are not (primarily) designed to 
display empathy becomes clear if one examines in what discursive context these displays of 
tolerance are deployed: displays of tolerance of lay views tend to be followed by contrastive 
declarative statements about science, e.g. I understand that people may think that but 
scientists…. In these discursive constructions with expansions such as membership claims in 
the lay category, lay views tend to be presented as without order: Everyone may think 
whatever they like, whereas statements about science are presented as rule-bound: in 
science standards are followed. The displays of tolerance in their immediate discursive 
context serve mainly to demonstrate that plant scientists sufficiently understand lay 
concerns to appraise their relevance for plant technology development and thereby retain 
their control over if, when and where lay concerns may be incorporated in technology 
development (see chapter 3). With this, plant scientists reflexively take full responsibility for 
plant technology development, including the usability and relevance of plant technologies in 
and to society. Whether this indeed leads to technologies that are usable in and by society is 
another question and cannot be determined with discursive psychological analysis. However, 
by claiming full responsibility for technology development, plant scientists unintentionally 
make themselves potentially very vulnerable to critique in the event that technologies turn 
out not to be usable in and by society.  
 In chapter 4, the focus is on plant experts’ user-references in expert board meetings. 
These meetings are organized with the aim of ensuring as much as possible that 
government-funded Phytophthora research results in plant technologies that are usable in 
and by society. Plant experts’ references to users are less univocal in tone than plant 
scientists’ constructions of laypeople in chapter 3. However, user-references appear to serve 
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similar purposes as references to laypeople. They imply that plant experts have sufficient 
access to, and understanding of, user concerns to assess when and where user concerns are 
relevant to plant technology development. Plant experts accomplish this mainly by using 
reported dialogue: we say: ‘…’, they say: ‘…’ (the pronoun we refers to the experts, they to 
the users; see also chapter 4).  
Furthermore, user concerns are presented as difficult to reconcile with scientific 
concerns. This is done by framing the dialogue in ‘we’ and ‘they’ terms and by exclusively 
making user feelings and expert knowledge relevant in meetings. Feelings and knowledge 
are hard to compare with each other. Feelings also tend to be less valued in science and 
professional practices than knowledge. Thus, framing user concerns in terms of feelings 
implies that scientific concerns should be prioritized over user concerns. Plant experts’ 
demonstrated access to user and scientific concerns and their implicit prioritizing of scientific 
concerns help scientific plant experts to present themselves as the group best equipped to 
assess the relevance of user concerns for plant technology development and to shelve user 
concerns (see also chapter 4). The risk here is again that implicitly plant experts claim full 
responsibility for plant technology development although they do not control how plant 
technologies are taken up by users and society. 
Chapter 5 focuses on how plant experts frame key concepts in Phytophthora 
research: Phytophthora and the technology to fight this versatile oomycete. We have seen 
that plant experts attribute agency and human traits to Phytophthora (see also Dorst, 2011, 
on personification). For instance, they say: Phytophthora produces proteins… or 
Phytophthora cons the potato. Reflexively, a clever versatile enemy such as Phytophthora 
requires a smart opponent in the form of intelligent and creative plant experts.  
Additionally, plant experts present GM as the way to speed up the crop breeding 
process so much that they can produce new Phytophthora-resistant potato crops before 
Phytophthora has figured out how to breach crops’ disease resistance. To support their 
story, plant experts deploy the so-called chain picture: a visual metaphor to compare 
classical breeding with genetic modification (see chapter 5). As we have seen, this chain 
picture is too neat to be true according to colleagues of plant experts in the audience. 
Moreover, alternative approaches to fight Phytophthora are not, or sparingly, discussed 
during expert board meetings (for an alternative approach to Phytophthora management, 
see Govers, 2009). 
Chapter 5 also demonstrates that plant experts use framing to weaken associations 
between genomics and the publicly controversial genetic modification. Technology is 
understood to be technology and knowledge at once (Barnes & Dupré, 2008: 400). In 
contrast, plant experts tend to portray genomics as either solely knowledge/data or solely 
technology. The function of framing here is to explicitly separate genomics from potentially 
publicly controversial technologies such as GM crops. This seems at odds with the assertion 
made by many plant experts in interviews that their research differs from biologists who, for 
instance, study the structure and inner workings of a plant primarily to understand plant 
structure better. Moreover, plant experts in the study maintain that they seek to address 
societal problems35.  
              A consequence of casting genomics technology as necessary is that it may foreclose 
                                                 
35
 This was said during ethnographic interviews. The ethnographic interviews focused on the work of plant 
experts and on how different actors such as the public and users related to their research. I generally started 
interviews by asking plant experts about their background and how they became involved in Phytophthora 
research.  
   
118 
 
discussion of potential alternatives to manage the Phytophthora problem. One does not 
argue about what is inevitable or inescapable. The latter appears to be the case and can be 
problematic given that plant experts only explored a limited number of strategies to manage 
Phytophthora (see chapter 5).  
 
Implications of Discursive Analyses  
As summarized in the foregoing section, references to laypeople and to users have in 
common that they are compared to scientific concerns. Lay and user concerns are found 
wanting, given that they do not conform to scientific standards. A problem with this 
scientism (Ninnes, 2000) – a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a 
knowledge standard that is projected as perfect and therefore essential – is that people’s 
and users’ concerns tend to be discredited implicitly because they differ in type from the 
scientific standard.  
Plant experts’ dichotomous pitching of lay/user as rule-free/emotional on the one 
hand, and science as governed by rules/rationality on the other, appears to be functional in 
that it helps scientific plant experts to uphold the professional norm of scientific 
independence: scientists are not supposed to let their research be affected by the stakes and 
interests of third parties. However, given that lay and user concerns are relegated to the 
private sphere or shelved in plant experts’ talk, laypeople and users may find that their 
concerns are not represented fairly; or they may claim that talk about lay and user concerns 
primarily serves to further scientists’ category-bound interests. Talk about laypeople and 
users without truly engaging with underlying lay and user concerns may unintentionally help 
maintain or create public and user alienation from science and technology development (cf. 
Wynne, 2001), in particular because, in this study, plant scientists demonstrate that they 
know and care enough about user concerns to be able to claim sufficient access to lay and 
user concerns for the sole purpose of shelving them until further notice. What they do or do 
not do with public and user concerns is simply not questioned by colleagues (see also 
chapters 3 and 4).  
 Phytophthora and genomics framings in chapter 5 also indicate a defensive stance on 
the part of plant experts: genomics and genomics applications such as GM are presented as 
the only viable solution that may keep Phytophthora definitively at bay. Defensive stances 
do not really invite talk about alternative ways of fighting Phytophthora. An alternative 
portrayal, a well-known science metaphor, not put forward by the plant experts I followed, is 
that a oomycete like Phytophthora is an interesting puzzle whose inner workings need to be 
deciphered in order to be able to master or control the disease (e.g. see Gibbon, 2012).  
In plant experts’ portrayal, Phytophthora management is depicted as a heroic 
undertaking, a fight or war, whereas in the puzzle depiction Phytophthora is presented as an 
intellectual endeavour. In the fight portrayal, the focus is on destroying or containing 
Phytophthora, and, in the portrayal of Phytophthora as a puzzle, the focus is on 
understanding Phytophthora better. Moreover, in the opponent–war portrayal, plant 
scientists’ reputations are put on the line far more than in the intellectual puzzle depiction. 
Losing a fight, after all, sounds far more dramatic than failing to solve a puzzle. Framing 
Phytophthora as an opponent instead of as a micro-organism raises the stakes: funding 
becomes a question not only of relevance and allocation but also of morality. Refusing to 
finance a war or battle may be hard to defend, if only because discursively one risks losing 
the war (see also Sontag, 2002, on militaristic metaphors).  
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To summarize, the discursive (psychological) analyses presented in this thesis show 
that plant experts use talk about Phytophthora, genomics, laypeople and users to ascertain 
and maintain their identities as experts who are still capable of fighting Phytophthora and 
who uphold the standard of scientific independence; they do independent research in 
conditions of controversy. How plant experts achieve this discursively is not without its 
contradictions and tensions, in particular because maintaining one’s scientific independence 
may come at the cost of really engaging with users’ concerns.  
 
 
7.3 Plant Experts’ Discursive Other 
The discursive Other is the central concept introduced in chapter 1 and was defined as 
follows36:  
 
The discursive Other consists of references to human and non-human actors; Others are 
discursively treated as human(oid) agents in their own right and as relevant to the interactive 
management of a problem or dilemma in an interaction setting.  
 
The Other tends to be discursively present but physically absent. The Others encountered in 
plant experts’ talk throughout this thesis are: laypeople (chapter 3), users (chapter 4) and 
humanized Phytophthora (chapter 5). These Others have in common that plant experts use 
them to manage the science–society and the user–science relationship: to position 
themselves as independently acting and capable professionals.  
 In chapter 3, plant scientists discursively position laypeople in a way that enables 
them to balance two requirements. Plant scientists need to conduct research that is 
excellent according to scientific standards and relevant according to societal norms (see May 
& Perry, 2011).  
According to May and Perry (2011), relevant research is often not considered to be 
excellent, and vice versa. Plant scientists attempt to manage the potentially conflicting 
requirements of excellence and relevance in research by presenting themselves as 
knowledge hybrids, that is, people who have knowledge of both lay concerns and scientific 
concerns (see also chapter 3). It is implied in this discursive construction that plant experts’ 
knowledge of lay concerns alongside scientific knowledge enables them to (potentially) 
develop technologies that are excellent and relevant to society, without giving non-scientists 
a substantial role in their research. A problem with this may be that relevant concerns are 
left unaddressed; even knowledge hybrids do not know everything.    
 In chapter 4, plant experts manage again the conflicting requirements of relevance 
and excellence in research, but with another discursive Other: users. Plant technologies need 
to be usable to be relevant to society (Leach et al., 2005); but, if experts listen too much to 
users, they run the risk, potentially at least, of their technologies being very practical but not 
excellent according to scientific criteria. We have seen in chapter 4 that plant experts deploy 
reported dialogue and emotional dispositional statements to discursively manage potential 
conflicts between scientific concerns and user concerns: scientists are responsible for ‘the 
facts’ and users for ‘emotions’. The latter enables plant experts to shelve user concerns 
when convenient and retrieve them if and when, according to them, the situation warrants 
it. 
                                                 
36
 Discursive is placed before Other to stress that plant experts’ constructions of others do not necessarily 
reflect the speakers’ actual beliefs, or reality.  
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The problem with the activity of shelving user concerns is that it is unlikely to 
contribute to user-friendly technologies, at least as long as it is unclear what the criteria are 
for putting user concerns on the shelf and taking them off. Moreover, by projecting the 
image that user and scientific concerns are hard to reconcile with each other, plant experts 
reflexively create the image that they do not know user concerns well enough to be able to 
incorporate user concerns in technology development (if desirable). 
In chapter 5, plant experts personify Phytophthora in public meetings to 
communicate that their research is relevant and worthwhile. The discursive strategy 
employed here is to create the image of a powerful and cunning Phytophthora. The 
cleverness and cunning of Phytophthora explains discursively why for so long plant experts 
have not been able to bring Phytophthora definitively under control and why plant experts 
are reflexively capable and worthy opponents of Phytophthora.  
What these three discursive Others have in common is that they present the Other as 
an opponent who cannot be totally understood from a purely scientific perspective; Others 
do not conform to scientific norms by discursively acting emotionally, unruly or unfair 
(Phytophthora cons etc.), that is, if compared to the scientific norm, Others tend to be 
subjugated to science and scientists: they are less rational or less moral, e.g. Phytophthora 
does not outwit but cons the potato.  
The question here is whether plant experts’ actual othering of Phytophthora, 
laypeople and users vis-à-vis science is a discursive strategy that contributes to plant 
technologies that are usable in and by society. Talk in oppositional terms generally 
contributes to subjugation and the disregard of some concerns. This may not be conductive 
of the open dialogue necessary to work together jointly on societal problems (e.g. see 
Edelman, 1993; Verkuyten et al., 1995). And that does not support discursively the creation 
of user-friendly or less controversial technologies.  
Despite this, there is hope. The fact that plant experts nowadays make their 
knowledge of laypeople and users relevant in talk at all signals that plant experts at least 
reflexively acknowledge that plant technology development is not a purely scientific affair. 
This may be a starting point from which experts, laypeople and users can work together to 
create an interactional space in which various types of concerns get the attention they need 
to reach the overarching shared goal of creating plant technologies that are usable in and by 
society.   
 
 
7.4 Conclusions 
Discursive constructions of Phytophthora, genomics, laypeople and users seem primarily to 
help plant experts to expand the authority of science with regard to societal issues. Plant 
experts project the image that they – the scientists – are veritable knowledge hybrids, able 
to conduct concurrently both excellent research according to scientific norms and relevant 
research according to socioeconomic norms; they know about science as researchers and 
they know about society as consumers and citizens.  
One problem with this may be that scientists do not always claim full responsibility 
for their research. They avoid, as discussed earlier, the issue of publicly controversial GM 
crops by discursively severing the link between genomics and controversial GM crops and by 
visually portraying GM crops as inevitable when compared to the slower but widely accepted 
practice of classical crop breeding. It is inconsistent for scientists to claim full responsibility in 
one interaction setting for developing technologies that are relevant in and to society and, 
       
121 
 
when faced with controversy in other interaction settings, to reject responsibility for what is 
done with the knowledge and technologies that they have developed.  
Put differently, plant experts’ accounts draw upon different conceptualizations of 
science. When plant experts need to discursively handle controversial GM crops, they draw 
upon the ‘ivory tower’ conceptualization of science in which a sharp distinction is made 
between the development of knowledge and knowledge applications in society. However, 
when faced with the requirement to account for the usability of technologies, plant experts 
draw upon their hybrid identities as scientist-citizens to claim control of, and implicitly 
responsibility for, the relevance of technologies. This inconsistency across interaction 
settings with regard to claiming responsibility may prove problematic in that it may 
potentially harm scientists’ authority.  
Another observation is that users and laypeople are generally not depicted as 
potential or natural allies of plant scientists in technology development but as actors who 
are a potential nuisance to science37. We saw a notable exception in chapter 4 in plant 
experts’ future-oriented talk. In that particular case, it served plant experts’ interests to 
depict users as commonsensically acting people who need or want Phytophthora research to 
continue. Plant experts manage the public and users as a nuisance in science by projecting 
the image that lay and user participation in technology development is more or less 
superfluous. Plant experts accomplish lay and user redundancy by claiming membership in 
the lay category and by showing that they have access to lay/user knowledge on the one 
hand and scientific knowledge on the other (see chapters 3 and 4).   
Moreover, in this thesis, plant experts implicitly show with their talk on 
Phytophthora, genomics, laypeople and users that they do not know how to act with regard 
to lay and user concerns on their own terms. Lay and users concerns are always set off 
against scientific standards. There is a hint in plant experts’ talk that in everyday life plant 
experts deploy other standards than they do in the laboratory and the field. However, they 
do not demonstrate how they use their everyday knowledge and experience to come up 
with standards and solutions that do not favour science over lay and user concerns (cf. Felt 
et al., 2009).   
Is this a problem? Are plant scientists not the best equipped to judge what is relevant 
in technology development and what is not? They might be if technology development was 
only be about science and knowledge; if having access to and understanding all kinds of 
relevant knowledge were enough – and if scientists indeed possessed sufficient knowledge 
of lay and user concerns as the plant scientists appear to claim in this study. However, 
knowledge alone does not make the world go round. Knowledge is important, certainly, but 
it is not enough (Dijstelbloem & Hagendijk, 2011; Genus & Coles, 2005; Swierstra & te 
Molder, 2012).  
In modern-day Dutch society, people have easy access to social media to share their 
opinions on a great number of things, get things done with crowd funding or become famous 
with enough hits or likes. We live in a society that emphasizes participation, personal 
responsibility, deregulation and the development of localized policies. In this context people 
– citizens and consumers – are increasingly used to having choices, to being able to make 
choices on their own, to letting their voices be heard when they feel like it, to starting or 
participating in ongoing debates. These consumers and citizens may leave technology 
development in the technical-scientific sense to the scientists, but they are unlikely to let 
                                                 
37
 This impression is strengthened by that lay/user concerns are pitted against each other in we: ‘…’ and they: 
‘…’ terms. 
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scientists tell them what technologies they should adopt and how they should use them. Or 
as te Molder (2012) states: society is already talking. Thus, it is not only about whether all 
relevant views – and what that means is subject to debate – are sufficiently accounted for – 
it is also about whether people are given sufficient say on issues that are relevant to society 
and themselves.   
If one looks at the purposes served by talk about Phytophthora, laypeople and users, 
then little appears to have changed. When and where non-scientific concerns are made 
relevant in technology development is – at least discursively – controlled by plant experts. 
Ironically enough, plant experts deploy references to laypeople and users to achieve this 
end. Moreover, framings of genomics indicate that plant experts claim to produce primarily 
knowledge or data; or they claim that genomics is only technology (see chapter 5). 
Reflexively, this implies that knowledge or technology is sufficient to fight Phytophthora and 
that therefore plant experts do not need other non-scientific measures to support them in 
their fight against it (except funding). This stance may be defendable and understandable 
from a purely technical-scientific perspective but not from a perspective on technology 
development in and for society (Leach et al., 2005).  
However, not all is lost. In chapter 6, we have seen that plant experts who appraised 
the interactional effects of their own talk are also critical of said talk. They are not 
necessarily opposed to what they actually discursively accomplish or project with their talk; 
scientific independence remains an important value to plant scientists. Rather, plant experts 
in this study concluded at the workshops that their talk about laypeople and user concerns 
does not enable the inclusion of other, potentially relevant, views in technology 
development. This raises the question of how plant experts could constructively relate to 
non-scientific Others.  
However, before I address this, I briefly reflect on the limitations of the study.  
 
 
7.5 Limitations of the Study  
Every research project has its limitations, and this thesis is no exception to this rule. Most 
limitations of The discursive Other are methodological in nature. Given that discursive 
psychological analysis is time-consuming, in particular in the transcription and analysis 
phase, a limited number of hours of talk-in-interaction can be studied.  
For instance, I would have liked to analyse plant scientists’ interactions with 
parliamentarians. Plant scientists are regularly asked to inform (new) parliamentarians on 
research that pertains to regulations and policies in agriculture at both national and EU level. 
Parliamentarians relate differently to plant scientists than, for instance, users of 
technologies. In a meeting between plant experts and a parliamentarian that I recorded (see 
also the data section of chapter 1), it caught my interest that the parliamentarian treated 
plant scientists discursively not only as experts in their respective fields of scientific 
expertise, but also as authorities on lay views on, among other things, GM crops. However, I 
was not able to gather enough naturalistic meetings of this sort to create potentially 
publishable articles (see also chapter 1). Thus, DP’s time-consuming nature and focus on 
naturalistic talk-in-interaction puts limits on the number and range of interactions that may 
be studied. Study of a fuller range of interactions may provide more useful insights in terms 
of what discursive work relevant to study participants’ situated practices is accomplished 
and what work is left undone.  
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A potential limitation specific to a focus on naturalistic interaction – talk-in-
interaction is not organized and co-produced by the researcher – is linked to the actual 
design of other-organized meetings in the interaction context. One has to make do with 
what one finds. For instance, the lecture format commonly found in science education is not 
ideally suited for discursive psychological analysis; there is relatively little interaction going 
on between speakers and their audiences.  
From a DP methodological perspective, absent or limited dialogue between experts 
and laypeople is problematic. Absence of recipient uptake makes it difficult to determine 
whether the discursive effects that are projected or enabled by plant experts are in actual 
practice achieved.   
Moreover, in naturalistic institutional interactions, not all participants have equal 
interactional rights – that is, the right to decide how interaction is organized. Typically, the 
organizer and chair of a meeting decides on the design of the meeting, that is, who is 
allowed to talk when, to whom, about what, in what manner (see also chapter 4). And as we 
have seen in Box 1.1, visitors to public meetings are granted limited discursive room to 
initiate topics themselves and make their own expertise relevant: their role is to listen and 
ask question; the organizer decides on the topics and who answers the questions.  
This design of (public) meetings may limit what can be said how and when in talk-in-
interaction, and, ultimately, the interactive accomplishments. This may in particular be 
problematic from a scientific technology studies (STS) or technology development 
perspective; that is, the dominant interaction design of public meetings in this study limits 
the mutual exchange of views necessary or desired to achieve technologies that are usable in 
society.   
If for DP desired naturalistic talk-in-interaction is largely absent, then one may deploy 
other strategies to generate desired insights. In this thesis, I used DP to analyse ethnographic 
interviews with plant scientists to gain insight into their lack of interactions with laypeople 
and users and their discursive constructions of the science–society relationship. To put it 
more generally, by analysing different types of data – naturalistic and non-naturalistic – one 
may compensate the weaknesses of one data source with the strengths of another data 
source, and vice versa.  
Another potential limitation of data-driven discursive analysis is the general focus on 
the here and now. This temporal focus means that discursive analyses tend to provide 
insight into talk-in-interaction in the recent past. This may prove very useful – as this thesis 
has attempted to show. Despite this, people generally expect studies in human 
communication to provide recommendations to improve communication in the future. 
Providing interested parties with general guidelines to improve their future communication 
is easy enough. However, the problem is generally not so much that people do not know 
how they should communicate in theory and need guidelines for that. It is more common for 
people to encounter problems when they try to put theory into future practice. After all, it is 
generally easier to look back than to look forward.   
A strength and limitation of the study is that the focus tended to be on recurring 
dominant discursive patterns (except chapter 5, which focused on plant experts’ use of 
innovative framings). On the upside, an analytical focus on dominant discursive patterns 
greatly affects discursive work done in an interaction setting. Studying these patterns is 
therefore relevant. On the downside, dominant discursive patterns provide relatively little 
insight into the diversity of discursive constructions deployed at the research site. This also 
implies that the study of dominant discursive patterns does not necessarily yield insight into 
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plant experts’ best discursive practices; insight into the latter is particularly useful if one 
wants to improve existing practices.  
So far, I have focused on study limitations linked to the main research approach. A 
study, however, may also be limited (and enabled) by the research setting or the research 
subject. This is certainly true for the research conducted for this thesis. Plant technology 
development focused on disease management in staple crops in conditions of controversy is 
a highly specialized field. The consequence of this may be that the discursive phenomena 
studied are specific to the plant technology field.  
From interaction studies we know that talk-in-interaction is highly context sensitive 
but rarely specific to a particular interaction context (e.g. see Arminen, 2000). This also 
appears to be true of plant experts’ talk studied in this thesis. Many, if not most, 
sociocultural inferences upon which study participants draw, e.g. the inferences about 
farmers and science, are not specific to plant technology science but available to a wide 
range of people within and outside plant technology science. Moreover, the discursive work 
that plant experts conduct with their talk – maintaining control over if, when and how lay 
concerns are considered in plant technology development – is not specific to plant 
technology science but something that other professions and their practitioners may also 
pursue. However, this is not to claim that what plant experts do accomplish or project with 
their talk in this study is generalizable across different research settings. The latter cannot be 
claimed based on situated discursive (psychological) analyses. Likewise, it cannot be claimed 
that results presented in this thesis are unique to plant experts’ talk on Phytophthora.   
That said, it stands to reason that what plant experts accomplish in talk-in-interaction 
and how they do that is partly informed by the conditions of public controversy in which 
technologies are developed. Possibly, plant experts’ presentation of the science–user 
relationship in we: ‘…’and they: ‘…’ terms is informed by the controversy surrounding GM 
crops. After all, plant scientists have to cope with action groups that destroy or damage their 
test field (e.g. see Duarte, 2011). In a way, plant scientists literally need to defend their 
research. This defensiveness may have sparked defensive stance-taking in ‘we’ (scientists) 
and ‘they’ (laypeople/users) terms. If the latter is true, then the discursive analyses 
presented in this thesis may be of use to researchers and practitioners who study or are 
involved in communication in conditions of controversy.  
 
 
7.6 Recommendations  
A problem previously identified in plant experts’ talk-in-interaction, as studied in this thesis, 
is that plant experts tend to talk in we say: ‘…’, they say: ‘…’ dual terms. The discursive Other 
in the form of laypeople, users and personified Phytophthora are discursively treated as 
opponents who need to be fought or controlled. This appears to be unhelpful in plant 
technology science in which the usability of plant technologies is considered important 
(Leach et al., 2005) by the field and by study participants (see chapter 6). Polarization is 
generally not conducive of collaboration. Thus, it appears that the Other discursively 
presented as distant and subjugated should be discursively turned into Others who are 
familiar and equal; someone with whom one may arrive at a shared understanding.  
From an interactional perspective, it may be fruitful to occasionally reverse 
interaction roles of laypeople and plant experts. Othering is generally enabled by the 
physical absence of the Other. So the first recommendation would be to bring together 
relevant Others, laypeople and experts. Normally, plant experts tend to tell and explain ‘the 
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facts’, whereas laypeople tend to listen and may ask the occasional question. This division of 
interactional labour tends to reinforce the low epistemic status of laypeople relative to 
experts. So the second recommendation would be to start change traditional interaction 
patterns, experts may be invited to think of questions to ask of laypeople and to attend 
meetings at which laypeople may be invited to give a talk about their concerns or specific 
expertise. The latter exercise would project that non-scientists have relevant expertise of 
their own.  
  Additionally, one could organize (mixed) discursive action method (DAM) workshops 
with various groups of experts, laypeople or users; workshop participants examine expert 
and lay discursive patterns in participants’ own talk-in-interaction and in talk-in-interaction 
in which interaction roles are reversed or mixed.  
In order to organize this type of meeting, criteria need to be met, such as security 
(Lamerichs et al., 2009) and equality. Participants need to feel free and secure enough to be 
critical and to be inclined to express their concerns. In chapter 4 we have seen that 
prospective users of plant technology are allowed and expected to show their emotions, but 
their knowledge is not treated as relevant. This indicates that relevant concerns and 
knowledge may be disregarded in expert board meetings and an effort needs to be made to 
ensure that non-expert knowledge is considered in technology development.  
It may also prove fruitful to try conducting discursive psychological analyses of best 
practices in talk-in-interaction – e.g. by studying the practices of speakers that are allegedly 
good at talk-in-interaction. Even if it turns out later on that they are not great, one may 
nevertheless still learn much from them.    
Finally, it may be interesting to discursively analyse visuals-in-use. As the saying  
goes: a picture says more than a thousand words and, consequently, may impact heavily on 
what participants achieve in talk-in-interaction, in particular in the science and technology 
field. The study of the use of visuals in talk-in-interaction may complement the multimodal 
analyses of talk-in-interaction currently popular in conversation analysis.  
 
 
7.7 References 
Arminen, I. (2000). On the Context Sensitivity of Institutional Interaction. Discourse & Society 
11(4), 435–458.  
Barnes, B., & Dupré, J. (2008). Genomes and What to Make of Them. USA/UK: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
Dijstelbloem, H.J., Hagendijk, R. (2011). Het Betwiste Gezag van de Wetenschap. Amsterdam: 
Van Gennep.  
Dorst, A. (2011). Personification in Discourse: Linguistic Forms, Conceptual Structures and 
Communicative Functions. Language and Literature 20(2), 113–134. 
Duarte, M. (2011). Gen-Tech Veld Beschoten met Bio-aardappelen. 
http://www.dewereldmorgen.be/video/2011/05/05/gentech-veld-beschoten-met-
bio-aardappelen 
Edelman, M. (1993). Contestable Categories and Public Opinion. Political Communication 
10(3), 231–242.  
Felt, U., Fochler, M., Müller, A., & Strassing, M. (2009). Unruly Ethics: On the Difficulties of a 
Bottom Up Approach to Ethics in the Field of Genomics. Public Understanding of 
Science 18(3), 354–371. 
   
126 
 
Gaskell, G., & Bauer, M. (2001). Biotechnology 1996–2001: The Years of Controversy. London: 
Science Museum.  
Gaskell, G., & Bauer, M.W. (2006). Genomics & Society: Legal, Ethical & Social Dimensions. 
London: Sterling VA.  
Genus, A., & Coles, A. (2005). On Constructive Technology Assessment and Limitations on 
Public Participation in Technology Assessment. Technology Assessment & Strategic 
Management 17(4), 433–443. 
Gibbon, J. (2012). Understanding of Accountability: An Autoethnographic Account Using 
Metaphor. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 23(3), 201–212.  
Govers, F. (2009). Dynamische Ziekteverwerkers: Wat We (Willen) Weten over Oömyceten. 
Inaugural Address, Wageningen University.  
Lamerichs, J., Koelen, M., & te Molder, H. (2009). Turning Adolescents into Analysts of Their 
Own Discourse: Raising Awareness of Everyday Talk to Develop Peer-Based Health 
Activities. Qualitative Health Research 19, 1162–1175. 
Leach, M., Scoones, I., & Wynne, B. (Eds). (2005). Science and Citizens: Globalization and the 
Challenge of Engagement. London/New York: Zed. 
May, T., & Perry, B. (2011). Social Research & Reflexivity: Content, Consequence and Context. 
London: Sage Publications.  
Merton, R.K. (1995). The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect. Social Forces 74(2), 379–
424. 
Ninnes, P. (2000). Representations of Indigenous Knowledges in Secondary School Science 
Text Books in Australia and Canada. International Journal of Science Education 22(6), 
603–617.  
Potter, J. (1996). Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction. 
Loughborough, UK: Sage Publications. 
Sontag, S. (2002). Illness and Its Metaphors & AIDS and Its Metaphors. London: Penguin 
Books. 
Swierstra, T., & te Molder, H. (2012). Risk and Soft Impacts. In S. Roeser (Ed.), Handbook of 
Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk (pp. 
1055–1066). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. 
Te Molder, H. (2012). Discourse Communities as Catalysts for Science and Technology 
Communication. In L. Philips, A. Carvalho, & J. Doyle (Eds.), Citizen Voices: Performing 
Public Participation in Science and Environment Communication (pp. 97–118). Bristol 
UK/Chicago USA: Intellect/The University of Chicago Press.  
Veen, M., Gremmen, B., te Molder, H., & van Woerkum, C. (2011). Emergent Technologies 
against the Background of Everyday Life: Discursive Psychology as a Technology 
Assessment Tool. Public Understanding of Science 20(6), 810–825. 
Verkuyten, M., de Jong, W., & Masson, C.N. (1995). The Construction of Ethnic Categories: 
Discourses of Ethnicity in the Netherlands. Ethnic and Racial Studies 18(2), 251–276.  
Wynne, B. (2001). Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics on GMOs. 
Science as Culture 10(4), 445–481.  
       
127 
 
  
   
128 
 
  
       
129 
 
Appendices 
  
   
130 
 
       
131 
 
Summary  
 
Technologies have far-reaching socioeconomic and political consequences, and technology 
development, adoption and use are far from straightforward; new technologies may be put 
to different uses than scientists and engineers envisioned originally, or users or publics may 
reject them. This is particularly true for technologies developed in plant genomics science. In 
Europe, plant technologies such as genetic modification (GM) continue to be met with 
resistance by the well-informed and the ignorant alike (e.g. see Gaskell & Bauer, 2001; 
Duarte, 2011). Moreover, a comprehensive content-analysis by the Dutch Advisory Board on 
Genetic Modification (COGEM, 2007) that investigates recurrent patterns in arguments for 
and against GM in the Netherlands shows that knowledge of all arguments does not 
necessarily result in public acceptance and adoption of GM.  
The latter may be because arguments not only convey information and standpoints, 
they also serve to manage social relations and human activities: language is routinely 
deployed to manage stakes and interests in face-to-face encounters with others (e.g. see 
Potter, 1996). For instance, plant scientists’ invocations of ‘lay’ arguments are not simply 
demonstrations of scientists’ knowledge, but may also help experts to inoculate potential 
charges that they are ignorant of, or indifferent to, public concerns.  
To date, science and technology studies (STS) scholars have scarcely begun to 
systematically explore the performative dimension of language (Veen et al. 2011). In 
particular, scientists’ talk in real-life real-time face-to-face encounters on specialized subjects 
in non-everyday settings such as (plant) technology science is understudied.  
The research project The discursive Other seeks to reduce this gap in the scientific 
literature; it investigates the interactional effects of Dutch plant science experts’ talk in 
different interaction settings: public meetings, expert board meetings and ethnographic 
interviews. The main research approach deployed is discursive psychology (DP): a 
methodology that focuses not on what is said but on what is accomplished with talk.  
Discursive psychological analyses provide insights into how people (re)produce 
relationships, identities and claims in talk-in-interaction and how speakers (routinely) 
manage interactional dilemmas. How participants manage interactional dilemmas is 
particularly relevant to plant technology science given that the relationship between science 
on the one hand, and the public or users on the other, appears to be strained for quite some 
time now (e.g. see Leach et al., 2005; Wynne, 2001).  
  The central topic of all the talk analysed in this thesis is Phytophthora Infestans: a 
major plant disease in staple crops that helped bring about the Irish famine in the 19th 
century. Phytophthora is still a large problem. To fight Phytophthora, plant experts have 
been developing different technologies, some of which, such as genetic modification (GM), 
are met with public controversy.  
  
Research Aims  
The thesis The discursive Other addresses the following aims:   
 Furthering insight into how and to what end plant (genomics) experts discursively 
manage the science–society relationship and the science–user relationship in real-
life, real-time encounters.   
 Increasing insight into whether and in what ways plant experts may be empowered 
to adopt a self-reflective stance with regard to the interactional effects of their talk 
about laypeople, users, genomics and Phytophthora in different interaction settings. 
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The discursive Other as Central Concept  
The discursive Other is the concept used to connect the various discursive (psychological) 
analyses presented in chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the thesis. The concept is inspired by, but not 
equal to, the anthropological concepts of the exotic Other (Buchowski, 2006), Mead’s 
concept of the generalized other (e.g. see Maranta et al., 2003; Holdsworth & Morgan, 2007) 
and Latour’s notion of actants (Latour, 1996). Discursive is placed before Other to stress that 
this thesis looks at how plant experts discursively manage their imagined or real ‘significant’ 
Others in different interaction settings (e.g. see Buchowski, 2006). 
What Other experts make discursively relevant in their talk varies across interaction 
settings: laypeople, prospective users of plant technology (farmers and breeders) and the 
plant disease Phytophthora. In this study, all discursive Others to a greater or lesser degree: 
(1) have a stake or interest in encounters analysed; (2) are literally not able or are not given 
the opportunity to voice their concerns by themselves; (3) tend to be talked about 
extensively in a general way; and (4) tend to be discursively treated as actors in their own 
right (regardless of whether they have this kind of agency in reality).  
 
The following data were gathered:  
(1) Twelve ethnographic interviews with plant scientists. These were discursively 
analysed to explore how and to what end plant scientists discursively construct 
the science–society relationship; the discursive Other in this setting are 
laypeople.  
(2) Eight plant expert board meetings connected to Phytophthora research 
programmes. In these board meetings, plant scientists consult with field experts 
and account for their research to increase prospective user adoption of new 
technologies and/or acquire permission to conduct research. The discursive Other 
in this setting are users.  
(3) Plant experts’ innovative use of (metaphorical) framings of genomics and 
Phytophthora. These were analysed in eight public Phytophthora meetings and in 
25 ethnographic interviews (the 12 aforementioned interviews are part of 25 
interviews). The discursive Other in this setting is Phytophthora.  
(4) Two workshops with in total 17 participants. These participants examine their 
own talk-in-interaction patterns found in ethnographic interviews (1), plant 
expert board meetings (2) and ethnographic interviews and public meetings (3).  
 
 
Research Approach: Discursive Psychology Complemented with Anthropological 
Methodology 
The main research approach deployed in the thesis is discursive psychology (DP). DP is a 
relatively young and little-known methodology that focuses on how talk-in-interaction is 
socially organized and occasioned (Potter, 1996). Analysts are interested in how talk-in-
interaction helps to manage interactional dilemmas relevant in specific interaction 
environments. The focus tends to be on recurring discursive patterns in the data.  
Basically, DP analysis is governed by two principles: the participant proof principle 
and the rhetorical principle. The participant proof principle entails that, in analysis, the 
responses of recipients of talk are leading and not what the speaker aimed for with an 
utterance. For instance, an invitation posed by someone may be accepted, declined or 
ignored. The actual response determines for the analyst what discursive work is 
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accomplished by the invitation, e.g. declining an invitation may harm the relationship of the 
inviter and invitee, especially if the invitee is rude in his/her rejection. However, people do 
not respond randomly to one another: participants in talk-in-interaction routinely make use 
of their tacit knowledge of language and sociocultural conventions to further their claims 
and arguments, e.g. questions are supposed to be followed up by answers not by counter-
questions. For instance, the statement: farmers are afraid to use new technology may be 
endorsed by recipients because it draws upon the stereotype that farmers tend to be 
conservative by nature. 
The rhetorical principle means in practice that the DP analyst compares what is 
actually made relevant in talk-in-interaction with alternative wordings of the same utterance 
in order to determine what is accomplished with actual talk-in-interaction.  
DP analysis requires the detailed transcription of talk-in-interaction: pauses in tenths 
of seconds, changes in speed and loudness of speech are transcribed in so-called 
Jeffersonian transcription notation (Jefferson, 2004). In DP, data are preferably naturalistic in 
form, that is, recorded talk-in-interaction is not affected by the researcher. The latter, 
however, does not mean that non-naturalistic data – such as interviews – cannot be 
analysed with discursive psychology (see chapter 3 for an example).  
 Anthropological methodology was deployed in the research project the discursive 
Other to gain and maintain sufficient physical and epistemic access to the plant science field 
and to successfully conduct discursive analyses. The use of anthropology methodology 
entailed: staying at the plant sciences group for one day a week for three years to talk 
informally to plant experts; 25 ethnographic interviews with key players in plant technology 
science; observation and note-taking during recording of meetings and the use of concepts 
partly inspired by anthropology.   
From the author’s research experiences, it is argued that physical and epistemic 
access to the research setting cannot be taken for granted; and, furthermore, that the extent 
to which the analyst gains physical and epistemic access to the research setting may affect 
analysis. The implication of this is that it would be good if more researchers who conduct 
discursive (psychological) analyses in specialized settings are transparent about how they 
physically and epistemically accessed their research settings. 
 
 
Results of Discursive Analyses of Plant Experts’ Talk 
In chapters 3 and 4, plant experts’ talk on laypeople and users is analysed using discursive 
psychology. The focus is on the discursive functions of dominant recurring patterns of 
references to laypeople and users. Chapter 5 deals with innovative and interactional 
(metaphorical) framings of Phytophthora and genomics.  
In chapter 3, the focus is on how plant scientists discursively manage the science–
society relationship. When in interviews plant scientists talk about how they view the 
science–society relationship, they consistently display first their tolerance of ‘lay’ concerns 
before they go on to contrast rule-free lay concerns with statements about rule-based 
science. Thus, plant experts tend to discursively subjugate lay concerns to science without 
appearing to be ignorant or uncaring about lay concerns. Moreover, by discursively 
demonstrating that they have access to lay knowledge in everyday life and techno-scientific 
knowledge in science, plant experts invoke the image that they are best equipped to decide 
if, when and how lay concerns are considered in plant technology development.  
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 In chapter 4, the focus is on how and to what end plant experts deploy user-
references in expert board meetings on plant science. Users are physically absent during 
these meetings. Plant experts actively voice user concerns by reporting dialogues between 
themselves and users. These reported dialogues show that experts have access to users and 
that user concerns are hard to combine with scientific concerns. Plant experts accomplish 
the latter by contrasting user feelings with expert knowledge. Ultimately, the use of reported 
dialogue between users and experts enables plant experts to shelve user concerns.  
In chapter 5, plant experts’ framing of key concepts is explored. With framings of 
genomics, plant experts attempt to discursively separate genomics from the publicly 
controversial GM. This framing of genomics contrasts with plant experts’ framing of the 
science–society and science–user relationship in chapters 3 and 4: with their genomics’ 
framings, plant experts do not take full responsibility for the societal relevance of plant 
technology development, whereas they do so implicitly with their science–society and 
science–user constructions.  
  By personifying Phytophthora in interviews and public meetings, plant experts 
project the image that it is still worthwhile to fund Phytophthora research; personification 
also helps to discursively establish that plant experts are best equipped to fight 
Phytophthora (personification is ascription of human traits to non-humans). With a visual 
metaphor, plant experts discursively project why GM crops are necessary to definitively 
manage Phytophthora.  
Chapter 6 reports on an exploratory study to turn plant experts into self-reflective 
speakers who are able to appraise the interactional consequences of their own talk. Two 
workshops were conducted in which in total 17 plant experts participated. Workshop 
participants were given representative fragments analysed by the author in chapters 3, 4 and 
5. The fragments show in an exemplary way how plant experts talk about their discursive 
Others: laypeople, users and personified Phytophthora. Plant experts confirmed in their own 
words the main discursive constructions and their functions as found in the discursive 
analyses reported in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Workshop participants appear able to reflect on the 
interactional effects of their own talk. Additionally, the workshops generated some insights 
that complement the discursive analyses presented in chapter 3, 4 and 5.  
 
The discursive Other across Interaction Settings 
The Other that plant experts make relevant in talk enables the handling of participant 
dilemmas. As the analyses show, the othering of laypeople, users and Phytophthora does not 
necessarily create discursive pathways that may help bring about less publicly controversial 
and more user-friendly technologies. Plant experts’ discursive constructions of the science–
society relationship, for instance, acknowledge differences in views between scientists and 
people; but acknowledgement of differences between lay and expert concerns is not 
primarily used to assert the relevance of lay concerns in technology development or to 
accommodate the incorporation of these concerns in technology development. Instead, 
plant scientists show that they have epistemic access to lay views, and they acknowledge the 
differences between lay and expert knowledge to subjugate ‘free’ lay knowledge to rule-
based scientific knowledge. The latter helps plant scientists to present themselves as 
knowledge hybrids that possess a superior capacity to assess the relevance of lay concerns to 
plant technology science. With the latter, they take full responsibility for the excellence and 
relevance of Phytophthora research. User concerns face a similar fate in expert board 
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meetings, albeit brought about with other discursive constructions: reported dialogue and 
emotional dispositional statements about users.  
The root of the problem may be that the non-scientific Other tends to be treated as 
an opponent. For instance, Phytophthora is treated as a smart, fickle enemy by plant experts 
in this thesis; and experts’ talk about users in we say: ‘…’, they say: ‘…’ terminology suggests 
an opposition between experts and users. Similarly, the use of I understand that but 
science… constructions – typical of plant scientists’ science–society constructions – suggests 
an opposition between experts on the one hand and laypeople on the other. Casting 
different concerns and knowledge in dual terms is an effective way to help establish 
(decisional) hierarchies or chains of command. However, it may not enable a balanced 
treatment of public, user and scientific concerns in technology development in and for 
society. One may wonder what would happen if the discursive playing field between experts 
and non-experts was levelled. What if experts and non-experts shared the privilege and 
responsibility of deciding when and where non-expert concerns were incorporated in 
technology? 
To stimulate dialogue and exchange of views, it may be fruitful to occasionally 
reverse interaction patterns of how laypeople and plant experts typically communicate with 
one another. Normally, plant experts tend to tell and explain ‘the facts’, whereas laypeople 
are there to listen and to ask questions. This division of interactional labour tends to 
reinforce the low epistemic status of laypeople relative to experts. To change this state of 
affairs, experts may be invited to ask questions of laypeople, and laypeople may be invited to 
give a talk about their concerns or expertise alongside experts. Changing the traditional 
division of interactional labour between laypeople and experts may help redistribute 
responsibility for technology development in and for society, and ultimately, technologies 
that are optimal usable in society.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Nieuwe technologieën worden geacht nuttig te zijn voor en in de samenleving. Als zodanig 
kunnen technologieën verstrekkende politieke en sociaaleconomische consequenties 
hebben; ze kunnen voor andere doelen ingezet worden dan waarvoor onderzoekers en 
ingenieurs ze oorspronkelijk ontwikkeld hadden. Of, een andere mogelijkheid, potentiële 
gebruikers of het bredere publiek verwerpen nieuwe technologieën. Het laatste geldt deels 
voor technologieën ontwikkeld in plantonderzoek; in Europa liggen plant technologieën zoals 
genetische modificatie (GM) al decennialang gevoelig bij een deel van het bredere publiek 
(zie bijvoorbeeld Gaskell & Bauer, 2001; Duarte, 2011). De hardnekkigheid van dit 
verschijnsel roept de vraag op hoe dit kan. 
  Een uitgebreide inhoudsanalyse van terugkerende argumenten voor en tegen GM in 
debatten laat zien dat zelfs als zogenoemde leken beschikken over kennis van alle 
argumenten voor GM dit niet perse leidt tot acceptatie of adoptie van GM (zie COGEM 
(2007)). Een verklaring voor het laatste is dat argumenten niet alleen informatie en 
standpunten communiceren; ze verrichten daarnaast ook discursief werk in gesprekken in de 
zin dat ze vaak onbewust en soms bewust verhoudingen tussen en handelingen van mensen 
managen (Potter, 1996). Gebruik van zogenaamde lekenargumenten door 
plantonderzoekers zijn bijvoorbeeld niet alleen manifestaties van kennis maar helpen 
plantonderzoekers ook om potentiële verwijten te pareren dat ze onvoldoende kennis 
hebben van of geen rekening houden met de zorgen en bezwaren die leven in de 
samenleving bij de ontwikkeling van nieuwe technologieën.  
 Tot nu toe is nog nauwelijks systematisch onderzocht hoe de performatieve functie 
van spraak-in-interactie tijdens bijeenkomsten van invloed is op hoe burgers en experts zich 
verhouden tot sociaal-maatschappelijke vraagstukken in de levenswetenschappen (zie 
bijvoorbeeld Veen et al., 2011). Het taalgebruik van wetenschappers in real-life real-time 
bijeenkomsten over gespecialiseerde onderwerpen zoals plantonderzoek is in het bijzonder 
nog nauwelijks bestudeerd.  
 Het onderzoeksproject de discursieve Ander beoogt hierin verandering te brengen 
door te exploreren wat de interactieve effecten zijn het taalgebruik van plantonderzoekers in 
uiteenlopende setttings: publieksmeetings, expert meetings en etnografische interviews. De 
hoofdmethodologie die gehanteerd wordt in het onderzoeksproject en in dit proefschrift is 
discursieve psychologie (DP). Deze methodologie wordt aangevuld met antropologische 
methoden zoals etnografische interviews.  
  DP focust op wat mensen bereiken in gesprekken met elkaar. Een discursief 
psychologische vraag is bijvoorbeeld: Hoe en met welk interactioneel resultaat brengen 
experts lekenargumenten in tijdens bijeenkomsten die focussen op 
technologieontwikkeling? Discursief psychologische analyses bieden doorgaans inzicht in hoe 
mensen in face-to-face ontmoetingen met elkaar onderlinge verhoudingen, identiteiten en 
claims (re)produceren en hoe sprekers routinematig interactionele dilemma’s managen. Hoe 
interactionele dilemma’s hanteerbaar gemaakt worden zou het inzicht kunnen vergroten in 
hoe de enigszins gespannen relatie tussen plant wetenschap aan de ene kant en gebruikers 
en burgers aan de andere kant in stand gehouden wordt.  
    Onderwerp van alle spraak-in-interactie die geanalyseerd wordt in het proefschrift de 
discursieve Ander is Phytophthora Infestans – een tot op de dag van vandaag 
veelvoorkomende plantziekte in voedselgewassen. Om Phytophthora te bestrijden doen 
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plantonderzoekers een beroep op voor een deel publiek omstreden technologieën als 
genetische modificatie (GM).  
 
Onderzoeksdoelen 
Het proefschrift de discursieve Ander beoogt: 
 het inzicht te vergroten in hoe en met welk resultaat plant (genomics) experts de 
relatie tussen wetenschap en samenleving en de relatie tussen wetenschap en 
gebruikers managen in real-life, real-time gesprekken.  
 het inzicht te vergroten in of en op welke manieren plant experts empowered 
kunnen worden om een reflexieve houding aan te nemen ten opzichte van hun praat 
over ‘leken’, gebruikers, genomics en Phytophthora.  
 
De discursieve Ander als Centraal Concept 
De discursieve Ander is het centrale concept dat discursieve analyses gepresenteerd in de 
hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 van deze thesis beoogt te verbinden. Dit concept als gebruikt in het 
proefschrift, is geïnspireerd op maar valt niet samen met het antropologische concept van 
de exotische Ander (Buchowski, 2006), Mead’s concept van de gegeneraliseerde Ander (zie 
bijvoorbeeld Maranta et al., 2003; Holdsworth & Morgan, 2007) en Latour’s begrip van 
actants (Latour, 1996). Discursief staat voor de Ander om te benadrukken dat er in dit 
proefschrift – anders dan bij de meeste andere studies die focussen op de Ander - de nadruk 
ligt op hoe plant experts discursief hun ‘significante’ Anderen managen.   
 Welke discursieve Ander experts relevant maken in bijeenkomsten varieert per 
interactiesetting: ‘leken’, prospectieve gebruikers van nieuwe plant technologieën en de 
plantziekte Phytophthora. Al deze discursieve Anderen hebben met elkaar gemeen da ze: (1) 
een belang hebben in Phytophthora onderzoek; (2) niet in staat zijn of niet de gelegenheid 
krijgen om zelf hun zorgen en bezwaren te uiten; (3) dat er over hen in generieke termen 
gepraat wordt; en dat ze (4) discursief behandeld worden als actoren die over 
handelingsmacht beschikken (onafhankelijk van of ze deze agency in het echt bezitten). 
 
De volgende data zijn verzameld om inzicht te verkrijgen hoe en met welk resultaat plant 
experts hun discursieve Anderen relevant maken in spraak-in-interactie: 
1. Twaalf etnografische interviews met plantonderzoekers zijn discursief geanalyseerd 
om te verkennen hoe en met welk resultaat plantonderzoekers de relatie tussen 
wetenschap en samenleving discursief construeren. De discursieve Ander in deze 
setting zijn ‘leken’. 
2. Acht expert overleggen verbonden aan Phytophthora onderzoeksprogramma’s. In 
expert overleggen consulteren plantonderzoekers veld experts en leggen 
plantonderzoekers verantwoording af over de potentiële bruikbaarheid van hun 
onderzoeksresultaten. De discursieve Ander in deze setting zijn gebruikers.  
3. Acht publieksbijeenkomsten en 25 etnografische interviews (de eerder genoemde 
twaalf interviews maken deel uit van deze set) zijn verzameld om plant experts’ 
innovatief gebruik van (metaforische) framing van genomics en Phytophthora te 
exploreren. De discursieve Ander in deze setting is de plantziekte Phytophthora.  
4. Twee workshops met in totaal 17 deelnemers. Deelnemers exploreren patronen in 
hun eigen spraak-in-interactie in etnografische interviews (1), plant expert 
bijeenkomsten (2) en etnografische interviews en publieksmeetings (3).  
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Onderzoeksbenadering: Discursieve Psychologie Aangevuld met Antropologische 
Methoden 
De relatief jonge en onbekende discursieve psychologie (DP) is de hoofdmethodologie in dit 
proefschrift. DP focust op hoe spraak-in-interactie sociaal georganiseerd wordt en sociale 
doelen dient (Potter, 1996). Analisten zijn geïnteresseerd in hoe spraak-in-interactie 
bijdraagt aan het hanteren van interactionele dilemma’s in specifieke interactie settings. Ze 
focussen daarbij in de praktijk op terugkerende interactiepatronen.  
  In de kern leunt discursieve psychologie in de analysefase op de toepassing van het 
participant proof principe en het retorische principe. Het participant proof principe houdt in 
dat de reacties van participanten in spraak-in-interactie op een uiting leidend zijn voor de 
analyse en niet wat sprekers beoogden te bereiken met een uiting.  Een uitnodiging kan 
bijvoorbeeld uiteenlopende reacties uitlokken bij geadresseerden: de uitnodiging kan 
worden geaccepteerd, genegeerd of verworpen. De feitelijke respons op de uitnodiging 
bepaalt in hoge mate wat voor werk wordt gerealiseerd door de uitnodiging; acceptatie van 
een uitnodiging kan de band versterken tussen degene die de uitnodiging doet en degene 
die hem accepteert maar wordt een uitnodiging verworpen dan dat schaadt potentieel de 
relatie tussen gespreksdeelnemers. Het gegeven dat deelnemers aan spraak-in-interactie 
uiteenlopend kunnen reageren op elkaars uitingen betekent niet dat ze volstrekt willekeurig 
reageren op uitingen. Participanten in spraak-in-interactie doen vaak onbewust een beroep 
op sociaal-culture normen en betekenissen die ingebed zijn in uitingen. Bijvoorbeeld, de 
mededeling ‘boeren zijn bang om nieuwe technologieën te gebruiken’ is relatief moeilijk te 
weerleggen omdat ze aansluit bij de welkbekende stereotype dat boeren van nature 
conservatief zijn. Gespreksdeelnemers houden zich daarnaast grotendeels aan in de vroege 
jeugd geleerde conversatieregels: een vraag dient bijvoorbeeld beantwoord te worden en 
niet gepareerd te worden met een tegenvraag.  
  Het retorisch principe houdt in dat de analist kijkt naar hoe gespreksdeelnemers 
zaken daadwerkelijk relevant maken in spraak-in-interactie en dit vervolgens vergelijkt met 
potentiële alternatieve verwoordingen van een uiting en de respons daarop.  
 Kenmerkend voor DP is verder de gedetailleerde transcriptie van spraak-in-interactie: 
pauzes in tienden van seconden en verandering in spreektempo en spreekvolume en andere 
non-verbale aspecten van spraak-in-interactie worden getranscribeerd. DP heeft daarnaast 
een voorkeur voor naturalistische gesprekken die veel beurtwisselingen tussen 
gesprekspartners bevatten. Met naturalistisch wordt bedoeld: gesprekken vinden 
onafhankelijk van de aanwezigheid en participatie van de onderzoeker plaats. Het laatste wil 
echter niet zeggen dat niet-naturalistische spraak-in-interactie niet geanalyseerd kan worden 
met discursieve psychologie.  
 Antropologische methoden zijn in het onderzoeksproject de discursieve Ander primair 
ingezet om de noodzakelijke fysieke en epistemologische toegang te verkrijgen en te 
behouden tot het veld van de plantwetenschappen en voor het succesvol verrichten van 
discursieve analyses. Concreet hield dat in dat ik een dag in de week gedurende drie jaar 
mijn werkplek bij plantwetenschappen gesitueerd was hetgeen me in staat stelde informeel 
plant experts te raadplegen. Daarnaast heb ik 25 etnografische interviews afgenomen, 
geobserveerd en aantekeningen gemaakt gedurende de opname van Phytophthora meetings 
en is het gebruik van concepten in het proefschrift gedeeltelijk geïnspireerd op 
antropologische inzichten.  
  Gebaseerd op mijn onderzoekservaringen beargumenteer ik in hoofdstuk 2 van het 
proefschrift dat fysieke en epistemologische toegang tot het onderzoeksveld niet 
   
140 
 
vanzelfsprekend is en dat de mate waarin de onderzoeker toegang verkrijgt tot het 
onderzoeksveld uitkomsten van discursieve analyses kunnen beïnvloeden. De implicatie 
hiervan is dat het goed zou zijn als meer onderzoekers die discursieve analyses verrichten 
verslag doen van hoe ze fysieke en epistemologische toegang tot het onderzoeksveld hebben 
verkregen en behouden.  
 
 
Resultaten Discursieve Analyses  
In hoofdstuk 3 en 4 is geanalyseerd met discursieve psychologie hoe plant experts praten 
over zogenaamde leken en gebruikers van nieuwe technologieën. De focus van de analyses 
ligt op de functies die dominante patronen in verwijzingen naar leken en gebruikers 
vervullen in spraak-in-interactie. Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op de interpretaties die innovatieve 
en interactieve (metaforische) framing van probleem-oplossing constructies uitloken. In de 
onderzochte probleem-oplossing constructies wordt Phytophthora als het probleem 
gepresenteerd en toepassingen van genomics als de oplossing.  
  In hoofdstuk 3 ligt de focus op hoe plantonderzoekers de relatie tussen wetenschap 
en samenleving discursief construeren. Wanneer plantonderzoekers praten over hoe ze de 
relatie tussen wetenschap en samenleving zien uiten ze consequent eerst hun tolerantie 
voor lekenargumenten om vervolgens deze lekenargumenten te contrasteren met 
wetenschappelijke argumenten. Plant experts neigen ertoe om lekenargumenten discursief 
ondergeschikt te maken aan wetenschappelijke argumenten zonder het beeld op te roepen 
dat ze geen weet hebben van of niet geven om lekenargumenten. Door expliciet discursief te 
tonen dat ze toegang hebben tot lekenkennis in het dagelijkse leven en beschikken over 
technologisch-wetenschappelijke kennis in het werkleven wekken plant experts de suggestie 
dat zij het beste in staat zijn om te beoordelen waar en wanneer lekenkennis relevant is en 
meegenomen dient te worden in technologieontwikkeling.  
  Hoofdstuk 4 focust op hoe en met welk resultaat plant experts praten over 
toekomstige gebruikers van technologie – boeren en plantveredelaars – in bijeenkomsten 
over Phytophthora onderzoek. Plant experts citeren dialogen tussen hen en gebruikers. Deze 
zogenoemde reported dialogues tonen aan dat plant experts toegang hebben tot 
gebruikersargumenten met betrekking tot technologie en dat argumenten van gebruikers 
voor een belangrijk deel niet compatibel zijn met wetenschappelijke inzichten. Het laatste 
bereiken plant experts door gevoelens van gebruikers af te zetten tegen de kennis van 
experts. Uiteindelijk stellen gequote dialogen plant experts in staat argumenten van 
gebruikers te parkeren.  
  Hoofdstuk 5 exploreert de innovatieve interactionele framing van kernconcepten in 
Phytophthora onderzoek. Met framings van het genomics concept scheiden plant experts 
genomics discursief af van publiek omstreden GM. De framing van genomics contrasteert 
met plant experts’ framing van de relatie tussen wetenschap en samenleving en met de 
framing van de relatie tussen wetenschap en gebruikers in hoofdstuk 3 en 4. Plant experts 
claimen met hun genomics framings dat ze niet verantwoordelijk zijn voor de 
maatschappelijke relevantie van nieuwe plant technologieën terwijl ze dit wel impliciet 
claimen met hun andere discursieve constructies. 
  Verder neigen plant experts ertoe Phytophthora te personificeren in interviews en 
publieksmeetings; personificatie is het toeschrijven van menselijke eigenschappen aan 
dieren, planten of objecten. De personificatie van Phytophthora stelt plant experts in staat 
aannemelijk te maken dat het nog steeds de moeite waard is om Phytophthora onderzoek te 
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financieren en dat plantonderzoekers het beste toegerust zijn om Phytophthora duurzaam te 
bestrijden. Ten slotte, projecteren plant experts met een visuele metafoor - een specifieke 
vorm van framing - dat genetische modificatie noodzakelijk is voor de duurzame bestrijding 
van Phytophthora.  
  Hoofdstuk 6 doet verslag van een exploratieve studie waarin gepoogd is plant experts 
te empoweren om zelf met een discursief psychologische bril naar gesprekken over 
Phytophthora onderzoek te kijken. Achterliggende gedachte bij deze deelstudie is dat als 
plant experts in staat zijn om naast inhoud naar interactie-effecten van hun voordrachten en 
interacties te kijken dit een positief effect kan hebben op hoe plant experts discursief 
omgaan met het brede publiek en gebruikers van technologieën omdat ze bewuster omgaan 
met de performatieve dimensie van taal. Twee workshops met in totaal 17 deelnemers zijn 
gehouden om dit te onderzoeken. Workshop deelnemers kregen één fragment uit hoofdstuk 
3, 4 en 5 voorgelegd om zelf te analyseren aan de hand van discursief psychologische 
principes. Plant experts bevestigden in hun eigen woorden de belangrijkste discursieve 
functies die in hoofdstuk 3, 4 en 5 aan de orde komen. Daarnaast leveren de workshops ook 
een aantal nieuwe inzichten op.  
 
De Discursieve Ander in Verschillende Interactieomgevingen 
De Ander centraal stellen in spraak-in-interactie stelt plant experts in staat verschillende 
participantendilemma’s te managen. De analyses in de verschillende hoofdstukken tonen 
aan dat het construeren van leken, gebruikers en Phytophthora als een Ander die een 
potentiële bedreiging vormt niet per se discursieve paden creëert die bijdragen aan nieuwe 
technologieën die minder gevoelig liggen of gebruiksvriendelijker zijn. Plant experts’ 
discursieve constructies van de relatie tussen wetenschap en samenleving, bijvoorbeeld, 
laten zien dat er verschillen zijn tussen visies van leken en experts op technologie (zonder al 
te diep in te gaan op de inhoud). De erkenning van verschil wordt echter niet primair ingezet 
om de relevantie van lekenargumenten voor technologieontwikkeling te beamen laat staan 
dat de erke nning van verschil ingezet wordt om de incorporatie van lekenargumenten in 
nieuwe technologieën te bevorderen.  
  In plaats daarvan zetten plantonderzoekers de verschillen tussen leken en experts 
aan om lekenargumenten als ondergeschikt aan wetenschappelijke inzichten neer te zetten. 
De erkenning van lekenargumenten in de privésfeer helpt plantonderzoekers om zichzelf te 
presenteren als knowledge hybrids die in een optimale positie verkeren om de relevantie van 
lekenargumenten voor technologieontwikkeling te beoordelen. Door dat te doen claimen ze 
impliciet de volledige verantwoordelijkheid voor de kwaliteit en relevantie van onderzoek 
gericht op de ontwikkeling van nieuwe technologieën. Bezwaren van gebruikers ondergaan 
een vergelijkbaar lot in expert meetings zij het met behulp van andersoortige discursieve 
middelen.  
  Kern van het probleem lijkt te zijn dat de niet-wetenschappelijke Ander behandeld 
wordt als een potentiële opponent. Phytophthora wordt bijvoorbeeld gepresenteerd als een 
slimme en onvoorspelbare tegenstander. En plant experts’ praat in wij-zij terminologie in 
hoofdstuk 4 suggereert een tegenstelling tussen gebruikers enerzijds en experts anderzijds. 
Het verwoorden van bezwaren en argumenten van verschillende groepen in duale termen is 
een manier om beslishiërarchieën te helpen creëren. Het spreken in duale termen lijkt 
echter niet bij te dragen aan een gelijkwaardige behandeling van publieks-, gebruikers en 
wetenschappelijke argumenten in technologieontwikkeling in en voor de samenleving. Men 
kan zich afvragen wat er zou gebeuren als het discursieve speelveld tussen experts en leken 
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gelijk getrokken zou worden. Wat zou er gebeuren als experts en leken het privilege en de 
verantwoordelijkheid zouden delen voor hoe rekening gehouden wordt met niet-
wetenschappelijke argumenten in technologieontwikkeling?  
  Het met enige regelmaat omkeren van dominante patronen in hoe experts en leken 
met elkaar communiceren zou de gelijkwaardige dialoog en de uitwisseling van ideeën en 
argumenten kunnen stimuleren. Traditioneel vertellen experts hoe het zit, leken luisteren en 
stellen vragen. Deze verdeling van interactionele arbeid bevestigt de relatief lage 
epistemologische status van leken in technologieontwikkeling in de plantwetenschappen. 
Het met enige regelmaat omgooien van dominante interactieve patronen zou kunnen 
bijdragen aan reflectie op bestaande praktijken en mogelijk een redistributie van 
verantwoordelijkheden in technologieontwikkeling helpen bewerkstelligen die bijdraagt aan 
technologieën die beter aansluiten bij de samenleving.  
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